Proof — Verse 1.39

यो यस्य स्वमिव ज्ञानं दर्शनं नातिशङ्कते ।
स्थितं प्रत्यक्षपक्षे तं कथमन्यो निवर्तयेत् ॥ ३९ ॥

When someone does not doubt a cognition — a seeing that is, as it were, his own possession — and it stands on the side of perception, how could another turn him back from it?

Endorsed axioms (each cite is verbatim commentary)

• {"kind": "relation", "name": "asrita", "from": "jnana", "to": "pratyaksa"}“The appeal to what stands pratyaksa-pakse, on perception's side, cuts in every direction”
• {"kind": "predication", "name": "atyanta-nirvikalpa", "of": "jnana"}“their cognition arrives with the self-evidence of perception, svam iva, like one's own property, and na atisankate, without residual doubt”
• {"kind": "relation", "name": "grahana-sthana", "from": "tarka", "to": "sanka"}“Argument gets its grip only where doubt has a foothold, and a cognition that presents itself perceptually offers none”
• {"kind": "identity", "a": "niscaya", "b": "jnana"}“their cognition arrives with the self-evidence of perception, svam iva, like one's own property, and na atisankate, without residual doubt”

Denials

• {"kind": "relation", "name": "nivartayet", "from": "tarka", "to": "jnana"}“katham anyah nivartayet, how could another dislodge it?”
• {"kind": "predication", "name": "sankamanvita", "of": "pratyaksa"}“a cognition that presents itself perceptually offers none”

Rejected readings (refuted by compiled theorems)

• “Rational argument has the power to overturn any cognition, whether it is grounded in perception or not.” — Contradicts the core epistemological claim: argument only has grip where doubt already exists. A perceptually-grounded cognition offers no foothold for argument to work.
• “Perceptual knowledge is itself subject to doubt, so argument can still be used to overturn perceptually-grounded cognitions.” — Denies the phenomenological fact the verse establishes: that a cognition standing on perception's side is presented without residual doubt. This misses the property atyanta-nirvikalpa essential to perceptual cognition.

Lean module

/- Verse 1.39 — generated from data/contracts/1.39.json. DO NOT EDIT.
   Axiom cites are verbatim commentary quotations, validated by
   tests/test_contracts.py. -/
import VakyaVallari.Adequacy

namespace VakyaVallari.Verses.V1_39

open VakyaVallari

def jnana : Entity := ⟨"jñāna", Sorta.cognition⟩
def pratyaksa : Entity := ⟨"pratyakṣa", Sorta.cognition⟩
def sanka : Entity := ⟨"śaṅka", Sorta.property⟩
def tarka : Entity := ⟨"tarka", Sorta.power⟩
def niscaya : Entity := ⟨"niśchaya", Sorta.cognition⟩

def contract : Contract :=
  { axioms := [ Claim.relation "asrita" (Node.ent jnana) (Node.ent pratyaksa)
    , Claim.predication "atyanta-nirvikalpa" jnana
    , Claim.relation "grahana-sthana" (Node.ent tarka) (Node.ent sanka)
    , Claim.identity niscaya jnana ]
  , denials := [ Claim.relation "nivartayet" (Node.ent tarka) (Node.ent jnana)
    , Claim.predication "sankamanvita" pratyaksa ]
  , reported := [] }

def accepted : Reading :=
  { claims := [ Claim.relation "asrita" (Node.ent jnana) (Node.ent pratyaksa)
    , Claim.predication "atyanta-nirvikalpa" jnana
    , Claim.identity niscaya jnana ] }

theorem accepted_adequate : contract.Adequate accepted := by decide

namespace Counterexamples

/- 'Rational argument has the power to overturn any cognition, whether it is grounded in perception or not.'
   Why rejected: Contradicts the core epistemological claim: argument only has grip where doubt already exists. A perceptually-grounded cognition offers no foothold for argument to work. -/
def argument_power_universality : Reading :=
  { claims := [ Claim.relation "nivartayet" (Node.ent tarka) (Node.ent jnana) ] }
theorem argument_power_universality_inadequate : ¬ contract.Adequate argument_power_universality := by decide
#guard contract.contradicts argument_power_universality = true

/- 'Perceptual knowledge is itself subject to doubt, so argument can still be used to overturn perceptually-grounded cognitions.'
   Why rejected: Denies the phenomenological fact the verse establishes: that a cognition standing on perception's side is presented without residual doubt. This misses the property atyanta-nirvikalpa essential to perceptual cognition. -/
def pratyaksa_dubitable : Entity := ⟨"pratyakṣa", Sorta.property⟩
def perception_as_doubt_source : Reading :=
  { claims := [ Claim.predication "sankamanvita" pratyaksa_dubitable ] }
theorem perception_as_doubt_source_inadequate : ¬ contract.Adequate perception_as_doubt_source := by decide
#guard contract.licenses perception_as_doubt_source = false
theorem perception_as_doubt_source_sort_error : pratyaksa_dubitable ≠ pratyaksa := by decide

end Counterexamples

end VakyaVallari.Verses.V1_39