Book 3 - Pada-kāṇḍa (10): Puruṣa-samuddeśa (On Person)

3.10.1 unformalized

प्रत्यक्ता परभावश्चाप्युपाधी कर्तृकर्मनोः ।
तयोः श्रुतिविशेषेण वाचकौ मध्यमोत्तमौ ॥ १ ॥

pratyaktā parabhāvaścāpyupādhī kartṛkarmanoḥ |
tayoḥ śrutiviśeṣeṇa vācakau madhyamottamau || 1 ||

Inwardness, and also otherness, are the adjuncts of agent and object; the middle and the highest persons are the expressors of those two, by a particularity of the hearing.

The definition of grammatical person, and it is built from two adjuncts. Pratyakta: *inwardness* — the turning-inward, the being-here-as-oneself; para-bhavah ca api: and also *otherness*. Upadhi kartr-karmanoh: these two are the *adjuncts* of *agent and object* — upadhi: the limiting condition (3.2.2's asatya-upadhi; 3.9.36's kriya-upadhih, time conditioned by action). So person is not a property of the participants but a condition laid on them: the agent taken inwardly is 'I', taken as other is 'he'. Tayoh sruti-visesena vacakau madhyama-uttamau: the *middle* and the *highest* persons are the *expressors* of those two, by a *particularity of the hearing* — the verbal endings differ, and that difference is the whole marking. The Sanskrit order is worth noting: uttama is the first person (the 'highest'), madhyama the second. So the samuddesa opens by making person an adjunct-pair on the karakas — and the next verse will say what the adjuncts are adjuncts *of*.

3.10.2 unformalized

सदसद्वापि चैतन्यमेताभ्यामवगम्यते ।
चैतन्यभागे प्रथमः पुरुषो न तु वर्तते ॥ २ ॥

sadasadvāpi caitanyametābhyāmavagamyate |
caitanyabhāge prathamaḥ puruṣo na tu vartate || 2 ||

Consciousness, whether existent or non-existent, is understood by these two; but the first person does not operate in the portion that is consciousness.

The samuddesa's central and strangest claim. Sad asad vapi caitanyam etabhyam avagamyate: *consciousness*, *whether existent or non-existent*, is *understood* by these two — the first and second persons carry caitanyam: to say 'I' or 'you' is to bring consciousness into the sentence, and the sentence works whether or not the consciousness is there (one addresses the dead, the dreamt, the absent). Caitanya-bhage prathamah puruso na tu vartate: but the *first person* — prathama, which in Sanskrit's ordering is the *third* person, the 'he' form — does *not operate* in the *portion that is consciousness*. So 'he goes' says nothing about consciousness; 'I go' and 'you go' do. The third person is the tenseless, consciousness-free default, and the other two are marked for awareness. This is a genuine observation about what the person-system encodes, and it is not the obvious one: person is usually taken to mark participant-role, and here it marks *sentience*.

3.10.3 unformalized

बुधिजानातिचितिभिः प्रथमे पुरुषे सति ।
सम्ज्ञानार्थैर्न चैतन्यस्योपयोगः प्रकाश्यते ॥ ३ ॥

budhijānāticitibhiḥ prathame puruṣe sati |
samjñānārthairna caitanyasyopayogaḥ prakāśyate || 3 ||

With 'budh', 'jna', 'cit' — the first person being present, and their meanings being cognition — the employment of consciousness is not made manifest.

The claim of 3.10.2 tested on the consciousness-verbs themselves. Budhi-janati-citibhih: with *'budh'* (to awaken, know), *'jna'* (to know), *'cit'* (to be aware) — verbs whose very meaning is cognition. Prathame puruse sati: the *first person* — the third-person form — being present: 'he knows', 'he is aware'. Samjnanarthaih na caitanyasya upayogah prakasyate: their meanings being *cognition*, the *employment of consciousness* is *not made manifest*. So even 'he knows' does not bring consciousness into the sentence as 'I know' does: the verb's meaning is cognition and the *person* is unmarked for it. The test is decisive and well chosen — if any third-person form were going to encode awareness it would be these — and the result confirms 3.10.2: what the first and second persons carry is not supplied by lexical meaning. It is carried by the ending.

3.10.4 unformalized

संबोधनार्थः सर्वत्र मध्यमे कैश्चिदिष्यते ।
तथा संबोधने सर्वां प्रथमां युष्मदो विदुः ॥ ४ ॥

saṃbodhanārthaḥ sarvatra madhyame kaiścidiṣyate |
tathā saṃbodhane sarvāṃ prathamāṃ yuṣmado viduḥ || 4 ||

By some, the meaning of address is accepted everywhere in the middle person; and likewise, in address, they know every first-case form of 'yusmad'.

The second person analysed as address. Sambodhana-arthah sarvatra madhyame kaiscid isyate: by *some*, the *meaning of address* is accepted *everywhere* in the *middle person* — every 'you' is a vocative in disguise: to use the second person is to call. Tatha sambodhane sarvam prathamam yusmado viduh: and *likewise*, in *address*, they know *every* first-case form of *'yusmad'* — every nominative 'tvam' is a calling. So the second person is the vocative's home, and the vocative (3.7.163's mere facing-toward, siddhasya abhimukhi-bhava-matram) is what the middle person means. This connects the person-system to the karaka-system's outlier: the vocative was not a karaka at all but the doorway into the sentence (3.7.163), and the second person is that doorway grammaticalized into the verb.

3.10.5 unformalized

संबोधनं न लोकेऽस्ति विधातव्येन वस्तुना ।
स्वाहेन्द्रशत्रुर्वर्धस्व यथा राजा भवेति च ॥ ५ ॥

saṃbodhanaṃ na loke'sti vidhātavyena vastunā |
svāhendraśatrurvardhasva yathā rājā bhaveti ca || 5 ||

In the world there is no address by means of a thing that is to be brought about — as 'Svaha! Grow, O slayer of Indra', and 'Be a king'.

A limit on 3.10.4's identification, and its example is famous. Sambodhanam na loke 'sti vidhatavyena vastuna: in the *world* there is *no address* by means of a *thing that is to be brought about* — one cannot call something by what it is not yet. And the examples: svaha indra-satrur vardhasva — '*Svaha!* *Grow*, O *slayer of Indra*': the mantra of Tvastr's sacrifice, whose mis-accentuation famously produced a son slain *by* Indra rather than Indra's slayer — the tradition's standing case of a rite destroyed by grammar. Yatha raja bhava iti ca: and '*Be a king*' — one addresses a man and tells him to become a king; one does not address him *as* king. So the address must fix on what is, and what is to be brought about cannot do the fixing (3.7.163's siddhasya: the vocative's target is what is *accomplished*). The Indra-satru example is chosen with some wit: it is the case where addressing something as what it was not yet went catastrophically wrong.

3.10.6-7 unformalized

युष्मदर्थस्य सिद्धत्वान्नियता चाद्युदात्तता ।
युष्मदः प्रथमान्तस्य परश्चेन्न पदादसौ ॥ ६ ॥
गुणप्रधानताभेदः पुरुशादिविपर्ययः ।
निर्देशश्चान्यथा शास्त्रे नित्यत्वान्न विरुध्यते ॥ ७ ॥

yuṣmadarthasya siddhatvānniyatā cādyudāttatā |
yuṣmadaḥ prathamāntasya paraścenna padādasau || 6 ||
guṇapradhānatābhedaḥ puruśādiviparyayaḥ |
nirdeśaścānyathā śāstre nityatvānna virudhyate || 7 ||

(6) From the accomplished-ness of 'yusmad's meaning, and the fixed initial-acute accent — of 'yusmad' ending in the first case, if it is subsequent, it is not from a word. (7) The difference of subordinate and principal, the inversion of person and the rest, and a designation otherwise in the science — from eternality, there is no contradiction.

Two technical notes, and the second is the samuddesa's methodological one. (6): yusmad-arthasya siddhatvat — from the *accomplished-ness* of 'yusmad's meaning (3.10.5's siddhasya: the addressed is what stands); niyata ca ady-udattata — and the *fixed initial-acute accent*: 'yusmad' forms have their own accentual rule. Yusmadah prathamantasya paras cen na padad asau: of 'yusmad' ending in the *first case*, *if it is subsequent*, it is *not from a word* — a technical condition on the accent-rule's application. (7) then generalizes: guna-pradhanata-bhedah puruso-adi-viparyayah — the *difference of subordinate and principal*, the *inversion of person* and the rest; nirdesah ca anyatha sastre: and a *designation otherwise* in the *science*. Nityatvat na virudhyate: *from eternality*, there is *no contradiction*. So the grammar's inversions — where person-marking runs contrary to the situation — do not contradict, because the language is eternal and its postings are not answerable to the moment (3.7.103's niyamah sabde na tu vastuni).

3.10.8-9 unformalized

यथानिर्देशमर्थाः स्युर्येसां शास्त्रं विधायकम् ।
किं चित् सामान्यमाश्रित्य स्थिते तु प्रतिपादनम् ॥ ८ ॥
योऽश्वे यः पीठ इत्यत्र भूतयोरश्वपीठयोः ।
यथोपलक्षणार्थत्वं तथार्थेष्वनुशासनम् ॥ ९ ॥

yathānirdeśamarthāḥ syuryesāṃ śāstraṃ vidhāyakam |
kiṃ cit sāmānyamāśritya sthite tu pratipādanam || 8 ||
yo'śve yaḥ pīṭha ityatra bhūtayoraśvapīṭhayoḥ |
yathopalakṣaṇārthatvaṃ tathārtheṣvanuśāsanam || 9 ||

(8) The meanings would be as the designation has it, for those of whom the science is the ordainer; but where it stands, having resorted to some general, the conveying is otherwise. (9) As in 'he who is on a horse', 'he who is on a seat' — the horse and the seat being existent — there is the purpose of indication: so is the teaching with respect to meanings.

The samuddesa closes with a methodological simile of great reach. (8): yatha-nirdesam arthah syuh yesam sastram vidhayakam — the *meanings* would be *as the designation has it*, for those of whom the *science is the ordainer*: if the sastra ordained meanings, meanings would be whatever it said. Kimcit samanyam asritya sthite tu pratipadanam: but where it *stands*, having *resorted to some general*, the *conveying* is otherwise — the science rests on generals it did not make, and its conveying follows them. (9) gives the simile: yo 'sve yah pitha iti atra — as in '*he who is on a horse*', '*he who is on a seat*' — bhutayoh asva-pithayoh, the horse and the seat *being existent*: one identifies a man by what he sits on, and the horse is not thereby part of him. Yatha upalaksana-arthatvam tatha arthesu anusasanam: as there is the *purpose of indication*, so is the *teaching* with respect to *meanings*. Upalaksana: indication, marking-out without describing (3.3.51's saptaparna; 3.4.3's dravya defined by pronominal referability). So the grammar's terms *indicate* their meanings as 'the man on the horse' indicates a man — pointing, not constituting. The Purusa-samuddesa ends by saying what the whole Padakanda has said: the science marks, and does not make.