Book 3 - Pada-kāṇḍa (9): Kāla-samuddeśa (On Time)

3.9.1 unformalized

व्यापारव्यतिरेकेण कालमेके प्रचक्षते ।
नित्यमेकं विभु द्रव्यं परिमाणं क्रियावताम् ॥ १ ॥

vyāpāravyatirekeṇa kālameke pracakṣate |
nityamekaṃ vibhu dravyaṃ parimāṇaṃ kriyāvatām || 1 ||

Some declare time apart from operation: an eternal, one, all-pervading substance — the measure of things possessing action.

The rival account first, and it is the Vaisesika's. Vyapara-vyatirekena kalam eke pracaksate: *some* declare *time* *apart from operation* — time as a thing in its own right, not the operating of anything (against 3.8.36's account of action as an operation resorting to nothing, and against everything the Kriya-samuddesa built). Nityam ekam vibhu dravyam: an *eternal*, *one*, *all-pervading* *substance* — the Vaisesika's four predicates for kala exactly: it is a dravya, one of the nine, eternal and omnipresent. Parimanam kriyavatam: the *measure* of things *possessing action* — its office is to measure processes. So time is a container-substance in which actions occur and by which they are measured. Bhartrhari will not deny the office; he will deny the substance, and by 3.9.12 time will be nothing but the operating it was supposed to measure.

3.9.2 unformalized

दिष्टिप्रस्थसुवर्णादि मूर्तिभेदाय कल्पते ।
क्रियाभेदाय कालस्तु संख्या सर्वस्य भेदिका ॥ २ ॥

diṣṭiprasthasuvarṇādi mūrtibhedāya kalpate |
kriyābhedāya kālastu saṃkhyā sarvasya bhedikā || 2 ||

The 'disti', the 'prastha', the 'suvarna' and the rest serve for the difference of corporeal things; but time serves for the difference of actions — and number differentiates everything.

The three measures sorted by domain. Disti-prastha-suvarnadi murti-bhedaya kalpate: the *disti* (a span), the *prastha* (a dry measure), the *suvarna* (a weight) and the rest serve for the *difference of corporeal things* — length, volume, weight: the measures of bodies. Kriya-bhedaya kalah tu: but *time* serves for the *difference of actions* — it is the measure whose domain is processes (3.9.1's parimanam kriyavatam). Samkhya sarvasya bhedika: and *number* *differentiates everything* — number crosses all domains, counting bodies and actions alike (3.1.28's samkhya-jati resting on what rests on the individual). So there are three differentiators: spatial measures for bodies, time for actions, number for both. The taxonomy is the rival's and it is fair — and its interest is that time is placed as a *measure*, which is what 3.9.12 will dismantle: a measure is not a thing, it is an operation.

3.9.3 unformalized

उत्पतौ च स्थितौ चैव विनाशे चापि तद्वताम् ।
निमित्तं कालमेवाहुर्विभक्तेनात्मना स्थितम् ॥ ३ ॥

utpatau ca sthitau caiva vināśe cāpi tadvatām |
nimittaṃ kālamevāhurvibhaktenātmanā sthitam || 3 ||

In the arising, in the standing, and in the destruction of things possessing those — they call time alone the occasioning ground, standing with a divided self.

Time's causal office on the rival account. Utpattau ca sthitau ca eva vinase ca api tadvatam: in the *arising*, the *standing*, and the *destruction* of things — the three great moments (and the six vikaras' reduction to two at 3.8.26-27, here as three). Nimittam kalam eva ahuh: they call *time alone* the *occasioning ground* — not a mere measure now but a *cause*: things arise, persist and perish *because of* time. Vibhaktena atmana sthitam: standing with a *divided self* — time is one (3.9.1) and stands divided, since it must be at each moment severally to do this work. So the Vaisesika's time is a substance that is one and divided, a measure and a cause. The tensions are already visible, and Bhartrhari lets them accumulate before he touches them. Vibhakta atma: a divided self — 3.7.96's dvaidha atma, the splitting that every such posit requires.

3.9.4 unformalized

तमस्य लोकयन्त्रस्य सूत्रधारं प्रचक्षते ।
प्रतिबन्धाभ्यनुज्ञाभ्यां तेन विश्वं विभज्यते ॥ ४ ॥

tamasya lokayantrasya sūtradhāraṃ pracakṣate |
pratibandhābhyanujñābhyāṃ tena viśvaṃ vibhajyate || 4 ||

They declare it the stage-manager of this world-machine; by it the universe is divided, through obstruction and permission.

The samuddesa's most famous image, and it is one of the great images of Indian philosophy. Tam asya loka-yantrasya sutradharam pracaksate: they declare *it* the *sutradhara* of this *world-machine* — sutradhara: literally the thread-holder, the puppeteer; in the theatre, the stage-manager who directs the play. Loka-yantra: the world as a *machine*, a contrivance of moving parts. And the mechanism: pratibandha-abhyanujnabhyam tena visvam vibhajyate — by it the *universe is divided*, through *obstruction* and *permission*. Time holds things back and lets them go, and that holding-and-releasing is what makes a world of ordered succession rather than a simultaneous heap. Two operations only: no, and now. The image is being reported (pracaksate, they declare) and Bhartrhari will adopt it entirely — it survives the demolition of time-as-substance, because a puppeteer is not a container.

3.9.5 unformalized

यदि न प्रतिबध्नीयात् प्रतिन्बधं च नोत्सृजेत् ।
अवस्था व्यतिकीर्येरन् पौर्वांपर्यविनाकृताः ॥ ५ ॥

yadi na pratibadhnīyāt pratinbadhaṃ ca notsṛjet |
avasthā vyatikīryeran paurvāṃparyavinākṛtāḥ || 5 ||

If it did not obstruct, and did not release the obstruction — the states, deprived of before-and-after, would be jumbled together.

The argument for 3.9.4's two operations, and it is a good one. Yadi na pratibadhniyat: *if* it did *not obstruct* — if nothing held things back, everything possible would happen at once. Pratibandham ca na utsrjet: and did *not release* the obstruction — if nothing let go, nothing would ever happen. Avastha vyatikiryeran paurva-aparya-vinakrtah: the *states* would be *jumbled together*, *deprived of before-and-after*. Vyatikirna: intermixed, confused, run together (3.7.144's cloud, where contradictory properties cannot be intended at once). So the world's seriality requires exactly these two: a holding that prevents simultaneity and a releasing that permits succession. The argument is transcendental in form — without the two operations, no ordered world — and it establishes the *office* of time without establishing a substance to fill it. Which is precisely the opening Bhartrhari needs.

3.9.6 unformalized

तस्यात्मा बहुधा भिन्नो भेदैर्धर्मान्तराश्रयैः ।
न हि भिन्नमभिन्नं वा वस्तु किञ्चन विद्यते ॥ ६ ॥

tasyātmā bahudhā bhinno bhedairdharmāntarāśrayaiḥ |
na hi bhinnamabhinnaṃ vā vastu kiñcana vidyate || 6 ||

Its self is manifoldly divided, by differences resting on other properties; for no thing whatever exists as divided or as undivided.

The turn against the substance-account begins. Tasya atma bahudha bhinno bhedaih dharmantara-asrayaih: *its self* is *manifoldly divided*, by *differences resting on other properties* — time's divisions come from elsewhere, from the properties of what it times (3.1.15's places constructed by the properties of the conjoined; 3.6.12's mountain's sides from the sun). And the general principle: na hi bhinnam abhinnam va vastu kimcana vidyate — for *no thing whatever* exists as *divided* or as *undivided*. This is 3.1.20-21 verbatim (neither oneness nor manifoldness is found in the self-realities of things uncommingled; difference and non-difference are adjuncts imposed by another). So the Vaisesika's time cannot be *one* (3.9.1's ekam) and cannot be divided (3.9.3's vibhaktena atmana), because nothing is either. The rival's first predicate has gone.

3.9.7 unformalized

नैको नाप्यनेकोऽस्ति न शुक्लो नापि चासितः ।
द्रव्यात्मा स तु संसर्गादेवंरूपः प्रकाशते ॥ ७ ॥

naiko nāpyaneko'sti na śuklo nāpi cāsitaḥ |
dravyātmā sa tu saṃsargādevaṃrūpaḥ prakāśate || 7 ||

It is neither one nor many; it is neither white nor black; but that substance-self, from commingling, shines forth as of such a form.

The negations, and they are the Padakanda's standing four. Na ekah na api anekah asti: it is *neither one nor many* (3.1.21's na ekatvam na api nanatvam). Na suklo na api ca asitah: *neither white nor black* — no quality either. Dravya-atma sa tu samsargat evam-rupah prakasate: but that *substance-self*, *from commingling*, *shines forth* as of *such a form*. So time, taken in itself, bears no predicate; taken in commingling, it shows as whatever it shows as. This is 3.2.12-13's paired tetralemmas (neither is nor is not; is and is not) applied to kala — and it is applied to *dravya-atma*, the substance-self, which is 3.2.11's identification (the real standing when the configurations are withdrawn *is* sabda-tattva). So time's substance-hood is not denied; it is granted and emptied: time is dravya as everything is dravya, and dravya bears no predicates.

3.9.8 unformalized

संसर्गिणां तु ये भेदा विशेषास्तस्य ते मताः ।
स भिन्नस्तैर्व्यवस्थानां कालो भेदाय कल्पते ॥ ८ ॥

saṃsargiṇāṃ tu ye bhedā viśeṣāstasya te matāḥ |
sa bhinnastairvyavasthānāṃ kālo bhedāya kalpate || 8 ||

The differences of the things commingled with it are held to be its particulars; divided by those, time serves for the difference of the settled arrangements.

Where time's divisions actually come from. Samsarginam tu ye bhedah visesah tasya te matah: the *differences of the things commingled* with it are held to be *its particulars* — time's minutes and seasons are the differences of what happens in it, credited to it. Sa bhinnah taih vyavasthanam kalo bhedaya kalpate: *divided by those*, *time* serves for the *difference of the settled arrangements*. So time is divided by the events, and then divides them — it borrows its divisions from what it differentiates and hands them back. The circle is exact and it is not vicious on Bhartrhari's account: it is what a sakti does (3.6.6's dig-vyavastha na vidyate: places are arranged by direction, and direction is not arranged; the capacities are brought about by assistance). Time orders everything and is itself ordered by what it orders — which is 3.6.20's finding (direction, differentiated by another's difference, serves for differentiation alone).

3.9.9 unformalized

विशिष्टकालसंबन्धाद् वृत्तिलाभः प्रकल्पते ।
शक्तीनां संप्रयोगस्य हेतुत्वे नावतिष्ठते ॥ ९ ॥

viśiṣṭakālasaṃbandhād vṛttilābhaḥ prakalpate |
śaktīnāṃ saṃprayogasya hetutve nāvatiṣṭhate || 9 ||

From connection with a particular time, the obtaining of operation is constructed; it does not stand as the cause in the conjunction of the capacities.

Time's role in the operation of capacities. Visista-kala-sambandhad vrtti-labhah prakalpyate: from connection with a *particular time*, the *obtaining of operation* is *constructed* — a capacity operates *when* its time comes; the seed sprouts in spring (3.7.28's sahaja sakti standing always, its assisting only at the action's time). Saktinam samprayogasya hetutve na avatisthate: it does *not stand as the cause* in the *conjunction of the capacities*. So time does not *make* the capacities meet; it permits their meeting to operate. The distinction is fine and it is 3.9.4's: time obstructs and releases; it does not push. The seed has its power and the soil has its; time does not supply either, and without time's release neither operates. Prakalpyate — is constructed: even the obtaining of operation is a construal.

3.9.10 unformalized

जन्माभिव्यक्तिनियमाः प्रयोगोपनिबन्धनाः ।
नित्याधीनास्थिति त्वाच्च स्थितिर्नियमपूर्विका ॥ १० ॥

janmābhivyaktiniyamāḥ prayogopanibandhanāḥ |
nityādhīnāsthiti tvācca sthitirniyamapūrvikā || 10 ||

The restrictions of birth and of manifestation are grounded in employment; and from the standing being dependent on the eternal, the standing is preceded by restriction.

Two sources of temporal order. Janma-abhivyakti-niyamah prayoga-upanibandhanah: the *restrictions* of *birth* and of *manifestation* are *grounded in employment* — what arises when is fixed by prayoga, the deployment (3.7.92's viniyoga; 2.258's mantras obtaining difference by their application). Nitya-adhinasthititvat ca sthitir niyama-purvika: and from the *standing* being *dependent on the eternal*, the *standing* is *preceded by restriction*. So persistence too is restriction-governed: a thing stands because it is held (3.9.4's pratibandha), and its standing depends on the eternal — on time, which is the holding. Sthitir niyama-purvika: standing is preceded by restriction. Nothing persists by inertia; everything persists by being held, and the holding is time's obstruction (3.9.5's argument: without obstruction, no order).

3.9.11 unformalized

स्थितस्यानुग्रहस्तैर्धर्मैः संसर्गिंभिस्ततः ।
प्रतिबन्धस्तिरोभावः प्रहाणमिति चात्मनः ॥ ११ ॥

sthitasyānugrahastairdharmaiḥ saṃsargiṃbhistataḥ |
pratibandhastirobhāvaḥ prahāṇamiti cātmanaḥ || 11 ||

Then, of what stands, there is favouring by those commingling properties; and obstruction, disappearance, abandonment — these of its self.

The four things that happen to what stands. Sthitasya anugrahah taih dharmaih samsargibhih tatah: of *what stands*, there is *favouring* by those *commingling* properties — a standing thing is assisted by what it is with (3.3.5's upakara; 3.7.12's whatever assists is the means). And then three privations: pratibandhah — *obstruction* (held back); tirobhavah — *disappearance* (hidden); prahanam — *abandonment* (let go). Iti ca atmanah: these *of its self*. So a thing's career is: standing, favoured, obstructed, hidden, abandoned — and every one of the five is a relation to what it is commingled with or to the time that holds it. Nothing in the list is the thing's own doing. This is the six vikaras (1.3, 3.1.36) redistributed as time's operations on a persisting thing, and it prepares the identification of 3.9.12.

3.9.12 unformalized

प्रत्यवस्थं तु कालस्य व्यापारोऽत्र व्यवस्थितः ।
काल एव हि विश्वात्मा व्यापार इति कथ्यते ॥ १२ ॥

pratyavasthaṃ tu kālasya vyāpāro'tra vyavasthitaḥ |
kāla eva hi viśvātmā vyāpāra iti kathyate || 12 ||

But at each state, time's operation stands settled here; for time alone, whose self is the universe, is spoken of as 'operation'.

The samuddesa's central identification, and it overturns 3.9.1 entirely. Praty-avastham tu kalasya vyaparo 'tra vyavasthitah: at *each state*, *time's operation* stands settled *here* — every one of 3.9.11's five moments is time operating. And then: kala eva hi visva-atma vyapara iti kathyate — for *time alone*, *whose self is the universe*, is *spoken of as 'operation'*. Time *is* operation. The rival opened by declaring time vyapara-vyatirekena, *apart from operation* (3.9.1), and the samuddesa answers: kala eva vyaparah — time is nothing else. What we call an operation is time operating; what we call time is the operating. And visva-atma: whose self is the universe (3.7.41's sky, earth, wind, sun as portions of the inner-organ reality standing outside). So time is not a container of processes nor a measure of them; it is the processing, and it is everything. The Kriya-samuddesa's action (3.8.36's operation resorting to nothing) and this samuddesa's time are the same doctrine.

3.9.13 unformalized

मूर्तीनां तेन भिन्नानामाचयापचयाः पृथक् ।
लक्ष्यन्ते परिणामेन सर्वासां भेदयोगिना ॥ १३ ॥

mūrtīnāṃ tena bhinnānāmācayāpacayāḥ pṛthak |
lakṣyante pariṇāmena sarvāsāṃ bhedayoginā || 13 ||

By it, the accumulations and diminutions of corporeal things, which are divided, are severally marked out — through transformation, which is joined with difference for all of them.

Time's work on bodies. Murtinam tena bhinnanam: of *corporeal things*, *divided* by it — bodies, differentiated by time (3.9.8's divisions borrowed and handed back). Acaya-apacayah prthak laksyante: their *accumulations and diminutions* are *severally marked out* — growth and decay, the two middle vikaras (vardhate, apaksiyate). Parinamena sarvasam bheda-yogina: through *transformation*, which is *joined with difference* for *all* of them. So time marks every body's waxing and waning, and the marking is parinama — real transformation, the Samkhya's word (3.2.15's prakrti-vikara relation, there accepted as simile and its metaphysics declined). The verse grants the bodies their real change and locates the marking of it in time — which on 3.9.12's identification means: the changing *is* time. Nothing changes *in* time; the changing is what time is.

3.9.14 unformalized

जलयन्त्रभ्रमावेशसदृशीभिः प्रवृत्तिभिः ।
स कलाः कलयन् सर्वाः कालाख्यां लभते विभुः ॥ १४ ॥

jalayantrabhramāveśasadṛśībhiḥ pravṛttibhiḥ |
sa kalāḥ kalayan sarvāḥ kālākhyāṃ labhate vibhuḥ || 14 ||

By operations resembling the whirling-motion of a water-machine, that all-pervading one, reckoning all the moments, obtains the name 'time'.

The samuddesa's second great image, and its etymology is the doctrine. Jala-yantra-bhrama-avesa-sadrsibhih pravrttibhih: by *operations* resembling the *whirling-motion* of a *water-machine* — the araghatta, the Persian wheel with its chain of buckets: turning endlessly, each bucket rising full and descending empty, the whole driven by the water it lifts. Sa kalah kalayan sarvah kala-akhyam labhate vibhuh: that *all-pervading one*, *reckoning* all the *moments*, obtains the *name 'time'*. Kalayan — reckoning, counting, impelling: the etymology derives kala from kal, and the derivation is exact for once (against 2.170-175's general scepticism about etymologies): time is *what reckons*. So time's name says what 3.9.12 said: it is not a thing that gets counted but the counting. And the water-wheel is chosen because it is a machine whose motion is its whole reality — stop it and there is no wheel-ness left over.

3.9.15 unformalized

प्रतिबद्धाश्च यास्तेन चित्रा विश्वस्य वृत्तयः ।
ताः स एवानुजानाति यथा तन्तुः शकुन्तिकाः ॥ १५ ॥

pratibaddhāśca yāstena citrā viśvasya vṛttayaḥ |
tāḥ sa evānujānāti yathā tantuḥ śakuntikāḥ || 15 ||

And those variegated operations of the universe which are held back by it — those same it permits, as a string does the birds.

The sutradhara-image (3.9.4) refined, and the refinement is beautiful. Pratibaddhah ca yah tena citrah visvasya vrttayah: the *variegated operations* of the *universe* which are *held back* by it — everything possible, restrained. Tah sa eva anujanati: *those same* it *permits*. Yatha tantuh sakuntikah: as a *string* does the *birds* — the fowler's tethered birds, each on its string: held from flying free, released to the length the string allows. The image is more precise than the puppeteer's: the birds have their own power of flight (3.7.124's all proceeding for their own becoming), and the string neither gives it nor takes it — it only permits so much and no more. So time does not move things; it lets them move, to the extent it lets them. Pratibandha and anujna (3.9.4's two operations), and the bird supplies its own wings.

3.9.16-17 unformalized

विशिष्टकालसंबन्धाल्लब्धपाकासु शक्तिषु ।
क्रियाभिव्यज्यते नित्या प्रयोगाख्येन कर्मणा ॥ १६ ॥
जातिप्रयुक्ता तस्यां तु फलव्यक्तिः प्रतीयते ।
कुतोऽप्यद्भुतया वृत्त्या शक्तिभिः सा नियम्यते ॥ १७ ॥

viśiṣṭakālasaṃbandhāllabdhapākāsu śaktiṣu |
kriyābhivyajyate nityā prayogākhyena karmaṇā || 16 ||
jātiprayuktā tasyāṃ tu phalavyaktiḥ pratīyate |
kuto'pyadbhutayā vṛttyā śaktibhiḥ sā niyamyate || 17 ||

(16) From connection with a particular time, when the capacities have obtained ripeness, the eternal action is manifested by the act called employment. (17) But in that, the manifestation of the fruit is understood as impelled by the universal; by some wonderful operation, it is restricted by the capacities.

The mechanism of ripening. (16): visista-kala-sambandhat labdha-pakasu saktisu — from connection with a *particular time*, the *capacities* having *obtained ripeness*: paka, ripening — the word 1.84 used for the seed-traces maturing into comprehension, and 2.148 for the wine's power arising by fermentation. Kriya abhivyajyate nitya prayoga-akhyena karmana: the *eternal action* is *manifested* by the act called *employment* — the action is eternal and its manifesting is timed (3.8.20's universal-theory, which held action asadhya and apprehended as though sadhya). (17): jati-prayukta tasyam tu phala-vyaktih pratiyate — the *manifestation of the fruit* is understood as *impelled by the universal* (3.1.25's jati as prayojika of the causes). Kuto 'pi adbhutaya vrttya saktibhih sa niyamyate: by some *wonderful* operation, it is *restricted* by the capacities. Adbhuta — wonderful: the word 1.142 gave the supreme station of speech and 3.3.81 gave the shining-forth at the footless station. Where the mechanism gives out, the samuddesa says so.

3.9.18 unformalized

ततस्तु समवायाख्या शक्तिर्भेदस्य बाधिका ।
एकत्वमिव ता व्यक्तीरापादयति कारणैः ॥ १८ ॥

tatastu samavāyākhyā śaktirbhedasya bādhikā |
ekatvamiva tā vyaktīrāpādayati kāraṇaiḥ || 18 ||

But thereafter, the capacity called inherence, which annuls difference, brings those individuals, by their causes, to something like oneness.

Inherence recast as a temporal power. Tatah tu samavaya-akhya saktir bhedasya badhika: the *capacity called inherence*, which *annuls difference* — samavaya, the Vaisesika's intimate relation (3.3.13's machinery), here not a category but a *sakti*, and one whose office is to annul difference. Ekatvam iva ta vyaktir apadayati karanaih: it *brings* those *individuals*, *by their causes*, to *something like oneness*. Ekatvam iva: something *like* oneness — the iva marks it, as always. So inherence is the power by which a manifold of causes yields one thing: the threads become a cloth, the moments become a life. And it is a *capacity*, working in time (3.3.10's samavaya transcending difference and non-difference and standing in quite another way). What the Vaisesika made a static bond, the samuddesa makes a temporal operation of unification.

3.9.19 unformalized

अथास्मान्नियमादूर्ध्वं जातयो याः प्रयोजिकाः ।
ताः सर्वा व्यक्तिमायान्ति स्वच्छे छाया इवाम्भसि ॥ १९ ॥

athāsmānniyamādūrdhvaṃ jātayo yāḥ prayojikāḥ |
tāḥ sarvā vyaktimāyānti svacche chāyā ivāmbhasi || 19 ||

Then, after this restriction, those universals which are the occasioners — all of them come to manifestation, like shadows in clear water.

The universals' arrival, with an image of great delicacy. Athasmat niyamad urdhvam: *after this restriction* — once time's holding has released (3.9.4's pratibandha lifted). Jatayo yah prayojikah: those *universals* which are the *occasioners* (3.1.25's jati deploying the causes for its own manifestation). Tah sarvah vyaktim ayanti: *all* of them *come to manifestation*. Svacche chaya iva ambhasi: like *shadows in clear water* — chaya in svaccha ambhas: reflections appearing on still water, arriving all at once, present without having travelled, and vanishing if the water stirs. So the universals manifest as reflections do: not by moving into place but by the medium's becoming fit. And the medium's fitness is time's releasing. The image completes 3.9.15's birds: there, held things let go; here, what fills the space the moment it is permitted.

3.9.20 unformalized

कारणानुविधायित्वादथ कारणपूर्वकाः ।
गुणास्तत्रोपलभ्यन्ते स्वजातिव्यक्तिहेतवः ॥ २० ॥

kāraṇānuvidhāyitvādatha kāraṇapūrvakāḥ |
guṇāstatropalabhyante svajātivyaktihetavaḥ || 20 ||

Then, from their conforming to the causes, the qualities — preceded by the causes — are apprehended there, being the grounds of the manifestation of their own universals.

The qualities' place in the sequence. Karana-anuvidhayitvat: from their *conforming to the causes* — the qualities follow the causes' lead; they do not arrive independently. Atha karana-purvakah gunah tatra upalabhyante: *then*, *preceded by the causes*, the *qualities* are *apprehended* there. Sva-jati-vyakti-hetavah: being the *grounds of the manifestation of their own universals* — the redness is what makes redness-hood manifest (3.1.29's face manifested by water: the universal itself is what is expressed). So the sequence runs: time releases, universals manifest (3.9.19), causes operate, qualities appear conforming to them, and the qualities ground their own universals' manifestation. Each stage is a manifesting and none is a making. The whole causal order is a choreography of appearings, timed.

3.9.21 unformalized

आश्रयाणां च नित्यत्वमाश्रितानां च नित्यता ।
ता व्यक्तीरनुगृह्वाति स्थितिस्तेन प्रकल्पते ॥ २१ ॥

āśrayāṇāṃ ca nityatvamāśritānāṃ ca nityatā |
tā vyaktīranugṛhvāti sthitistena prakalpate || 21 ||

And from the eternality of the substrata and the eternality of what rests on them — it favours those individuals; thereby standing is constructed.

How persistence is produced. Asrayanam ca nityatvam asritanam ca nityata: the *eternality of the substrata* and the *eternality of what rests on them* — both the bearers and the borne are eternal (3.1.2's nityau eva; 3.1.41's universal standing in a non-eternal substratum by the unbroken succession). Ta vyaktir anugrhnati: it *favours* those *individuals* — time assists them (3.9.11's anugraha). Sthitih tena prakalpyate: *thereby standing* is *constructed*. So persistence is not a thing's own inertia but time's continued favouring of it — prakalpyate, constructed. This is 3.9.10's sthitir niyama-purvika (standing is preceded by restriction) given its positive form: a thing stands because time keeps assisting it, and stops when time stops. The next verse draws the consequence.

3.9.22 unformalized

अनित्यस्य यथोत्पादे पारतन्त्र्यं तथा स्थितौ ।
विनाशायैव तत् सृष्टस्वाधीनस्थितिं विदुः ॥ २२ ॥

anityasya yathotpāde pāratantryaṃ tathā sthitau |
vināśāyaiva tat sṛṣṭasvādhīnasthitiṃ viduḥ || 22 ||

As, for the non-eternal, there is dependence in its arising — so also in its standing; they know that its being loosed for destruction alone is its self-dependent standing.

The verse's second half is one of the samuddesa's sharpest sayings. Anityasya yatha utpade paratantryam tatha sthitau: as, for the *non-eternal*, there is *dependence* in its *arising* — so also in its *standing*: a thing depends on others to arise, and equally to persist (3.9.21's favouring). And then: vinasaya eva tat srsta-svadhina-sthitim viduh — they know that its being *loosed* *for destruction alone* is its *self-dependent standing*. A thing stands on its own only when it has been released for destruction. To be independent is to be dying. So long as it persists it is held (3.9.4's pratibandha); the moment the holding stops it is its own and it perishes. Svadhina-sthiti — self-dependent standing — is thus not a good state but the last one, and the verse's irony is exact: autonomy is what a thing gets when time has let it go.

3.9.23 unformalized

स्थितः संसर्गिभिर्भावैः स क्रियास्वनुगृह्यते ।
नैषां सत्तामनुद् गृह्य वृत्तिर्जन्मवतां स्मृता ॥ २३ ॥

sthitaḥ saṃsargibhirbhāvaiḥ sa kriyāsvanugṛhyate |
naiṣāṃ sattāmanud gṛhya vṛttirjanmavatāṃ smṛtā || 23 ||

Standing, it is favoured in its actions by the commingling entities; the operation of things possessing birth is not remembered without taking up their existence.

The condition of a thing's operating. Sthitah samsargibhih bhavaih sa kriyasu anugrhyate: *standing*, it is *favoured in its actions* by the *commingling* entities — a thing acts only as assisted by what it is with (3.3.5's upakara; 3.7.12's whatever assists is the means). Na esam sattam anudgrhya vrttir janmavatam smrta: the *operation* of things *possessing birth* is *not remembered* without *taking up their existence*. Anudgrhya — without taking up, without appropriating: a thing cannot operate without first having taken up its own existence, and that taking-up is what time's favouring gives it (3.9.21). So the born must be granted being before they can do anything, and the granting is temporal. The verse locates the whole karaka-system (3.7's crowd of self-interested operations) inside time's economy: nothing assists anything until time has let each participant be.

3.9.24 unformalized

जराख्या कालशक्तिर्या शक्त्यन्तरविरोधिनी ।
सा शक्तिं प्रतिबध्नाति जायन्ते च विरोधिनः ॥ २४ ॥

jarākhyā kālaśaktiryā śaktyantaravirodhinī |
sā śaktiṃ pratibadhnāti jāyante ca virodhinaḥ || 24 ||

That capacity of time which is called old-age, which is opposed to other capacities — it obstructs the capacity, and the opposing ones are born.

Decay named as a capacity of time. Jara-akhya kala-saktih ya: that *capacity of time* which is called *old-age* — jara: aging, the fourth of the six vikaras' declining phase (apaksiyate). Sakty-antara-virodhini: which is *opposed to other capacities* — it is a power whose whole nature is to be against powers. Sa saktim pratibadhnati: it *obstructs* the capacity — 3.9.4's pratibandha, now aimed at a thing's own powers. Jayante ca virodhinah: and the *opposing ones* are *born* — and as the thing's powers are held, their opposites arise. So aging is not the wearing-out of a thing but time's holding-back of its capacities while their contraries are released. The account is exact and it is entirely within 3.9.4's two operations: nothing is done to the aging thing; its powers are obstructed and their enemies permitted. Decay is a schedule.

3.9.25 unformalized

प्रयोजकास्तु ये भावाः स्थितिभा गस्य हेतवः ।
तिरोभवन्ति ते सर्वे यत आत्मा प्रहीयते ॥ २५ ॥

prayojakāstu ye bhāvāḥ sthitibhā gasya hetavaḥ |
tirobhavanti te sarve yata ātmā prahīyate || 25 ||

But those entities which are the occasioners, the causes of the portion of standing — all of them disappear, whereby the self is abandoned.

The mechanism of death. Prayojakah tu ye bhavah sthiti-bhagasya hetavah: those *entities* which are the *occasioners*, the *causes of the portion of standing* — whatever was favouring the thing (3.9.21, 3.9.23's samsargibhih bhavaih). Tirobhavanti te sarve: *all of them* *disappear* — they do not attack; they withdraw. Yata atma prahiyate: *whereby* the *self* is *abandoned*. So a thing dies because its supporters vanish, not because anything destroys it — 3.8.27's finding (in destruction there is non-thinghood; destruction is not a thing) given its positive mechanism. Prahiyate: is abandoned, let go (3.9.11's prahanam; 3.9.22's srsta, loosed). Death is desertion. And on 3.9.12's identification (time *is* operation), the deserting is time — which is to say that nothing kills anything, and things stop being held.

3.9.26 unformalized

यथैवाद्भुतया वृत्त्या निष्क्रमं निर्निबन्धनम् ।
अपदं जायते सर्वं तथास्यात्मा प्रहीयते ॥ २६ ॥

yathaivādbhutayā vṛttyā niṣkramaṃ nirnibandhanam |
apadaṃ jāyate sarvaṃ tathāsyātmā prahīyate || 26 ||

Just as, by a wonderful operation, everything is born motionless, without ground, footless — so its self is abandoned.

Birth and death given the same three privations, and the vocabulary is 3.3's. Yatha eva adbhutaya vrttya: just as, by a *wonderful* operation (3.9.17's adbhuta, and 3.3.81's atyadbhuta tv iyam vrttih — 'this operation is utterly wonderful', where the self-reality of things not previously existent shines forth). Niskramam nirnibandhanam apadam jayate sarvam: *everything* is *born* *motionless*, *without ground*, *footless* — apada: 3.3.80's apada-sthana, the footless station of speech, where language has no floor to set a foot on. Tatha asya atma prahiyate: *so* its *self* is *abandoned*. Birth and death are the same wonder, and both happen where nothing supports them. So the samuddesa's account of death (3.9.25's desertion) and of birth converge on 3.3.80-81: at the place where speech has no footing, things arise and depart, and the arising is wonderful. The mechanism has run out, and the verse says so rather than inventing more.

3.9.27 unformalized

क्रिययोरपवर्गिण्योर्नानार्थसमवेतयोः ।
संबन्धिना विनैकेन परिच्छेदः कथं भवेत् ॥ २७ ॥

kriyayorapavargiṇyornānārthasamavetayoḥ |
saṃbandhinā vinaikena paricchedaḥ kathaṃ bhavet || 27 ||

Of two actions ending in completion, inherent in different objects — how could there be delimitation, without some one relatum?

The problem that time solves. Kriyayoh apavarginyoh nana-artha-samavetayoh: of *two actions* *ending in completion*, *inherent in different objects* — two processes, in different things, each running to its own end. Sambandhina vina ekena paricchedah katham bhavet: *how* could there be *delimitation*, *without some one relatum*? How can one say which is longer, which came first, whether they overlapped? Two independent processes have no common measure unless something relates them. The question is genuine and it is the strongest argument for time's reality: something must be shared, or no comparison of durations is possible. And it is exactly the office 3.9.1's rival assigned time (parimanam kriyavatam, the measure of things possessing action). The next verse answers with an image — and the answer will grant the office and refuse the substance.

3.9.28 unformalized

यथा तुलायां हस्ते वा नानाद्रव्यव्यवस्थितम् ।
गुरुत्वं परिमीयेत कालादेवं क्रियागतिः ॥ २८ ॥

yathā tulāyāṃ haste vā nānādravyavyavasthitam |
gurutvaṃ parimīyeta kālādevaṃ kriyāgatiḥ || 28 ||

As weight, established in various substances, would be measured on a balance or in the hand — so the course of action, by time.

The answer to 3.9.27, and the simile does exactly the required work. Yatha tulayam haste va nana-dravya-vyavasthitam gurutvam parimiyeta: as *weight*, established in *various substances*, would be *measured* on a *balance* or in the *hand* — different things, incommensurable in themselves, brought to comparison by a common instrument. Kalad evam kriya-gatih: so the *course of action*, *by time*. So time is the balance: what lets independent processes be compared. And notice what a balance is — it is not a substance the weights are in; it is an *operation* that brings them into relation, and it has no weight of its own that it contributes. Or the hand: even less a thing, more an act of hefting. So the office of 3.9.27 is granted (time measures) and the substance of 3.9.1 is refused (a measure is not a container). This is 3.9.12's identification given its argument: time is the weighing, not the scale-pan.

3.9.29 unformalized

जहाति सहवृत्ताश्च क्रियाः स समवस्थिताः ।
व्रीहिर्यथोदकं तेन हायनाख्यां प्रपद्यते ॥ २९ ॥

jahāti sahavṛttāśca kriyāḥ sa samavasthitāḥ |
vrīhiryathodakaṃ tena hāyanākhyāṃ prapadyate || 29 ||

It abandons the actions that stand co-occurrent with it; as rice abandons water — thereby it obtains the name 'year'.

The samuddesa's most compressed image, and its transcription is difficult. Jahati saha-vrttah ca kriyah sa samavasthitah: it *abandons* the *actions* that stand *co-occurrent* with it — time lets go of what accompanies it (3.9.25's tirobhavanti; 3.9.22's srsta). Vrihir yatha udakam: as *rice* abandons *water* — the boiling rice, which takes up water and gives it off as steam; or the ripening grain, which draws water and dries. Tena hayana-akhyam prapadyate: *thereby* it obtains the name *'year'* — hayana, the year, whose etymology the tradition connects with ha, to abandon: the year is what lets go. So time gets its name from its abandoning, as at 3.9.14 it got its name from its reckoning — two etymologies, two operations, and both are 3.9.4's: obstruction and permission, holding and letting go. The year is a letting-go, and the rice giving up its water is the figure for it.
contested: the rice-and-water simile is compressed and the transcription uncertain; whether the picture is boiling (rice releasing steam) or ripening (grain drying) cannot be settled, and the hayana-etymology (from ha, to abandon) is the traditional one the verse evidently invokes

3.9.30 unformalized

प्रतिबन्धाभ्यनुज्ञाभ्यां वृत्तिर्या तस्या शाश्वती ।
तया विभज्यमानोऽसौ भजते क्रमरूपताम् ॥ ३० ॥

pratibandhābhyanujñābhyāṃ vṛttiryā tasyā śāśvatī |
tayā vibhajyamāno'sau bhajate kramarūpatām || 30 ||

That operation of it which consists of obstruction and permission is everlasting; being divided by that, it takes on the form of sequence.

Time's self-division, and it is reflexive. Pratibandha-abhyanujnabhyam vrttir ya tasya sasvati: that *operation* of it consisting of *obstruction and permission* (3.9.4's two) is *everlasting* — the holding-and-releasing never stops, and it is what time *is* (3.9.12's kala eva vyaparah). Taya vibhajyamano 'sau bhajate krama-rupatam: *being divided by that*, it *takes on* the *form of sequence*. So time is divided by its own operation: the holding-and-releasing is what carves time into before and after, and time is the holding-and-releasing. The circle is exact and it is not vicious — it is what a self-operating power looks like. Bhajate: takes on, wears (3.2.8's tattvam eva avikalpitam vikalpa-rupam bhajate: reality itself, unconstructed, takes on the form of construction). Sequence is time's own garment, worn by its own act.

3.9.31 unformalized

कर्तृभेदात् तदर्थेषु प्रकर्षापचयौ गतः ।
समत्वं विषमत्वं वा स एकः प्रतिपद्यते ॥ ३१ ॥

kartṛbhedāt tadartheṣu prakarṣāpacayau gataḥ |
samatvaṃ viṣamatvaṃ vā sa ekaḥ pratipadyate || 31 ||

From difference of agents, having gone to excellence and diminution in respect of their purposes — that one thing attains sameness or unevenness.

Time's apparent variability. Kartr-bhedat tad-arthesu prakarsa-apacayau gatah: from *difference of agents*, having gone to *excellence and diminution* in respect of *their purposes* — the same hour is long to the waiting and short to the busy: time's felt extent varies with whose purposes are in play. Samatvam visamatvam va sa ekah pratipadyate: *that one* thing attains *sameness or unevenness*. So time is one and is met as even or uneven, according to the agents and their ends. The verse does not psychologize this away: the unevenness is real, and it belongs to time-as-met, since time is nothing but its operating on somebody's purposes (3.9.12). And prakarsa — excellence, the graded more-ness of 3.5.2-3 — is here temporal: an hour can be more.

3.9.32 unformalized

कियाभेदाद्यथैकस्मिंस्तक्षाद्याख्या प्रवर्तते ।
क्रियाभेदात् तथैकस्मिन्नृत्वाद्याख्योपजायते ॥ ३२ ॥

kiyābhedādyathaikasmiṃstakṣādyākhyā pravartate |
kriyābhedāt tathaikasminnṛtvādyākhyopajāyate || 32 ||

As, from difference of action, the designation 'carpenter' and the rest proceeds with respect to one thing — so, from difference of action, the designation 'season' and the rest arises with respect to one thing.

The seasons explained by an occupational analogy. Kriya-bhedad yatha ekasmin taksady-akhya pravartate: as, from *difference of action*, the designation *'carpenter'* and the rest proceeds with respect to *one* thing — one man is carpenter, cook, father: the names track what he does, and he is one. Kriya-bhedat tatha ekasmin rtv-ady-akhya upajayate: so, from difference of action, the designation *'season'* and the rest arises with respect to *one* thing. Spring and autumn are one time under different doings — as teacher and uncle are one man under different relations (3.8.63's closing simile). So the calendar is an occupational list: time named by what it is doing. And the analogy's force is that nobody thinks the carpenter and the cook are two men, or that carpentry is a substance the man is in.

3.9.33 unformalized

आरम्भश्च क्रिया चैव निष्ठा चेत्यभिधीयते ।
धर्मान्तराणामध्यासभेदात् सदसदात्मनः ॥ ३३ ॥

ārambhaśca kriyā caiva niṣṭhā cetyabhidhīyate |
dharmāntarāṇāmadhyāsabhedāt sadasadātmanaḥ || 33 ||

'Commencement', 'action', and 'completion' — these are spoken of, from a difference of superimposition of other properties, upon what is of existent-and-non-existent self.

The three phases of any process, and their status. Arambhah ca kriya ca eva nistha ca iti abhidhiyate: *'commencement'*, *'action'*, and *'completion'* — the three moments every act is analysed into. Dharmantaranam adhyasa-bhedat: from a *difference of superimposition* of *other properties* — adhyasa: superimposition (3.1.6's central term; 3.8.11's asad-adhyasa, the superimposition of what is not there). Sad-asad-atmanah: upon what is of *existent-and-non-existent self* — the action, whose phases are existent and non-existent by sequence (3.8.6, 3.8.19's atma eka iva grhyate). So the three phases are superimposed on something that is neither wholly there nor wholly not, and they differ only in which properties are laid on. This is the Kriya-samuddesa's analysis (3.8.4's construed collection) restated as time's doing: the phases are time's superimpositions.

3.9.34 unformalized

यावांश्च द्व्यणुकादीनां तावान् बिमवतोऽप्यसौ ।
न ह्यात्मा कस्यचिद् भेत्तुं प्रचेतुं वापि शक्यते ॥ ३४ ॥

yāvāṃśca dvyaṇukādīnāṃ tāvān bimavato'pyasau |
na hyātmā kasyacid bhettuṃ pracetuṃ vāpi śakyate || 34 ||

And as much as it is for the dyad and the rest, so much is it also for a mountain; for the self of anything whatever cannot be split or accumulated.

Time's indifference to magnitude. Yavan ca dvy-anukadinam tavan bimavato 'py asau: as much as it is for the *dyad* and the rest — the smallest composite of the atomists — *so much* is it also for a *mountain*. Time is not more for big things. Na hi atma kasyacid bhettum pracetum vapi sakyate: for the *self* of anything whatever cannot be *split* or *accumulated*. Nothing's self can be divided or added to — which is 3.6.15's great leveling (partlessness is equal for the atom and for the pot) now applied to time: as nothing has parts of its own, nothing has more time than anything else. So the mountain's age and the dyad's are not different quantities of a stuff. Duration is not a possession.

3.9.35 unformalized

अन्यैस्तु भावैरन्येषां प्रचयः परिकल्प्यते ।
शनैरिदमिदं क्षिप्रमिति तेन प्रतीयते ॥ ३५ ॥

anyaistu bhāvairanyeṣāṃ pracayaḥ parikalpyate |
śanairidamidaṃ kṣipramiti tena pratīyate || 35 ||

But by other entities, an accumulation is constructed for others; thereby it is understood: 'this slowly, this quickly'.

Where duration comes from, then. Anyaih tu bhavaih anyesam pracayah parikalpyate: by *other entities*, an *accumulation* is *constructed* for *others* — durations are conferred by comparison with something else: the mountain is old *relative to* the flower's seasons. Sanaih idam idam ksipram iti tena pratiyate: *thereby* it is understood: '*this slowly*, *this quickly*'. So fast and slow are relational constructions, borrowed from a comparison-term, and neither belongs to the process. This is 3.9.28's balance (weight measured by an instrument that contributes none) and 3.9.34's leveling (no thing has its own duration) combining: durations are conferred, comparisons confer them, and time is the conferring.

3.9.36 unformalized

क्रियापाधिश्च सन् भूतभविष्यद्वर्तमानताः ।
एकादशभिराकारैर्विभक्ताः प्रतिपद्यते ॥ ३६ ॥

kriyāpādhiśca san bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānatāḥ |
ekādaśabhirākārairvibhaktāḥ pratipadyate || 36 ||

And being conditioned by action, it attains past-ness, future-ness and present-ness, divided by eleven forms.

The tense-doctrine, announced. Kriya-upadhih ca san: *being conditioned by action* — upadhi: the limiting adjunct (3.2.2's asatya-upadhi; 1.75's grahana-upadhi-bheda). Time takes its tenses from the actions that condition it, not from itself. Bhuta-bhavisyad-vartamanatah: *past-ness*, *future-ness* and *present-ness* — the three tenses, and they are *-ta* abstractions: past-*ness*, conditions rather than times. Ekadasabhih akaraih vibhaktah pratipadyate: *divided by eleven forms* it attains them. Eleven: Panini's ten lakaras plus one, or the traditional enumeration the next verses give. So the three tenses are eleven forms, and all of them are time conditioned by action. Time has no tense of its own — which follows from 3.9.12: if time is the operating, its tenses are the operations'.

3.9.37 unformalized

क्रियापाधिश्च सन् भूतभविष्यद्वर्तमानताः ।
एकादशभिराकारैर्विभक्ताः प्रतिपद्यते ॥ ३७ ॥

kriyāpādhiśca san bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānatāḥ |
ekādaśabhirākārairvibhaktāḥ pratipadyate || 37 ||

And being conditioned by action, it attains past-ness, future-ness and present-ness, divided by eleven forms.

The source transmits this verse identically with 3.9.36 — the same two lines under two page-labels. Whether the wisdomlib edition has duplicated a single karika across two pages, or whether the text genuinely repeats it (a not-unknown scribal or recensional event), cannot be settled from the transcription alone. We record the duplication rather than silently collapsing it, and the substantive commentary is given at 3.9.36.
contested: the verse is transmitted identically with 3.9.36 in the source; this is very likely a pagination or transcription fault rather than a genuine repetition in the text, and readers consulting other editions should expect the numbering here to diverge

3.9.38 unformalized

भूतः पञ्जविधस्तत्र भविष्यंश्च चतुर्विधः ।
वर्तमानो द्विधाख्यात इत्येकादश कल्पनाः ॥ ३८ ॥

bhūtaḥ pañjavidhastatra bhaviṣyaṃśca caturvidhaḥ |
vartamāno dvidhākhyāta ityekādaśa kalpanāḥ || 38 ||

The past there is five-fold, and the future four-fold; the present is declared two-fold — thus eleven constructions.

The eleven enumerated. Bhutah panca-vidhah tatra: the *past* is *five-fold* — Sanskrit's several past forms (the aorist, the imperfect, the perfect, and the periphrastics, distinguished by remoteness and witness). Bhavisyan ca catur-vidhah: the *future* *four-fold*. Vartamano dvidha akhyatah: the *present* is declared *two-fold*. Ity ekadasa kalpanah: thus *eleven* *constructions*. And the last word is the doctrine: kalpanah — *constructions*, not times. The tense-system is eleven ways of construing, not eleven regions of a substance. So Sanskrit's remarkably fine past-tense apparatus (five forms where a modern European language has two or three) is not a finer map of a real past; it is a richer set of postings (3.7.103's niyamah sabde na tu vastuni: the restriction is in the word, not in the thing).

3.9.39 unformalized

काले निधाय स्वं रूपं प्रज्ञया यन्निगृह्यते ।
भावास्ततो निवर्तन्ते तत्र संक्रान्तशक्तयः ॥ ३९ ॥

kāle nidhāya svaṃ rūpaṃ prajñayā yannigṛhyate |
bhāvāstato nivartante tatra saṃkrāntaśaktayaḥ || 39 ||

Having deposited their own form in time, what is grasped by the understanding — from that, entities withdraw, their capacities having passed over into it.

The past, and it is a deposit-account. Kale nidhaya svam rupam: *having deposited their own form in time* — things leave their shape with time as one leaves goods in trust. Prajnaya yan nigrhyate: what is *grasped by the understanding* — what memory holds is that deposit. Bhavas tato nivartante: *from that*, entities *withdraw* — they go, and the form stays. Tatra sankranta-saktayah: their *capacities having passed over into it* — sankranta: transferred, migrated. So the past is where things leave their forms and powers when they withdraw, and what we grasp of the past is the deposit, not the things. This is a genuinely strange and beautiful account: the past is a repository, the deposits are real, and the depositors are gone. And it explains how the past is knowable (its forms are there) without being present (its things are not).

3.9.40 unformalized

भाविनां चैव यद्रूपं तस्य च प्रतिबिम्बकम् ।
सुनिर्मृष्ट इवादर्शे काल एवोपपद्यते ॥ ४० ॥

bhāvināṃ caiva yadrūpaṃ tasya ca pratibimbakam |
sunirmṛṣṭa ivādarśe kāla evopapadyate || 40 ||

And the form of things to come — the reflection of that, too, is possible in time alone, as in a well-polished mirror.

The future, and the image is exact. Bhavinam ca eva yad rupam: the *form* of *things to come*. Tasya ca pratibimbakam: the *reflection* of that. Sunirmrsta iva adarse: as in a *well-polished mirror* — sunirmrsta: thoroughly wiped, burnished. Kala eva upapadyate: is possible *in time alone*. So the future is time reflecting what has not arrived — a mirror-image with no object yet before it. The image completes 3.9.39's pair: the past is a deposit, the future is a reflection, and time holds both. And the reflection-figure carries all its earlier freight (1.49's borrowed properties; 2.294's reflection failing the effect-test; 3.9.19's shadows in clear water): the future is *there* in time as a face is in a mirror — present to be seen, doing nothing, and not a second thing. Sunirmrsta — well-polished — is the condition: a clouded mirror shows no future, and time's clarity is what makes anticipation possible.

3.9.41 unformalized

तृणपर्णलतादीनि यथा स्रोतोऽनुकर्षति ।
प्रवर्तयति कालोऽपि मात्रा मात्रावतां तथा ॥ ४१ ॥

tṛṇaparṇalatādīni yathā sroto'nukarṣati |
pravartayati kālo'pi mātrā mātrāvatāṃ tathā || 41 ||

As a current draws along grass, leaves, creepers and the like — so time too impels the measures of things possessing measure.

The current, and it is the samuddesa's third great image. Trna-parna-lata-adini yatha srotah anukarsati: as a *current* *draws along* *grass*, *leaves*, *creepers* and the like — the river carrying its debris: each thing moving at the water's speed, none of them swimming. Pravartayati kalo 'pi matra matravatam tatha: so *time* too *impels* the *measures* of things *possessing measure*. So things are carried, not travelling: their durations are the current's, as the leaf's speed is the river's. The image was already used at 3.7.33 (the capacity, in a single substratum, draws downward like a current) and here it is time's. And what a current is matters: not a thing in the water but the water's own moving — which is 3.9.12's identification exactly. Time is not what carries things along; it is the carrying.

3.9.42 unformalized

आविश्येवानुसन्धत्ते यथा गतिमतां गतीः ।
वायुस्तथैव कालात्मा विधत्ते क्रमरूपताम् ॥ ४२ ॥

āviśyevānusandhatte yathā gatimatāṃ gatīḥ |
vāyustathaiva kālātmā vidhatte kramarūpatām || 42 ||

As the wind, having entered them as it were, connects up the motions of things possessing motion — so the self of time brings about the form of sequence.

The wind, and it is the fourth image and the most intimate. Avisya iva anusandhatte yatha gatimatam gatih vayuh: as the *wind*, having *entered* them *as it were*, *connects up* the *motions* of things possessing motion — the wind that carries the leaves does not push them from outside; it enters and moves them from within, and their separate motions become one motion. Anusandhatte: connects up, threads together, joins into a sequence (the same root as the sutradhara's thread, 3.9.4). Tatha eva kala-atma vidhatte krama-rupatam: so the *self of time* *brings about* the *form of sequence*. So time works as wind does: entering (avisya *iva*: as it were — the iva is careful) and threading the many motions into one order. This is the puppeteer (3.9.4), the string (3.9.15), the current (3.9.41) and now the wind — four images for one operation, and each more inward than the last.

3.9.43 unformalized

अयनप्रविभागश्च गतिश्च ज्योतिषां ध्रुवा ।
निवृत्तिप्रभवाश्चैव भूतानां तन्निबन्धनाः ॥ ४३ ॥

ayanapravibhāgaśca gatiśca jyotiṣāṃ dhruvā |
nivṛttiprabhavāścaiva bhūtānāṃ tannibandhanāḥ || 43 ||

The division of the solstices, and the fixed motion of the luminaries; and the ceasings and originations of beings — these are grounded in that.

The observable order, grounded. Ayana-pravibhagah ca: the *division of the solstices* — the year's great turning-points, by which the calendar is fixed. Gatih ca jyotisam dhruva: and the *fixed motion* of the *luminaries* — the stars' unfailing courses, the most reliable regularity anyone knew. Nivrtti-prabhavah ca eva bhutanam: and the *ceasings and originations* of *beings* — birth and death. Tan-nibandhanah: these are *grounded in that* — in time. So the astronomical order and the biological one have one ground, and it is the holding-and-releasing (3.9.4). The verse is quietly ambitious: it claims that what makes the sun turn at the solstice and what makes a man die are the same operation, differently scheduled. And nibandhana is the grounding-word the whole work has used since 1.13.

3.9.44-45 unformalized

मात्राणां परिमाणा ये कालवृत्त्यनुयायनः ।
नक्षत्राख्या पृथक् तेषु चिह्नमात्रं तु तारकाः ॥ ४४ ॥
रुतैर्मृगशकुन्तानां स्थावराणां च वृत्तिभिः ।
छायादिपरणामैश्च ऋतुधामा निरूप्यते ॥ ४५ ॥

mātrāṇāṃ parimāṇā ye kālavṛttyanuyāyanaḥ |
nakṣatrākhyā pṛthak teṣu cihnamātraṃ tu tārakāḥ || 44 ||
rutairmṛgaśakuntānāṃ sthāvarāṇāṃ ca vṛttibhiḥ |
chāyādiparaṇāmaiśca ṛtudhāmā nirūpyate || 45 ||

(44) Those measures of the moments which follow upon time's operation are severally called 'naksatra' among them; but the stars are a mere mark. (45) By the cries of beasts and birds, by the operations of stationary things, and by the transformations of shadow and the rest — the season's abode is determined.

How time is read, and the epistemology is careful. (44): matranam parimanah ye kala-vrtty-anuyayinah: the *measures* of the *moments* which *follow upon time's operation* — the divisions that track the operating. Naksatra-akhya prthak tesu: they are severally called *'naksatra'* — the lunar mansions, the sky's calendar. And the correction: cihna-matram tu tarakah — the *stars* are a *mere mark*. The stars do not constitute the naksatras; they mark them. What is real is the operation; the constellations are its dial. (45) then lists the other dials: rutaih mrga-sakuntanam — by the *cries* of beasts and birds; sthavaranam ca vrttibhih — by the *operations* of *stationary* things (the flowering, the leaf-fall); chaya-adi-parinamaih ca — and by the *transformations of shadow* and the rest (the gnomon's shadow, the day's lengthening). Rtu-dhama nirupyate: the *season's abode* is *determined*. So one reads time from birdsong, budding and shadow as much as from stars — and all of them equally are marks (cihna-matra), none of them time.

3.9.46 unformalized

निर्भासोपगमो योऽयं क्रमवानिव दृश्यते ।
अक्रमस्यापि विश्वस्य तत् कालस्य विचेष्टितम् ॥ ४६ ॥

nirbhāsopagamo yo'yaṃ kramavāniva dṛśyate |
akramasyāpi viśvasya tat kālasya viceṣṭitam || 46 ||

This coming-to-appearance which is seen as though possessing sequence — of a universe that is sequenceless — that is time's activity.

The samuddesa's thesis, stated in one line. Nirbhasa-upagamo yo 'yam kramavan iva drsyate: this *coming-to-appearance* which is *seen* *as though possessing sequence* — the iva marks it, as it has marked every claim of this kind since 1.48. Akramasya api visvasya: *of a universe* that is *sequenceless* — the world does not run; nothing is in order. Tat kalasya vicestitam: *that* is *time's activity*. So the whole appearance of sequence, in a sequenceless universe, is what time does. Vicestita: activity, exertion, the writhing or working of something — a strong word, and it fits 3.9.12 (time is operation): time does not exist and then act; the acting is all there is, and its product is the look of order. Everything the samuddesa has built converges here: the puppeteer, the string, the current, the wind — four figures for one activity, and this is what the activity produces.

3.9.47 unformalized

द्रान्तिकव्यवस्थानमध्वाधिकरणं यथा ।
चिरक्षिप्रव्यवस्थानं कालाधिकरणं तथा ॥ ४७ ॥

drāntikavyavasthānamadhvādhikaraṇaṃ yathā |
cirakṣipravyavasthānaṃ kālādhikaraṇaṃ tathā || 47 ||

As the settled arrangement of far and near has the road for its locus — so the settled arrangement of long and quick has time for its locus.

The parallel that places time among the constructions. Duranti ka-vyavasthanam adhva-adhikaranam yatha: as the *settled arrangement* of *far and near* has the *road* for its *locus* — distance is measured along a road, and the road is where far-and-near live. Cira-ksipra-vyavasthanam kala-adhikaranam tatha: so the settled arrangement of *long and quick* has *time* for its *locus*. The parallel is exact and it is deflationary: as a road is not distance but where distance is reckoned, time is not duration but where duration is reckoned. And a road, notoriously, is not a thing — it is a way, made by going. Adhikarana: the locus, the karaka that assists at two removes without touching anything (3.7.148). So time is the locus of durations as the road is of distances: indispensable, reckoned along, and not an item.

3.9.48 unformalized

तस्याभिन्नस्य कालस्य व्यवहारे क्रियाकृताः ।
भेदा इव त्रयः सिद्धा यांल्लोको नातिवर्तते ॥ ४८ ॥

tasyābhinnasya kālasya vyavahāre kriyākṛtāḥ |
bhedā iva trayaḥ siddhā yāṃlloko nātivartate || 48 ||

Of that undivided time, in practice, three differences — as it were, made by action — are established, which the world does not transgress.

The three tenses, and every qualification matters. Tasya abhinnasya kalasya: of that *undivided* time — one, partless (3.9.7's neither one nor many). Vyavahare: *in practice* — the divisions belong to transaction, not to time (2.297's sabdah loka-nibandhanah). Kriya-krtah bheda iva trayah siddhah: *three* differences, *as it were*, *made by action*, are *established* — kriya-krta: action-made (3.9.36's kriya-upadhih: time conditioned by action), and iva: as though. Yan loko na ativartate: which the *world does not transgress* — the phrase 2.462 used of sequence and simultaneity (which the world does not transgress). So the three tenses are practical, action-made, apparent divisions of an undivided time — and nobody escapes them. Both halves stand: constructed, and inescapable (3.6.18's dik-kala-parikalpana standing like consciousness itself).

3.9.49 unformalized

एकस्य शक्तयः तिस्रः कालस्य समवस्थिताः ।
यत्संबन्धेन भावानां दर्शनादर्शने सताम् ॥ ४९ ॥

ekasya śaktayaḥ tisraḥ kālasya samavasthitāḥ |
yatsaṃbandhena bhāvānāṃ darśanādarśane satām || 49 ||

Three capacities of the one time stand established, by connection with which there is the seeing and the non-seeing of entities that exist.

The tenses recast as saktis, and this is the samuddesa's central move. Ekasya saktayah tisrah kalasya samavasthitah: *three capacities* of the *one* time stand established — not three times but three powers of one (1.2's Brahman resting on its differentiated powers; 3.7.37's agency alone, sixfold). And their office: yat-sambandhena bhavanam darsana-adarsane satam — by *connection with which* there is the *seeing* and the *non-seeing* of entities *that exist*. Satam — *that exist*: the entities exist throughout; what the tenses govern is whether they are *seen*. So past and future things are not absent; they are unseen. The tense-system is an optics, not an inventory — and this single word satam is the hinge of the whole doctrine. Everything is; the three powers decide what shows.

3.9.50 unformalized

द्वाभ्यां स किल शक्तिभ्यां भावानां वरणात्मकः ।
शक्तिस्तु वर्तमानाख्या भावरूपप्रकाशिनी ॥ ५० ॥

dvābhyāṃ sa kila śaktibhyāṃ bhāvānāṃ varaṇātmakaḥ |
śaktistu vartamānākhyā bhāvarūpaprakāśinī || 50 ||

By two of its capacities it is, indeed, of the nature of a screen for entities; but the capacity called 'present' is the illuminator of the entities' form.

The three sorted, two against one. Dvabhyam sa kila saktibhyam bhavanam varanatmakah: by *two* of its capacities it is *of the nature of a screen* — varana: a covering, a curtain, a screening-off. Past and future are screens: they hide what exists (3.9.49's satam). Saktih tu vartamana-akhya bhava-rupa-prakasini: but the capacity called *'present'* is the *illuminator* of the entities' *form*. So of time's three powers, two conceal and one reveals; and 'the present' names not a stretch of time but a lighting. This is the samuddesa's most economical statement of its tense-doctrine, and it inverts the ordinary picture entirely: things do not come into the present and pass out; they stand, and time's screens draw back and close.

3.9.51 unformalized

अनागता जन्मशक्तेः शक्तिरप्रतिबन्धिका ।
अतीताख्या तु या शक्तिस्तया जन्म विरुध्यते ॥ ५१ ॥

anāgatā janmaśakteḥ śaktirapratibandhikā |
atītākhyā tu yā śaktistayā janma virudhyate || 51 ||

The capacity called 'future' is not the obstructor of the capacity of birth; but that capacity called 'past' — by it, birth is opposed.

The two screens distinguished by their relation to birth. Anagata janma-sakteh saktir apratibandhika: the capacity called *'future'* is *not the obstructor* of the *capacity of birth* — the future screens without preventing: what is future is unborn and *may* be born; the screen does not bar the door. Atita-akhya tu ya saktih taya janma virudhyate: but that capacity called *'past'* — by *it*, *birth* is *opposed*. The past screens and bars: what is past cannot be born again. So the two screens differ in modality, and the difference is exactly the asymmetry we feel between past and future — the future is open and the past is closed. And the samuddesa has derived that asymmetry from time's powers rather than assuming it: pratibandha (3.9.4's obstruction) is what the past does, and the future merely conceals.

3.9.52 unformalized

तमःप्रकाशवत्त्वेते त्रयोऽध्वानो व्यवस्थिताः ।
अक्रमास्तेषु भावानां क्रमः समुपलभ्यते ॥ ५२ ॥

tamaḥprakāśavattvete trayo'dhvāno vyavasthitāḥ |
akramāsteṣu bhāvānāṃ kramaḥ samupalabhyate || 52 ||

These three roads stand established, having the nature of darkness and light; they are sequenceless, and in them the sequence of entities is apprehended.

The image that gathers 3.9.50-51. Tamah-prakasavat tv ete trayo 'dhvano vyavasthitah: these *three roads* stand established, having the nature of *darkness and light* — adhvan: road, the word 3.9.47 used for the locus of far-and-near; and the three roads are two dark and one lit. Akramah tesu bhavanam kramah samupalabhyate: they are *sequenceless*, and *in them* the *sequence of entities* is *apprehended*. So the three tenses are themselves without sequence — the past is not before the future — and the sequence we find is the entities' as apprehended in them. The image is precise: a lit stretch of road between two dark ones, and things showing as they pass through the light. Nothing moves the road; the road does not run. And 3.9.46's finding stands: the sequence is the appearance, and the appearing is time's activity.

3.9.53 unformalized

द्वौ तु तत्र तमोरूपावेकस्यालोकवत् स्थितिः ।
अतीतमपि केषाञ्चित् पुनर्विपरिवर्तते ॥ ५३ ॥

dvau tu tatra tamorūpāvekasyālokavat sthitiḥ |
atītamapi keṣāñcit punarviparivartate || 53 ||

But two of them there are of the form of darkness; of one, the standing is like light. And for some, even the past turns round again.

The image confirmed and then complicated. Dvau tu tatra tamo-rupau: *two* of them are of the *form of darkness* — past and future, the screens (3.9.50's varanatmakah). Ekasya alokavat sthitih: of *one*, the *standing* is *like light* — the present. Then: atitam api kesamcit punar viparivartate — and for *some*, even the *past* *turns round again*. Some hold that the past returns — the cyclical cosmologies, the recurring ages, the doctrine that what has been will be again. So 3.9.51's asymmetry (the past bars birth) is not universally granted: on a cyclical view the past's screen is not final. Bhartrhari reports it (kesamcit) without adopting it, and its presence here is honest doxography: the tense-doctrine he has built assumes an asymmetry his tradition does not unanimously hold.

3.9.54 unformalized

युगपद्वर्तमानत्वं तद्धर्मा प्रतिपद्यते ।
केषांचिद्वर्तमानत्वाच्चैति तद्वदतीतताम् ॥ ५४ ॥

yugapadvartamānatvaṃ taddharmā pratipadyate |
keṣāṃcidvartamānatvāccaiti tadvadatītatām || 54 ||

What has that property attains present-ness simultaneously; and from the present-ness of some, it likewise goes to past-ness.

The cyclical view of 3.9.53 developed. Yugapad vartamanatvam tad-dharma pratipadyate: what has *that* property attains *present-ness* *simultaneously* — on the recurrence-view, the returning past becomes present all at once. Kesamcid vartamanatvat ca eti tadvad atitatam: and from the *present-ness* of *some*, it *likewise goes to past-ness*. So things cycle through the three, and the cycling is what the recurrence-doctrine describes. Bhartrhari is reporting a view in which the three saktis are not fixed stations but phases each thing passes through and re-enters — and it is compatible with his own account (the three are powers of one time, not regions) while its cyclicality is an addition he does not endorse. The report is careful and the reader is left to weigh it.

3.9.55 unformalized

हेतूरकारादाक्षिप्तो वर्तमानत्वमागतः ।
शान्तहेतुपकारः सन् पुनर्नोपैति दर्शनम् ॥ ५५ ॥

hetūrakārādākṣipto vartamānatvamāgataḥ |
śāntahetupakāraḥ san punarnopaiti darśanam || 55 ||

Drawn forth by the assistance of a cause, it has come to present-ness; the cause's assistance having subsided, it does not again come to seeing.

The linear account, against 3.9.53-54's cyclical one. Hetu-upakarad aksiptah vartamanatvam agatah: *drawn forth* by the *assistance of a cause*, it has come to *present-ness* — a thing enters the light because something assists it (3.9.23's favouring by commingling entities). Santa-hetupakarah san punar na upaiti darsanam: the cause's assistance having *subsided*, it does *not again* come to *seeing*. Santa: quieted, stilled. So on this account the present is where a thing stands while its causes assist, and when they subside it goes dark and does not return — 3.9.25's death (the supporters withdrawing) as the general law of pastness. This is the asymmetry of 3.9.51 given its mechanism, and it is set here against 3.9.53's recurrence without adjudication. Two accounts of whether the dark road behind is final.

3.9.56 unformalized

द्वे एव कालस्य विभोः केषांचिच्छक्तिवर्त्मनी ।
करोति याभ्यां भावानामुन्मीलननिमीलने ॥ ५६ ॥

dve eva kālasya vibhoḥ keṣāṃcicchaktivartmanī |
karoti yābhyāṃ bhāvānāmunmīlananimīlane || 56 ||

For some, there are only two capacity-paths of the all-pervading time, by which it effects the opening and closing of the eyes of entities.

A rival reduction, and its image is lovely. Dve eva kalasya vibhoh kesamcit sakti-vartmani: only *two* *capacity-paths* of the *all-pervading* time, for *some*. Karoti yabhyam bhavanam unmilana-nimilane: by which it effects the *opening and closing of the eyes* of entities — unmilana and nimilana: the eye's opening and shutting; also the blossoming and closing of a flower. So on this account there are not three powers but two — a showing and a hiding — and past and future collapse into one darkness. The reduction is economical: 3.9.50 already made two of the three screens, and this view asks why two screens are two powers. And the image is the samuddesa's gentlest: things blink open and shut, and time is the blinking.

3.9.57 unformalized

कालाभिः पृथगर्थाभिः प्रविभक्ते स्वभावतः ।
केचिद् बुद्ध्यनुसंहारलक्षणे ते प्रचक्षते ॥ ५७ ॥

kālābhiḥ pṛthagarthābhiḥ pravibhakte svabhāvataḥ |
kecid buddhyanusaṃhāralakṣaṇe te pracakṣate || 57 ||

Some declare that they are divided, by their own nature, by times which have separate meanings, and are characterized by the intellect's gathering-together.

The idealist option. Kalabhih prthag-arthabhih pravibhakte svabhavatah: divided, *by their own nature*, by *times* which have *separate meanings* — the tenses as genuinely distinct times, each with its own content. Kecid buddhy-anusamhara-laksane te pracaksate: *some* declare them to be *characterized by the intellect's gathering-together*. Buddhy-anusamhara: the mind's drawing-together — 2.1's sixth view of the sentence (buddhy-anusamhrtih, the gathering-together in cognition, which the Vakyakanda's whole argument favoured). So the tenses are the mind's gatherings: past is what the intellect has drawn together, future what it projects. The view makes tense wholly cognitive — and it is very close to Bhartrhari's own (3.7.104's buddhy-avastha carving the karakas), differing only in making the gathering constitutive of time rather than of its divisions.

3.9.58 unformalized

ज्ञानानुगतशक्तिं वा बाह्यं वा सत्यतः स्थितम् ।
कालात्मानमनाश्रित्य व्यवहर्तुं न शक्यते ॥ ५८ ॥

jñānānugataśaktiṃ vā bāhyaṃ vā satyataḥ sthitam |
kālātmānamanāśritya vyavahartuṃ na śakyate || 58 ||

Whether a capacity that follows upon cognition, or something external standing in truth — without resorting to a self of time, it is not possible to transact.

The dispute of 3.9.57 declined, and the declining is the samuddesa's method. Jnana-anugata-saktim va: whether a *capacity that follows upon cognition* — the idealist option (3.9.57); bahyam va satyatah sthitam: or something *external* *standing in truth* — the realist option (3.9.1's substance). Kala-atmanam anasritya vyavhartum na sakyate: *without resorting to a self of time*, it is *not possible to transact*. So: whichever it is, one cannot do without it. The office is undeniable and the ontology is undecided — which is 1.28's move (eternal or produced, no beginning either way), 2.433's (all-natured or self-less, the word is sovereign either way), 3.1.107's (whatever the substrate, the doctrine stands). Vyavahartum: to transact — and 3.6.19 already said the theorist who abandons these entities takes hold of them again.

3.9.59 unformalized

तिस्रो भावस्य भावस्य केषाञ्चिद् भावशक्तयः ।
ताभिः स्वशक्तिभिः सर्वं सदैवास्ति च नास्ति च ॥ ५९ ॥

tisro bhāvasya bhāvasya keṣāñcid bhāvaśaktayaḥ |
tābhiḥ svaśaktibhiḥ sarvaṃ sadaivāsti ca nāsti ca || 59 ||

For some, there are three being-capacities of each and every entity; by those own capacities, everything always both is and is not.

The three saktis relocated from time to things. Tisro bhavasya bhavasya kesamcid bhava-saktayah: *three* *being-capacities* of *each and every* entity — every thing carries its own past, present and future as powers, rather than passing through time's three. Tabhih sva-saktibhih sarvam sada eva asti ca na asti ca: by those *own capacities*, *everything* *always* both *is* and *is not*. Sada eva: always — and both. So on this view nothing ever changes tense; each thing is permanently existent-and-non-existent by its own three powers, and the appearance of passage is the shifting of which power shows. This is 3.3.87's finding (the eternal one, whose self is both being and non-being, shines forth as multiform) applied to each thing severally — and it dissolves time into the things, as 3.9.12 dissolved it into operation.

3.9.60 unformalized

सत्त्वादव्यतिरेकेण तास्तिस्रोऽपि व्यवस्थिताः ।
क्रमस्तास्तदभेदाच्च सदसत्त्वं न भिद्यते ॥ ६० ॥

sattvādavyatirekeṇa tāstisro'pi vyavasthitāḥ |
kramastāstadabhedācca sadasattvaṃ na bhidyate || 60 ||

Being not different from existence, those three also stand established; and from their non-difference from that, sequence and existence-and-non-existence are not differentiated.

The reduction completed, and it lands where the Padakanda always lands. Sattvad avyatirekena tah tisro 'pi vyavasthitah: *being not different from existence*, those *three* also stand established — the three capacities are not other than satta (3.1.33's sole universal, in which all words stand established). Kramah tah tad-abhedac ca sad-asattvam na bhidyate: and from their *non-difference* from that, *sequence* and *existence-and-non-existence* are *not differentiated*. So: the three tenses are satta's powers, satta is one, and therefore sequence and being/non-being are not two things but one Existence variously showing. This is 3.3.84 exactly (in reality there is no difference whatever of simultaneity from sequence, just as no non-being is determined as other than being) — and its arrival here completes the Kala-samuddesa's absorption into the Padakanda's single doctrine. Time, action, being: one satta, carved.

3.9.61 unformalized

दर्शनादर्शनेनैकं दृष्टादृष्टं तदेव तु ।
अध्वनामेकता नास्ति न च किञ्चिन्निवर्तते ॥ ६१ ॥

darśanādarśanenaikaṃ dṛṣṭādṛṣṭaṃ tadeva tu |
adhvanāmekatā nāsti na ca kiñcinnivartate || 61 ||

By seeing and non-seeing it is one; but that very thing is seen and unseen. There is no oneness of the roads, and nothing whatever withdraws.

The three roads (3.9.52) audited, and the audit is severe. Darsana-adarsanena ekam: by *seeing* and *non-seeing* it is *one* — the thing is one, whether shown or screened (3.9.49's satam: the entities exist throughout). Drstadrstam tad eva tu: but *that very thing* is *seen and unseen* — one thing, both. Adhvanam ekata na asti: there is *no oneness of the roads* — the three are not one road; the metaphor of a single track through darkness and light is refused. Na ca kimcin nivartate: and *nothing whatever* *withdraws* — nothing goes away, ever. So the picture of things passing along a road out of the light is dismantled: nothing travels, nothing leaves, and the three roads are not a road. What is left is 3.9.50's screens — powers that show and hide what stands unmoving.

3.9.62 unformalized

शक्त्यात्मदेवतापक्षैर्भिन्नं कालस्य दर्शनम् ।
प्रथमं तदविद्यायां यद्विद्यायां न विद्यते ॥ ६२ ॥

śaktyātmadevatāpakṣairbhinnaṃ kālasya darśanam |
prathamaṃ tadavidyāyāṃ yadvidyāyāṃ na vidyate || 62 ||

The seeing of time is differentiated by the positions of capacity, of self, and of deity; that is first in nescience — which does not exist in knowledge.

The three schools of time named, and then placed. Sakty-atma-devata-paksaih bhinnam kalasya darsanam: the *seeing of time* is differentiated by the positions of *capacity* (time as sakti — Bhartrhari's own, 3.9.49), of *self* (time as atman, a substance: 3.9.1's Vaisesika), and of *deity* (time as a god — Kala the destroyer, the Mahabharata's dark deity). Three doctrines, three darsanas. And then the placing: prathamam tad avidyayam yad vidyayam na vidyate — *that* is *first in nescience*, *which does not exist in knowledge*. All three belong to avidya — the domain of constructed difference (2.233's sciences describing only avidya) — and none survives into vidya. So the samuddesa's own doctrine, the sakti-paksa, is named as one of three and consigned with the others. This is the most unsparing thing in the samuddesa: it classifies its own position as nescience.

3.9.63-64 unformalized

अभेदे यदि कालस्य ह्रस्वदीर्घप्लुतादिषु ।
दृश्यते भेदनिर्भासः स चिरक्षिप्रबुद्धिवत् ॥ ६३ ॥
ह्रस्वदीर्घप्लुतावृत्त्या नालिकासालिलादिषु ।
कथं प्रचययोगः स्यात् कल्पनामात्रहेतुकः ॥ ६४ ॥

abhede yadi kālasya hrasvadīrghaplutādiṣu |
dṛśyate bhedanirbhāsaḥ sa cirakṣiprabuddhivat || 63 ||
hrasvadīrghaplutāvṛttyā nālikāsālilādiṣu |
kathaṃ pracayayogaḥ syāt kalpanāmātrahetukaḥ || 64 ||

(63) If, time being undivided, an appearance of difference is seen in short, long, prolated and the rest — that is like the cognition of slow and quick. (64) By the repetition of short, long and prolated, in water-clocks and the like — how could there be a connection with accumulation, caused by mere construction?

An objection about measured time. (63): if time is *undivided* (3.9.48's abhinna), whence the *appearance of difference* in the vowel-quantities — hrasva, dirgha, pluta, the measured units by which recitation is timed? The answer offered: sa cira-ksipra-buddhi-vat — that is *like the cognition of slow and quick* (3.9.35's constructed durations; 2.23's cognitions of slow and quick, which do not themselves differ in time). But (64) presses: hrasva-dirgha-pluta-avrttya nalika-salilaadisu — by the *repetition* of short, long, prolated, in *water-clocks* and the like — katham pracaya-yogah syat kalpana-matra-hetukah: *how* could there be a *connection with accumulation*, caused by *mere construction*? Water accumulates in the clock; the accumulation is measured; and a mere construction does not fill a vessel. The objection is genuine and it is the strongest against the whole doctrine: constructed time does not explain the clepsydra. 3.9.70 will answer it.

3.9.65-67 unformalized

अबिव्यक्तिनिमित्तस्य प्रचयेन प्रचीयते ।
अभिन्नमपि शब्दस्य तत्त्वमप्रचयात्मकम् ॥ ६५ ॥
एवं मात्रातुरीयस्य भेदो दाशतयस्य वा ।
परिमाणविकल्पेन शब्दात्मनि न विद्यते ॥ ६६ ॥
अनुनिष्पादिकल्पेन येऽन्ताराल इव स्थिताः ।
शब्दास्ते प्रतिपत्तॄणामुपायाः प्रतिपत्तये ॥ ६७ ॥

abivyaktinimittasya pracayena pracīyate |
abhinnamapi śabdasya tattvamapracayātmakam || 65 ||
evaṃ mātrāturīyasya bhedo dāśatayasya vā |
parimāṇavikalpena śabdātmani na vidyate || 66 ||
anuniṣpādikalpena ye'ntārāla iva sthitāḥ |
śabdāste pratipattṝṇāmupāyāḥ pratipattaye || 67 ||

(65) It is accumulated by the accumulation of the occasioning ground of manifestation; but the word's reality, though undivided, is not of the nature of accumulation. (66) Thus a difference of a quarter-mora, or of ten such, by an option of measure, does not exist in the word's self. (67) Those words which stand, as it were, in the interval, by a kind of arising-in-consequence, are the means of comprehension for the comprehenders.

The answer for the word, before the answer for time. (65): abhivyakti-nimittasya pracayena praciyate: it is *accumulated* by the *accumulation of the occasioning ground of manifestation* — what accumulates is the manifesting sound, not the word; abhinnam api sabdasya tattvam apracaya-atmakam: the word's *reality*, though *undivided*, is *not of the nature of accumulation*. So the morae pile up in the utterance and not in the sphota (1.76-77's prakrta and vaikrta dhvani, the quantities lodged in the manifesting sound). (66): hence no *quarter-mora* difference, nor of ten, exists *in the word's self* — the measures are the medium's. (67): and the intermediate words — antarale iva sthitah, standing *as it were in the interval*, arising anunispadi (2.121's entailed) — are *the means of comprehension*: upayah pratipattaye, the ladder (2.38's discardable means). So the measured time of recitation is the manifesting stream's, and the word is untouched. The parallel is being laid for time itself.

3.9.68 unformalized

विशिष्टमवधिं तं तमुपादाय प्रकल्पते ।
कालः कलावतामेकः क्षणमासर्तुभेदभाक् ॥ ६८ ॥

viśiṣṭamavadhiṃ taṃ tamupādāya prakalpate |
kālaḥ kalāvatāmekaḥ kṣaṇamāsartubhedabhāk || 68 ||

Taking up this or that particular limit, the one time of things possessing moments is constructed as partaking of the differences of instant, month and season.

How time's units are made. Visistam avadhim tam tam upadaya prakalpyate: taking up *this or that particular limit* — avadhi: the limit, the reference-point (3.6.2's avadhi from which direction separates; 3.7.137's dhruva). Kalah kalavatam ekah: the *one* time of things possessing moments. Ksana-masa-rtu-bheda-bhak: constructed as *partaking of* the differences of *instant*, *month*, *season*. So the units are made by taking up limits: pick a reference-point and a return, and you have a unit. The instant, the month, the season differ only in which avadhi is taken — the heartbeat, the moon, the solstice. And prakalpyate: constructed. Time is one; the units are chosen limits; and nothing in time favours one choice over another (3.9.47's road, along which distances are reckoned).

3.9.69 unformalized

बुद्ध्यवग्रहभेदाच्च व्यवहारात्मनि स्थितेः ।
तावानेव क्षणः कालो युगमन्वन्तराणि वा ॥ ६९ ॥

buddhyavagrahabhedācca vyavahārātmani sthiteḥ |
tāvāneva kṣaṇaḥ kālo yugamanvantarāṇi vā || 69 ||

And from a difference in the intellect's grasping, in the standing that is of the nature of practice — just so much is the instant, the time, or the aeons and the world-ages.

The units' relativity, stated without hedging. Buddhy-avagraha-bhedat ca: from a difference in the *intellect's grasping* — the units follow how the mind takes hold (3.7.104's buddhy-avastha carving the karakas; 3.7.3's sadhana-vyavahara grounded in a state of the intellect). Vyavahara-atmani sthiteh: in the *standing* that is *of the nature of practice*. Tavan eva ksanah kalo yugam anvantarani va: *just so much* is the *instant*, the *time*, or the *aeons* and the *world-ages*. Tavan eva: just so much — the instant and the aeon are made the same way, by a grasp, and differ only in the grasp's scale. So there is no smallest unit and no largest: the ksana is not time's atom, and the manvantara is not its total. Both are how long a mind held something.

3.9.70 unformalized

प्रतिबन्धाभ्यानुज्ञाभ्यां नालाकाविवराश्रिते ।
यदम्भसि प्रक्षरणं तत्कालस्यैव चेष्टितम् ॥ ७० ॥

pratibandhābhyānujñābhyāṃ nālākāvivarāśrite |
yadambhasi prakṣaraṇaṃ tatkālasyaiva ceṣṭitam || 70 ||

By obstruction and permission, in that which rests in the aperture of the tube — that trickling in the water: that is time's very activity.

The water-clock, and it answers 3.9.64's objection exactly. The nalika is the clepsydra: a pierced vessel set in water, filling through its hole and sinking at a fixed interval. Pratibandha-abhyanujnabhyam: by *obstruction* and *permission* — 3.9.4's two operations, and here they are visible: the tube's wall obstructs, the aperture permits. Nalaka-vivara-asrite yad ambhasi praksaranam: that *trickling* in the *water* which *rests in the aperture of the tube*. Tat kalasya eva cestitam: *that* is *time's very activity* — cestita: 3.9.46's word for what time does. So the clepsydra does not measure time; the trickling *is* time — obstruction and permission, made of brass and water. The objection of 3.9.64 asked how a mere construction fills a vessel, and the answer is that time was never a construction laid over the trickle: the trickle is the holding-and-releasing, which is what time is (3.9.12). The clock is not time's instrument; it is time's portrait.

3.9.71 unformalized

अल्पे महति वा छिद्रे तत्संबन्धे न भिद्यते ।
कालस्य वृत्तिरात्मापि तमेवास्यानुवर्तते ॥ ७१ ॥

alpe mahati vā chidre tatsaṃbandhe na bhidyate |
kālasya vṛttirātmāpi tamevāsyānuvartate || 71 ||

Whether the hole be small or large, in connection with that it does not differ; time's operation, and its self too, follows just that of it.

The clepsydra pressed, and the result is the samuddesa's. Alpe mahati va chidre tat-sambandhe na bhidyate: whether the *hole* be *small or large*, in connection with that it does *not differ* — time does not run faster through a wide aperture; the clock is calibrated to the hole, and time is not. Kalasya vrttir atma api tam eva asya anuvartate: time's *operation*, and *its self* too, *follows just that of it*. So time's operation follows the trickling and time's *self* follows it too — atma api: even its self. There is nothing behind the trickle that the trickle measures. This completes 3.9.70: the clock is not a portrait of time but time itself, and asking whether the clock is accurate is asking whether the trickling trickles. The verse is the samuddesa's flattest identification, and it is delivered in plumbing.

3.9.72 unformalized

आक्रीड इव कालस्य दृश्यते यः स्वशक्तिभिः ।
बहुरूपस्य भावेषु बहुधा तेन भिद्यते ॥ ७२ ॥

ākrīḍa iva kālasya dṛśyate yaḥ svaśaktibhiḥ |
bahurūpasya bhāveṣu bahudhā tena bhidyate || 72 ||

That which is seen as it were a playground of time, of the many-formed one, by its own capacities — by that it is manifoldly differentiated among the entities.

Time's variety, and the image is a play-space. Akrida iva kalasya drsyate yah sva-saktibhih: that which is *seen* as it were a *playground* of *time* — akrida: a pleasure-garden, a place of sport; the word carries lila, the divine play. Bahu-rupasya bhavesu bahudha tena bhidyate: of the *many-formed* one, it is *manifoldly differentiated* among the *entities*. So the world is time's playground, and time's many forms are its games. The image softens the puppeteer (3.9.4's sutradhara: a stage-manager working the strings) into something less coercive — not a machine driven but a garden played in. And both are true on the doctrine: the holding-and-releasing is a discipline and a sport, and 3.9.15's tethered birds are exactly a game.

3.9.73 unformalized

त्वचिसारस्य वा वृद्धिं तृणसारस्य वा दधत् ।
तावद् तदूवृद्धियोगेन कालतत्त्वं विकल्पते ॥ ७३ ॥

tvacisārasya vā vṛddhiṃ tṛṇasārasya vā dadhat |
tāvad tadūvṛddhiyogena kālatattvaṃ vikalpate || 73 ||

Or bearing the growth of a bark-pithed tree, or of a grass-pithed one — to just that extent, by connection with their growth, time's reality is optioned.

Time read from growth-rates. Tvaci-sarasya va vrddhim trna-sarasya va dadhat: *bearing* the *growth* of a *bark-pithed* tree, or of a *grass-pithed* one — two kinds of plant, growing at their own rates: the hardwood slowly, the reed fast. Tavad tad-vrddhi-yogena kala-tattvam vikalpate: to *just that extent*, by *connection with their growth*, *time's reality* is *optioned*. Vikalpate: is optioned, constructed as an alternative (3.9.69's tavan eva ksanah: just so much is the instant). So time's reality is measured out by whatever is growing, and the hardwood's year and the reed's are different lengths of the same year. This is 3.9.35's relational duration (accumulation constructed for one thing by another) with living clocks — and it belongs with 3.9.44-45's birdsong and shadow: time is read from anything that changes, and every reading is a marking.

3.9.74 unformalized

व्यतिक्रमे।ञपि मात्राणां तस्य नास्ति व्यतिक्रमः ।
न गन्तृगतिभेदेन मार्गभेदोऽस्ति कश्चन ॥ ७४ ॥

vyatikrame|ñapi mātrāṇāṃ tasya nāsti vyatikramaḥ |
na gantṛgatibhedena mārgabhedo'sti kaścana || 74 ||

Even in the transgression of the measures, there is no transgression of it; there is no difference whatever of the road by a difference of the goer's going.

Time's invariance under all its measurements. Vyatikrame 'pi matranam tasya na asti vyatikramah: even in the *transgression of the measures* — even when the units are exceeded, miscounted, or run over — there is *no transgression of it*: time is not violated by a bad clock. Na gantr-gati-bhedena marga-bhedo 'sti kascana: there is *no difference whatever* of the *road* by a *difference of the goer's going*. The road does not change when travellers walk at different speeds. So the measures vary (3.9.73's trees) and the measured does not — and the road-image (3.9.47's adhva-adhikaranam; 3.9.52's three roads) does the work: what is reckoned along is untouched by the reckoning. This is the invariance that 3.9.71's clepsydra seemed to threaten, restored: the trickle is time, and a different hole is a different trickle and the same time.

3.9.75 unformalized

उदयास्तमयावृत्त्या ज्योतिषां लोकसिद्धया ।
कालस्याव्यतिपातेऽपि ताद्धर्म्यमिव लभ्यते ॥ ७५ ॥

udayāstamayāvṛttyā jyotiṣāṃ lokasiddhayā |
kālasyāvyatipāte'pi tāddharmyamiva labhyate || 75 ||

By the repetition of the risings and settings of the luminaries, established in the world — though there is no lapsing of time, a likeness of property, as it were, is obtained.

The astronomical clock, and its status. Udaya-astamaya-avrttya jyotisam loka-siddhaya: by the *repetition* of the *risings and settings* of the *luminaries*, *established in the world* — the day, the tradition's most fundamental unit, given by the sun's return. Kalasya avyatipate 'pi: *though there is no lapsing of time* — time does not pass; nothing withdraws (3.9.61's na ca kimcin nivartate). Tad-dharmyam iva labhyate: a *likeness of property*, *as it were*, is *obtained*. So the sun's returning lends time an appearance of passing, and the appearance is a borrowed property (1.49's reflection following the water's movement; 3.9.30's krama-rupata worn). The day is not a piece of time; it is a resemblance conferred on the unlapsing by something that comes back. Iva, as always.

3.9.76 unformalized

आदित्यग्रहनक्षत्रपरिस्पन्दमथापरे ।
भिन्नमावृत्तिभेदेन कालं कालविदो विदुः ॥ ७६ ॥

ādityagrahanakṣatraparispandamathāpare |
bhinnamāvṛttibhedena kālaṃ kālavido viduḥ || 76 ||

But others — knowers of time — know time as the pulsation of sun, planets and constellations, differentiated by a difference of revolutions.

The astronomers' reduction, reported. Aditya-graha-naksatra-parispandam: the *pulsation* of *sun*, *planets* and *constellations* — parispanda: throbbing, vibration, the regular beat of the heavens. Atha apare bhinnam avrtti-bhedena kalam kala-vido viduh: *others* — *knowers of time*, the kala-vids, which is to say the astronomers — know *time* as *that*, *differentiated by a difference of revolutions*. So for the professionals, time simply *is* the celestial motion: no substance behind it, no sakti, just the turning. And the samuddesa reports this without objection, because it is very nearly its own view — 3.9.71 said time's self follows the trickle, and this says it follows the stars. The difference is only that the astronomer stops at the heavens and 3.9.44's correction stands: the stars are a mere mark (cihna-matram tu tarakah), and what they mark is the operating.

3.9.77 unformalized

क्रियान्तरपरिच्छेदप्रवृत्ता या क्रियां प्रति ।
निर्ज्ञातपरिमाणा सा काल इत्यभिधीयते ॥ ७७ ॥

kriyāntaraparicchedapravṛttā yā kriyāṃ prati |
nirjñātaparimāṇā sā kāla ityabhidhīyate || 77 ||

That action which proceeds toward the delimitation of another action, and whose measure is well ascertained — that is expressed as 'time'.

The functional definition, and it makes time an action. Kriyantara-pariccheda-pravrtta ya kriyam prati: that *action* which *proceeds toward* the *delimitation* of *another action* — one process used to bound another: the sun's course delimiting the day's work, the clepsydra's trickle (3.9.70) delimiting the recitation. Nirjnata-parimana sa: and whose *measure is well ascertained* — the delimiting process must itself be known-in-measure, or it delimits nothing. Kala iti abhidhiyate: *that* is *expressed* as '*time*'. So time is any well-measured action used to bound another. Not a substance (3.9.1 refused), not a container: an *action*, doing a job. This is 3.9.12's identification (kala eva vyaparah) given as a definition — and it means that anything regular enough can *be* time, which is what 3.9.44's stars, 3.9.73's trees and 3.9.70's water-clock have all been showing.

3.9.78 unformalized

ज्ञाने रूपस्य संक्रान्तिर्ज्ञानेनैवानुसंहृतिः ।
अतः क्रियान्तराभावे सा क्रिया काल इष्यते ॥ ७८ ॥

jñāne rūpasya saṃkrāntirjñānenaivānusaṃhṛtiḥ |
ataḥ kriyāntarābhāve sā kriyā kāla iṣyate || 78 ||

In cognition there is a passing-over of the form; by cognition alone there is the gathering-together. Therefore, in the absence of another action, that action is held to be time.

Time's limiting case: when there is nothing to measure by. Jnane rupasya sankrantih: in *cognition* there is a *passing-over* of the *form* — sankranti: migration, the word 3.9.39 used for capacities passing over into time. Jnanena eva anusamhrtih: by *cognition alone* there is the *gathering-together* — anusamhrti: 2.1's sixth view of the sentence, the mind's drawing-together; 3.9.57's buddhy-anusamhara. Atah kriyantara-abhave sa kriya kala isyate: *therefore*, in the *absence of another action*, *that* action is held to be *time*. So where no external process delimits, cognition's own gathering does — and cognition's gathering is then time. This completes 3.9.77: time is the delimiting action, and when nothing outside delimits, the mind's own act does, and the mind's act is time. Which is why 3.9.69 could say that the instant and the aeon are both *just so much* as the intellect grasped.

3.9.79 unformalized

भूतो घट इतीयं च सत्ताया एव भूतता ।
भूता सत्तेति सत्तायाः सत्ता भूताभिधीयते ॥ ७९ ॥

bhūto ghaṭa itīyaṃ ca sattāyā eva bhūtatā |
bhūtā satteti sattāyāḥ sattā bhūtābhidhīyate || 79 ||

And this 'the pot was' is the past-ness of Existence alone; 'Existence was' — thus the existence of Existence is called 'past'.

The tenses reduced to Existence's tenses. Bhuto ghata iti iyam sattayah eva bhutata: '*the pot was*' is the *past-ness* of *Existence alone* — not the pot's pastness: the pot is nothing over satta (3.1.33), so what was past was Being, potwise. Bhuta satta iti sattayah satta bhuta abhidhiyate: '*Existence was*' — thus the *existence of Existence* is called '*past*'. So every past-tense sentence says: Being was. And the reduction is complete — subject, tense and predicate all collapse into satta and its temporal powers (3.9.60's three saktis not different from existence). This is the Kala-samuddesa reaching what the Jati- and Kriya-samuddesas reached (3.1.33's sole universal; 3.8.62's every root meaning satta): there is one thing, and the tenses are its powers, and 'the pot was' is Being wearing pastness.

3.9.80 unformalized

परतो भिद्यते सर्वमात्मा तु न विकल्पते ।
पर्वतादिस्थितिस्तस्मात् पररूपेण भिद्यते ॥ ८० ॥

parato bhidyate sarvamātmā tu na vikalpate |
parvatādisthitistasmāt pararūpeṇa bhidyate || 80 ||

Everything is differentiated by another; but the self is not optioned. Therefore the standing of a mountain and the rest is differentiated by another's form.

The principle behind 3.9.79. Paratah bhidyate sarvam: *everything* is *differentiated by another* — nothing differentiates itself (3.9.8's time divided by its commingled things; 3.1.15-16's places conferred by relata). Atma tu na vikalpate: but the *self* is *not optioned* — the thing's own self admits no alternatives; it is not one of several ways it might be. Parvatadi-sthitih tasmat para-rupena bhidyate: *therefore* the *standing* of a *mountain* and the rest is *differentiated by another's form*. The mountain's endurance is measured by what passes, and the passing is not the mountain's. So a mountain does not have a long duration; other things have short ones. This is 3.9.35's relational accumulation and 3.9.73's growth-clocks stated as a general law — and it is why 3.9.79 could reduce the pot's pastness to Being's: the pot never had a tense of its own to lose.

3.9.81 unformalized

प्रसिद्धभेदा व्यापारा विरूपावयबक्रियाः ।
साहचर्येण भिद्यन्ते सरूपावयवक्रियाः ॥ ८१ ॥

prasiddhabhedā vyāpārā virūpāvayabakriyāḥ |
sāhacaryeṇa bhidyante sarūpāvayavakriyāḥ || 81 ||

Operations whose difference is well established, and whose part-actions are of different form, are differentiated by accompaniment from those whose part-actions are of like form.

How actions are told apart. Prasiddha-bheda vyaparah virupa-avayava-kriyah: *operations* whose *difference* is *well established*, and whose *part-actions* are of *different form* — cooking and walking: their sub-actions differ visibly, and nobody confuses them. Sahacaryena bhidyante sarupa-avayava-kriyah: those whose *part-actions are of like form* are differentiated *by accompaniment* — two walkings, two cookings: identical in their parts, told apart only by what accompanies them (where, when, whose). So actions of unlike parts are distinguished by their parts, and actions of like parts by their company. And the second class is where time does its work: two identical processes are two only because they are accompanied differently — which is to say, timed differently. The verse quietly explains why time is needed at all: without it, repetitions would be indistinguishable.

3.9.82-84 unformalized

व्यवधानमिवोपैति निवृत्त इव दृश्यते ।
क्रियासमूहो भुज्यादिरन्तरालप्रवृत्तिभिः ॥ ८२ ॥
न च विच्छिन्नरूपोऽपि सोऽविरामान्निवर्तते ।
सर्वैव हि क्रियान्येन सङ्कीर्णेवोपलभ्यते ॥ ८३ ॥
तदन्तरालदृष्टा वा सर्वैवावयवक्रिया ।
सादृश्यात् सति भेदे तु तदङ्गत्वेन गृह्यते ॥ ८४ ॥

vyavadhānamivopaiti nivṛtta iva dṛśyate |
kriyāsamūho bhujyādirantarālapravṛttibhiḥ || 82 ||
na ca vicchinnarūpo'pi so'virāmānnivartate |
sarvaiva hi kriyānyena saṅkīrṇevopalabhyate || 83 ||
tadantarāladṛṣṭā vā sarvaivāvayavakriyā |
sādṛśyāt sati bhede tu tadaṅgatvena gṛhyate || 84 ||

(82) The collection of actions such as eating comes, as it were, to interruption; it is seen as though ceased, by reason of the operations in the interval. (83) And though its form is severed, it does not withdraw, from want of a stopping; for every action is apprehended as though intermixed with another. (84) Or every part-action seen in that interval, though a difference exists, is grasped as a limb of it, from likeness.

The problem of interrupted actions. (82): a meal is interrupted — one pauses, talks, resumes: the collection of eatings *comes as it were to interruption*, vyavadhanam iva upaiti, and is *seen as though ceased*, nivrtta iva drsyate, because of what happened in the interval. Two iva's: the interruption is apparent. (83): na ca vicchinna-rupo 'pi so 'viramat nivartate — though its *form is severed*, it does *not withdraw*, from *want of a stopping*: the eating did not stop, only its manifestation did (3.9.50's screens). And the general truth: sarva eva hi kriya anyena sankirna iva upalabhyate — *every* action is apprehended as though *intermixed* with another; there are no pure processes. (84) then explains the resumption: the interval's part-actions are *grasped as limbs of it*, from *likeness* — sadrsyat, and sati bhede, *though a difference exists*. So an interrupted meal is one meal because likeness lets the intervals be annexed. This is 3.8.4's construed unity, and the interruption shows the construing at work.

3.9.85-90 unformalized

सदसद् वापि वस्तु स्यात् तृतीयं नास्ति किञ्चन ।
तेन भूतभविष्यन्तौ मुक्त्वा मध्यं न विद्यते ॥ ८५ ॥
निर्वृत्तिरूपमेकस्य भेदाभावान्न कल्पते ।
सदसद् वापि तेनैकं क्रमरूपं कथं भवेत् ॥ ८६ ॥
बहूनां चानवस्थानादेकमेवोपलभ्यते ।
यथोपलब्धिस्मरणं तत्र चाप्युपपद्यते ॥ ८७ ॥
सदसद्रूपमेकं स्यात् सर्वस्यैकत्वकल्पने ।
निर्वृत्तिरूपं निर्वृत्तेः सामान्यमथवा भवेत् ॥ ८८ ॥
कार्योत्पत्तौ समर्थं वा स्वेन धर्मेण तत् तथा ।
आत्मतत्त्वे गृह्येत सा चास्मिन् वर्तमानता ॥ ८९ ॥
क्रियाप्रबन्धरूपं यदध्यात्मं विनिगृह्यते ।
सङ्क्रान्तबिम्बमेकत्र तामाहुर्वर्तमानताम् ॥ ९० ॥

sadasad vāpi vastu syāt tṛtīyaṃ nāsti kiñcana |
tena bhūtabhaviṣyantau muktvā madhyaṃ na vidyate || 85 ||
nirvṛttirūpamekasya bhedābhāvānna kalpate |
sadasad vāpi tenaikaṃ kramarūpaṃ kathaṃ bhavet || 86 ||
bahūnāṃ cānavasthānādekamevopalabhyate |
yathopalabdhismaraṇaṃ tatra cāpyupapadyate || 87 ||
sadasadrūpamekaṃ syāt sarvasyaikatvakalpane |
nirvṛttirūpaṃ nirvṛtteḥ sāmānyamathavā bhavet || 88 ||
kāryotpattau samarthaṃ vā svena dharmeṇa tat tathā |
ātmatattve gṛhyeta sā cāsmin vartamānatā || 89 ||
kriyāprabandharūpaṃ yadadhyātmaṃ vinigṛhyate |
saṅkrāntabimbamekatra tāmāhurvartamānatām || 90 ||

(85) A thing must be either existent or non-existent; there is no third whatever. Therefore, apart from past and future, no middle exists. (86) The form of completion, for one thing, is not construed, from the absence of difference; how then could one thing, existent or non-existent, have the form of sequence? (87) And from the non-standing of many, only one is apprehended; and there, remembrance according to apprehension is also possible. (88) On the construction of oneness for everything, the one would be of existent-and-non-existent form; or the form of completion would be the general of completion. (89) Or, being capable in the arising of the effect by its own property — it would be grasped so in its self-reality, and that is present-ness in it. (90) That form of the continuum of action which is inwardly grasped, its reflection having passed over into one place — that they call present-ness.

The samuddesa's hardest problem: whether a present exists. (85) states it with brutal economy: sad asad vapi vastu syat trtiyam na asti kimcana — a thing must be *existent or non-existent*; there is *no third whatever*. Tena bhuta-bhavisyantau muktva madhyam na vidyate: *therefore*, apart from *past and future*, *no middle exists*. The present is squeezed out: what has happened is past, what has not is future, and there is nothing between. This is the classical argument that eliminates the present, and Bhartrhari states it at full strength. (86-87) press: no completion-form for one thing, no sequence for what is simply existent or non-existent; and from many things' *non-standing*, only *one* is apprehended, with remembrance following. (88-90) then rebuild. (88): construct oneness and the one is *of existent-and-non-existent form* (3.9.59's every entity always both is and is not). (89): or a thing *capable in the arising of the effect by its own property* is grasped so in its *self-reality* — and *that* is *present-ness*: the present is capability-in-act. (90) gives the final account, and its image is the mirror again: kriya-prabandha-rupam yad adhyatmam vinigrhyate — the *continuum of action* which is *inwardly grasped*, sankranta-bimbam ekatra, its *reflection having passed over into one place* — tam ahur vartamanatam: *that* they call *present-ness*. So the present is not a stretch of time but the inward grasping of a continuum, its image gathered into one — which is 3.9.78's cognition-gathering, and 3.9.40's mirror. The present is where the mind's mirror holds the process.
contested: the six-verse passage is the samuddesa's most compressed and its argumentative structure is genuinely hard to reconstruct; we read 85-87 as the objection (no present) and 88-90 as the answer (present-ness as capability, and as the inwardly-gathered reflection of a continuum). Readers who take 88-89 as further horns of the objection will find 90 the sole answer, which the text also permits

3.9.91 unformalized

क्रियातिपत्तिरत्यन्तं क्रियानुत्पत्तिलक्षणा ।
न च भूतमनुत्पन्नं न भविष्यत्तथाविधम् ॥ ९१ ॥

kriyātipattiratyantaṃ kriyānutpattilakṣaṇā |
na ca bhūtamanutpannaṃ na bhaviṣyattathāvidham || 91 ||

The lapsing of an action has, as its mark, the utter non-arising of the action; and the past is not un-arisen — nor is the future of that kind.

A third category distinguished from both tenses. Kriya-atipattih atyantam kriya-anutpatti-laksana: the *lapsing of an action* has as its *mark* the *utter non-arising* of the action — the kriya-atipatti is the grammarian's category for the action that was to have happened and did not (Panini's conditional, the lin of unfulfilled condition: 'had he come, he would have seen'). Its mark is atyantam anutpatti: *utter* non-arising — not merely absent but never to arrive. Na ca bhutam anutpannam: and the *past* is *not un-arisen* — the past arose and is screened (3.9.50). Na bhavisyat tatha-vidham: *nor* is the *future* of that kind — the future has not arisen and may (3.9.51's future not obstructing birth). So the lapsed action is neither past nor future: it is what will never have been. And Sanskrit has a tense for it. The verse identifies a genuine fourth category that 3.9.85's dichotomy (existent or non-existent, no third) cannot accommodate.

3.9.92 unformalized

प्राग्विरुद्धक्रियोत्पादान्निर्वृत्ते वा विरोधिनि ।
व्यापारेऽवधिभेदेन विषयस्तत्र भिद्यते ॥ ९२ ॥

prāgviruddhakriyotpādānnirvṛtte vā virodhini |
vyāpāre'vadhibhedena viṣayastatra bhidyate || 92 ||

From the arising of a contrary action beforehand, or when a contrary operation has been completed — the domain there is differentiated by a difference of limit.

How the lapsed action of 3.9.91 comes about. Prag-viruddha-kriya-utpadat: from the *arising* of a *contrary action* *beforehand* — something incompatible happened first, and the action could not arise: the messenger died, so the message never came. Nirvrtte va virodhini vyapare: or when a *contrary operation* has been *completed* — the incompatible thing finished, and the window closed. Avadhi-bhedena visayas tatra bhidyate: the *domain* there is *differentiated* by a *difference of limit* — avadhi: the limit, the samuddesa's constant (3.9.68's units made by taking up limits). So a lapsing is fixed by where one sets the limit: relative to this moment the action is merely future; relative to that one, it has lapsed forever. The category of the never-to-be is thus limit-relative like every other temporal category — and 3.9.68's doctrine (take up a limit and the units follow) reaches even the tense of what will never have happened.

3.9.93-94 unformalized

व्यभिचारे निमित्तस्य साधुत्वं न प्रकल्पते ।
भाव्यासीदिति सूत्रेण तत्कालेऽन्यत्र शिष्यते ॥ ९३ ॥
स्वकाल एव साधुश्चेत् कालभेदे गतिः कथम् ।
वाक्यार्थादतदर्थेषु विशिष्टत्वं न सिध्यति ॥ ९४ ॥

vyabhicāre nimittasya sādhutvaṃ na prakalpate |
bhāvyāsīditi sūtreṇa tatkāle'nyatra śiṣyate || 93 ||
svakāla eva sādhuścet kālabhede gatiḥ katham |
vākyārthādatadartheṣu viśiṣṭatvaṃ na sidhyati || 94 ||

(93) When the occasioning ground deviates, correctness is not constructed; by the sutra 'bhavya asit', it is taught elsewhere, at that time. (94) If it is correct only in its own time, how is there passage in a difference of time? From the sentence-meaning, distinctness is not established in respect of things not of that meaning.

A grammatical problem about tense-mismatch. (93): vyabhicare nimittasya sadhutvam na prakalpyate — when the *occasioning ground deviates*, *correctness* is *not constructed*: if a form's licensing condition fails, the form is incorrect (1.27's sadhutva established from the sistas). The sutra cited (bhavya asit — 'what was to be' plus a past 'was') licenses a future-participle with a past verb: a form whose two halves point opposite ways in time. (94) presses: sva-kale eva sadhus cet kala-bhede gatih katham — if it is *correct only in its own time*, *how is there passage* in a *difference of time*? A form correct only in its own tense should not survive transplantation into another. Vakya-arthad atad-arthesu visistatvam na sidhyati: from the *sentence-meaning*, *distinctness* is not established in respect of things *not of that meaning*. So the tense-mismatched construction is a genuine puzzle: the grammar licenses it, and no account of why is forthcoming. The next verses supply one.
contested: the sutra invoked at 93 is compressed to 'bhavya asit' and its identification is uncertain; the construction at issue — a future-sense stem under a past-tense finite verb — is clear enough from 94-101's discussion

3.9.95 unformalized

तदर्थश्चेदवयवो भाविनो भूततागतिः ।
न स्यादत्यन्तभूतत्वमेवैकं तत्र सम्भवेत् ॥ ९५ ॥

tadarthaścedavayavo bhāvino bhūtatāgatiḥ |
na syādatyantabhūtatvamevaikaṃ tatra sambhavet || 95 ||

If the part is of that meaning, there would be no understanding of past-ness for what is future; utter past-ness alone would be possible there.

The first horn. Tad-arthas ced avayavah: if the *part* — the stem — is *of that meaning*, i.e. genuinely future in sense. Bhavino bhutata-gatih na syat: there would be *no understanding of past-ness* for what is *future* — the two senses would simply conflict and the form would say nothing. Atyanta-bhutatvam eva ekam tatra sambhavet: *utter past-ness alone* would be *possible* there — the finite verb's past would swallow the stem's future entirely, and the construction's whole point (that something *was going to* happen) would be lost. So taking the stem's futurity at face value destroys the form. The horn is real, and 3.9.96 offers the other.

3.9.96 unformalized

विशिष्टकालता पूर्वं तथापि तु विशेषणे ।
आश्रयात् सोऽन्तरङ्गत्वात् तत्र साधुर्भविष्यति ॥ ९६ ॥

viśiṣṭakālatā pūrvaṃ tathāpi tu viśeṣaṇe |
āśrayāt so'ntaraṅgatvāt tatra sādhurbhaviṣyati || 96 ||

Even so, the state of having a particular time is prior; but in the qualifier, from its resting on it, and from its being internal — the correct form will be there.

The second horn, and it appeals to derivational order. Visista-kalata purvam: the state of having a *particular time* is *prior* — the stem's tense is settled first, before the finite verb arrives. Tatha api tu visesane: even so, *in the qualifier*. Asrayat sah antarangatvat: from its *resting on* it, and from its being *internal* — antaranga: the Paninian priority-notion (3.1.182's antarangatva, operations belonging to the inner layer, settled before the outer). Tatra sadhur bhavisyati: the *correct form* will be *there*. So the stem's futurity is settled antaranga, at the inner layer, and the finite verb's past is applied outside it — and the two do not conflict because they belong to different derivational strata. This is 3.7.182's argument (what is settled antaranga is settled before the outer operations touch it) transferred to tense, and it dissolves 3.9.95's horn: the stem is future *in its layer*, past-ness is predicated *of the whole*, and no contradiction arises.

3.9.97 unformalized

आमिश्र एव प्रक्रान्तः स पदार्थस्तथाविधः ।
केवलस्य विमिश्रत्वं नित्येऽर्थे नोपपद्यते ॥ ९७ ॥

āmiśra eva prakrāntaḥ sa padārthastathāvidhaḥ |
kevalasya vimiśratvaṃ nitye'rthe nopapadyate || 97 ||

That word-meaning, being of such a kind, is commenced only as commingled; the state of being intermixed does not hold for what is isolated, in an eternal meaning.

The stem's tense placed. Amisra eva prakrantah sa padarthah tatha-vidhah: that *word-meaning*, being of such a kind, is *commenced only as commingled* — amisra: mixed; the stem never occurs unmixed, and its tense is always already in composition. Kevalasya vimisratvam nitye 'rthe na upapadyate: the state of *being intermixed* does *not hold* for what is *isolated*, in an *eternal* meaning. So the isolated stem, whose meaning is eternal (3.1.2's nityau eva; 3.8.62's every root meaning satta), has no tense at all — tense belongs to the mixture. This resolves 3.9.94's puzzle at the root: the stem does not have a time to be transplanted out of, because unmixed it has no time. Time enters at composition, and 3.9.96's antaranga ordering describes how.

3.9.98 unformalized

शुद्धे च काले व्याख्यातमामिश्रे न प्रसिध्यति ।
साधुत्वमयथाकालं तत् सूत्रेणोपदिश्यते ॥ ९८ ॥

śuddhe ca kāle vyākhyātamāmiśre na prasidhyati |
sādhutvamayathākālaṃ tat sūtreṇopadiśyate || 98 ||

And what has been explained in the case of pure time does not obtain in the commingled; that correctness, contrary to the time, is taught by the sutra.

The two domains separated. Suddhe ca kale vyakhyatam amisre na prasidhyati: what has been *explained* in the case of *pure* time does *not obtain* in the *commingled* — the analysis of time-as-such does not govern composed forms. Sadhutvam ayatha-kalam tat sutrena upadisyate: that *correctness*, *contrary to the time*, is *taught by the sutra*. Ayatha-kalam: not-according-to-time — and it is *taught*, prescribed by rule. So the tense-mismatched form is correct by stipulation, and the stipulation is possible because the stem had no tense to be violated (3.9.97). The grammar simply posts a tense where its operations need one — 3.7.103's niyamah sabde na tu vastuni (the restriction is in the word, not in the thing), now at the finest morphological grain.

3.9.99 unformalized

आख्यातपदवाच्येऽर्थे निर्वर्त्यत्वात् प्रधानता ।
विशेषणं तदाक्षेपात् तत्काले व्यवतिष्ठते ॥ ९९ ॥

ākhyātapadavācye'rthe nirvartyatvāt pradhānatā |
viśeṣaṇaṃ tadākṣepāt tatkāle vyavatiṣṭhate || 99 ||

In the meaning expressible by the finite-verb word, principality belongs from its being what-is-to-be-produced; the qualifier, from its being implied by that, stands settled at that time.

The construction's semantic architecture. Akhyata-pada-vacye 'rthe nirvartyatvat pradhanata: in the meaning expressible by the *finite verb*, *principality* belongs from its being *what-is-to-be-produced* — the finite verb carries the nirvartya (3.7.45's object to be produced), and hence the sentence's principal (3.8.40's operations expressed as principal by the finite verbs). Visesanam tad-aksepat tat-kale vyavatisthate: the *qualifier*, from its being *implied* by that, stands settled *at that time*. So the stem's tense is not its own; it is implied by the finite verb and settled at the verb's time. This is 3.7.81-82's propagation (the capacity resting on the subordinate follows the principal) applied to tense — and it completes the answer to 3.9.94: the stem has no time, the verb supplies one, and the supplying is aksepa, implication.

3.9.100 unformalized

सम्प्रत्ययानुकारो वा शब्दव्यापार एव वा ।
अध्यस्यते विरुद्धेऽर्थे न च तेन विरुध्यते ॥ १०० ॥

sampratyayānukāro vā śabdavyāpāra eva vā |
adhyasyate viruddhe'rthe na ca tena virudhyate || 100 ||

Either an imitation of the comprehension, or else the word's very operation, is superimposed upon a contrary meaning — and it is not thereby contradicted.

The mechanism named, and it is superimposition. Sampratyaya-anukaro va: either an *imitation of the comprehension* — the form mimics how the thing is understood; sabda-vyapara eva va: or else the *word's very operation*. Adhyasyate viruddhe 'rthe: is *superimposed* upon a *contrary meaning* — adhyasa (3.1.6's central term; 3.8.11's asad-adhyasa; 3.9.33's phases superimposed). Na ca tena virudhyate: and it is *not thereby contradicted*. So the future-stem's sense is laid over a past-tense meaning, and the superimposition does not contradict because superimpositions never contradict what they are laid on (3.2.10's atyantam atad-atmakam: reality established as though having that for its self while being utterly not of that self). The tense-mismatch is a superimposition, and superimposition is what the whole Padakanda has said every category is.

3.9.101 unformalized

भूतं भविष्यदित्येतौ प्रत्ययौ वर्तमानताम् ।
अत्यजन्तौ प्रपद्येते विरुद्धाश्रयरूपताम् ॥ १०१ ॥

bhūtaṃ bhaviṣyadityetau pratyayau vartamānatām |
atyajantau prapadyete viruddhāśrayarūpatām || 101 ||

These two cognitions, 'past' and 'future', not abandoning present-ness, attain the form of resting on contraries.

The resolution, and it is elegant. Bhutam bhavisyad iti etau pratyayau: these two *cognitions*, '*past*' and '*future*' — and note pratyayau: they are cognitions, not times. Vartamanatam atyajantau: *not abandoning* *present-ness* — the cognitions of past and future are themselves present: to think of the past is to think now (3.9.90's present-ness as the inwardly-grasped continuum). Viruddha-asraya-rupatam prapadyete: they attain the *form of resting on contraries*. So past-cognition and future-cognition are both present cognitions resting on contrary contents — which is why a form can be future in its stem and past in its verb without contradiction: both tenses are present cognitions, and present cognitions of contraries coexist perfectly well in one mind. The verse resolves 3.9.93-95's puzzle by relocating tense into cognition, where contraries are ordinary.

3.9.102 unformalized

अध्वनो वर्तमानस्य यः शेषो य उपक्रमः ।
तद् वर्तमानसामीप्यं शास्त्रे भेदेन दर्शितम् ॥ १०२ ॥

adhvano vartamānasya yaḥ śeṣo ya upakramaḥ |
tad vartamānasāmīpyaṃ śāstre bhedena darśitam || 102 ||

That remainder of the present road, and that which is its commencement — that proximity to the present is shown by difference in the science.

The near-past and near-future. Adhvano vartamanasya yah sesah ya upakramah: that *remainder* of the *present road*, and that which is its *commencement* — the road-image again (3.9.52's three roads): the lit stretch has a beginning and a remainder, and things just entering or just leaving are neither simply present nor simply not. Tad vartamana-samipyam sastre bhedena darsitam: that *proximity to the present* is *shown by difference* in the *science* — Panini has rules for the immediate past and the immediate future (the lat used of what is just about to be, the near-past forms). So the grammar recognizes a penumbra around the present and marks it, and the penumbra is the road's ends. The verse is fine observation: languages do mark 'just now' and 'about to', and the samuddesa's road-image predicts exactly such a zone.

3.9.103 unformalized

अशंसा वर्तमानापि विषयेण भविष्यता ।
भाष्ये भविष्यत्कालेति कार्यार्थं व्यपदिश्यते ॥ १०३ ॥

aśaṃsā vartamānāpi viṣayeṇa bhaviṣyatā |
bhāṣye bhaviṣyatkāleti kāryārthaṃ vyapadiśyate || 103 ||

Expectation, though present, is designated in the Bhasya as 'of future time', for the sake of the operation, by reason of its object being future.

A case where the grammar names a tense by its object. Asamsa vartamana api: *expectation*, *though present* — hoping is happening now; the hope is a present state. Visayena bhavisyata: by reason of its *object* being *future* — what one hopes for is future. Bhasye bhavisyat-kala iti karyartham vyapadisyate: in the *Bhasya* it is *designated* as '*of future time*', *for the sake of the operation*. So Patanjali calls expectation future-tensed, though it is a present state, because its object lies ahead — and the naming is karyartham, for the sake of the rule's operation, not because anyone thinks hoping happens later. This is 3.9.98's ayatha-kalam sadhutva (correctness contrary to the time, taught by the sutra) with its authority named: the Bhasya does it, and it does it for the machinery.

3.9.104 unformalized

इच्छा चिकीर्षतीत्यत्र स्वकालमनुरुध्यते ।
भविष्यति प्रकृत्यर्थे तत्कालं नानुरुध्यते ॥ १०४ ॥

icchā cikīrṣatītyatra svakālamanurudhyate |
bhaviṣyati prakṛtyarthe tatkālaṃ nānurudhyate || 104 ||

In 'cikirsati', desire conforms to its own time; in the base-meaning which is future, it does not conform to that time.

The desiderative analysed. Iccha cikirsati iti atra sva-kalam anurudhyate: in *'cikirsati'* ('he wishes to do'), *desire* *conforms to its own time* — the wishing is present, and the form's tense is the wishing's. Bhavisyati prakrty-arthe tat-kalam na anurudhyate: in the *base-meaning* which is *future* — the doing that is wished — it does *not conform to that time*: the doing's futurity does not govern the form. So the desiderative's tense is the desire's, not the desired's — and this is the exact reverse of 3.9.103's expectation, where the grammar took the object's tense. Two closely-related constructions, opposite treatments, and no principle decides: the sastra posts what its operations need (3.9.98). The pair is the samuddesa's evidence that tense-assignment is stipulation.

3.9.105 unformalized

आशंस्यमानतन्त्रत्वादाशंसायां विपर्ययः ।
प्रयोक्तृधर्म शब्दार्थे शब्दैरेवानुषज्यते ॥ १०५ ॥

āśaṃsyamānatantratvādāśaṃsāyāṃ viparyayaḥ |
prayoktṛdharma śabdārthe śabdairevānuṣajyate || 105 ||

From its being dependent on what is expected, in expectation there is the reverse; the speaker's property is attached to the word's meaning by words alone.

Why 3.9.103 and 3.9.104 differ. Asamsyamana-tantratvat asamsayam viparyayah: from its being *dependent on what is expected*, in *expectation* there is *the reverse* — expectation's whole structure points at its object, so the object's tense governs; desire's structure centres on the desiring, so the desirer's time governs. Prayoktr-dharmah sabdarthe sabdaih eva anusajyate: the *speaker's property* is *attached* to the *word's meaning* *by words alone* — and this last is the doctrine: the speaker's own temporal position enters the word-meaning through the words, and nowhere else. So tense is where the speaker's now gets into what is said, and it gets in by morphology. This is 3.7.103's niyamah sabde na tu vastuni given its temporal application: the speaker's present is a property of his words, not of his meaning.

3.9.106 unformalized

अप्शालिबीजसंयोगे वर्तते निष्पदिर्यदा ।
तत्रावयववृत्तित्वाद् भविष्यत्प्रतिषेधनम् ॥ १०६ ॥

apśālibījasaṃyoge vartate niṣpadiryadā |
tatrāvayavavṛttitvād bhaviṣyatpratiṣedhanam || 106 ||

When 'nispad' operates on the conjunction of water and rice-seed, there — from its resting in the part — there is the negation of the future.

A worked case. Ap-sali-bija-samyoge vartate nispadir yada: when *'nispad'* (to be produced) *operates* on the *conjunction* of *water* and *rice-seed* — the sowing, where the crop's production is under way but not complete. Tatra avayava-vrttitvad bhavisyat-pratisedhanam: there — from its *resting in the part* — there is the *negation of the future*. The production is already occurring *in its part* (the germination), so it is not future: one says 'it is being produced', not 'it will be'. So the future is negated by the process's having begun anywhere in itself — and the whole-at-each doctrine (3.8.5's pratibhedam samapyate) makes the germination the whole production, present. This is why a sown field is not merely going to bear: the bearing has started, and the tense follows the part.

3.9.107 unformalized

फलप्रसवरूपे तु निष्पदौ भूतकालता ।
धर्मान्तरेषु तद्रूपमध्यस्य परिकल्प्यते ॥ १०७ ॥

phalaprasavarūpe tu niṣpadau bhūtakālatā |
dharmāntareṣu tadrūpamadhyasya parikalpyate || 107 ||

But in 'nispad' whose form is the bringing-forth of fruit, there is past-ness; that form, having been superimposed on other properties, is constructed.

The complement of 3.9.106. Phala-prasava-rupe tu nispadau bhuta-kalata: in *'nispad'* whose form is the *bringing-forth of fruit* — the production taken as complete, at its fruit — there is *past-ness*. Dharmantaresu tad-rupam adhyasya parikalpyate: that *form*, having been *superimposed* on *other properties*, is *constructed*. So the same root is present when taken at its part (3.9.106) and past when taken at its fruit, and the pastness is a superimposition (3.9.100's adhyasa) laid on the other phases. One process, two tenses, and the difference is where one looks: at the germinating or at the grain. This is 3.9.92's avadhi-bheda (the domain differentiated by a difference of limit) inside a single verb's semantics.

3.9.108 unformalized

उपयुक्ते निमित्तानां व्यापारे फलसिद्धये ।
तत्र रूपं यदध्यस्तं तत्कालं तत् प्रतीयते ॥ १०८ ॥

upayukte nimittānāṃ vyāpāre phalasiddhaye |
tatra rūpaṃ yadadhyastaṃ tatkālaṃ tat pratīyate || 108 ||

When the operation of the occasioning grounds has been employed for the accomplishing of the fruit — the form that is superimposed there is understood as of that time.

The general rule behind 3.9.106-107. Upayukte nimittanam vyapare phala-siddhaye: when the *operation* of the *occasioning grounds* has been *employed* for the *accomplishing of the fruit* — the causes have done their work. Tatra rupam yad adhyastam tat-kalam tat pratiyate: the *form* that is *superimposed* there is understood as *of that time*. So the tense follows the superimposed form, and the superimposition follows where the causes have got to. Tense is thus a report on causal progress — but a report by superimposition (adhyasta), which means it is a posting on the process rather than a reading of it. And 3.9.107 showed the posting is optional: the same causal state bears a present or a past according to where the limit is set.

3.9.109 unformalized

निष्पत्ताववधिः कश्चित् कश्चित् प्रतिविवक्षितः ।
हेतुजन्मव्यपेक्षातः फलजन्मेति चोच्यते ॥ १०९ ॥

niṣpattāvavadhiḥ kaścit kaścit prativivakṣitaḥ |
hetujanmavyapekṣātaḥ phalajanmeti cocyate || 109 ||

In the completion, some limit is intended, and some other; from dependence on the cause's birth, it is called 'the fruit's birth'.

The limits multiplied. Nispattau avadhih kascit kascit prati-vivaksitah: in the *completion*, *some* limit is *intended*, and *some other* — different speakers set the boundary differently, and each setting is a vivaksa (3.7.2's kvacit kimcit vivaksyate). Hetu-janma-vyapeksatah phala-janma iti ca ucyate: from *dependence on the cause's birth*, it is called '*the fruit's birth*'. So one may date the fruit's birth from the cause's beginning (the sowing is the harvest's birth) or from the fruit's own arrival — and the two datings are both correct, being different avadhis. This is why 3.9.106-107 could give one process two tenses: the limit is chosen, and the tense follows the limit (3.9.92's avadhi-bhedena visayo bhidyate).

3.9.110 unformalized

अबहिस्साधनाधीना सिद्धिर्यत्र विवक्षिता ।
तत् साधनान्तराभावात् सिद्धमित्युपदिश्यते ॥ ११० ॥

abahissādhanādhīnā siddhiryatra vivakṣitā |
tat sādhanāntarābhāvāt siddhamityupadiśyate || 110 ||

Where an accomplishment not dependent on external means is intended — that, from the absence of another means, is taught as 'accomplished'.

The limiting case of completion. Abahih-sadhana-adhina siddhir yatra vivaksita: where an *accomplishment not dependent on external means* is *intended* — nothing outside is still required; the process contains everything it needs. Tat sadhanantara-abhavat siddham iti upadisyate: *that*, from the *absence of another means*, is *taught as 'accomplished'*. So a thing counts as done when no further instrument is wanted — completion is defined by the exhaustion of requirements, not by the arrival of a result. This is 3.8.17's krtarthatva (the expectancy of the means withdrawing, its purpose served) given as the criterion for the past tense: something is past when nothing more is needed for it. And it explains the tense-system's deepest feature — that the past is where akanksa has closed.

3.9.111-114 unformalized

तस्मादवधिभेदेन सिद्धा मुख्यैव भूतता ।
अनागतत्वमस्तित्वं हेतुधर्मव्यपेक्षणे ॥ १११ ॥
सतामिन्द्रियसंबन्धात् सैव सत्ता विशिष्यते ।
भेदेन व्यवहारो हि वस्त्वन्तरनिबन्धनः ॥ ११२ ॥
अस्तित्वं वस्तुमात्रस्य बुद्ध्या तु परिगृह्यते ।
यः समासादनाद् भेदः स तत्र न विवक्षितः ॥ ११३ ॥
योगाद्वा स्त्रीत्वपुंस्त्वाभ्यां न किंचिदवतिष्ठते ।
स्वस्मिन्नात्मनि तत्रान्यद् भूतं भावि च कथ्यते ॥ ११४ ॥

tasmādavadhibhedena siddhā mukhyaiva bhūtatā |
anāgatatvamastitvaṃ hetudharmavyapekṣaṇe || 111 ||
satāmindriyasaṃbandhāt saiva sattā viśiṣyate |
bhedena vyavahāro hi vastvantaranibandhanaḥ || 112 ||
astitvaṃ vastumātrasya buddhyā tu parigṛhyate |
yaḥ samāsādanād bhedaḥ sa tatra na vivakṣitaḥ || 113 ||
yogādvā strītvapuṃstvābhyāṃ na kiṃcidavatiṣṭhate |
svasminnātmani tatrānyad bhūtaṃ bhāvi ca kathyate || 114 ||

(111) Therefore, by a difference of limit, past-ness is established as primary indeed; future-ness is existence, when the cause's property is depended upon. (112) From the sense-connection of existent things, that same Existence is distinguished; for practice by way of difference is grounded in another thing. (113) The existence of the mere thing is grasped by the intellect; that difference which comes from approach is not intended there. (114) Or, from connection with femininity and masculinity, nothing whatever stands settled; in its own self there, something else is called past and future.

The samuddesa's close, and it gathers everything into satta. (111): tasmad avadhi-bhedena siddha mukhya eva bhutata — *therefore*, by a *difference of limit*, *past-ness* is established as *primary indeed*: the past is not a derived or figurative tense but the primary one, and what makes it past is where the limit falls (3.9.109). And: anagatatvam astitvam hetu-dharma-vyapeksane — *future-ness* is *existence*, when the *cause's property* is *depended upon*: the future *is* existence, viewed from the causes. So both tenses are existence under limits. (112): satam indriya-sambandhat sa eva satta visisyate — from the *sense-connection* of *existent* things, *that same Existence* is *distinguished*: the present is Existence sense-connected (3.9.49's darsana-adarsane: the seeing and non-seeing of entities that exist). Bhedena vyavaharo hi vastv-antara-nibandhanah: *practice* by way of *difference* is *grounded in another thing* (3.9.80's paratah bhidyate sarvam). (113): astitvam vastu-matrasya buddhya tu parigrhyate — the *existence of the mere thing* is *grasped by the intellect*; yah samasadanad bhedah sa tatra na vivaksitah: the *difference* that comes from *approach* is *not intended* there — bare existence, intellect-grasped, carries no tense. (114) closes with a grammatical parallel: yogad va stritva-pumstvabhyam na kimcid avatisthate — from *connection with femininity and masculinity*, *nothing whatever* stands settled: as gender settles nothing about a thing (3.6.10's direction-words, feminine, with nothing in direction to be engendered), so tense settles nothing. Svasmin atmani tatra anyad bhutam bhavi ca kathyate: *in its own self* there, *something else* is called *past and future*. The samuddesa that began by refusing time-as-substance (3.9.1) ends by refusing tense-as-property: in a thing's own self nothing is past or future, and the tenses are said of something else — which is Existence, limited (3.9.111).
contested: the four-verse close is compressed and its argumentative joints are hard; we read 111-112 as the positive doctrine (both tenses are satta under limits, the present being satta sense-connected) and 113-114 as the negative (bare existence is tenseless; tense is no more a property than gender). The gender-parallel of 114 is our construal of a genuinely obscure verse