Book 3 - Pada-kāṇḍa (6): Dik-samuddeśa (On Position)

3.6.1 unformalized

दिक् साधनं क्रिया काल इति वस्त्वभिधायिनः ।
शक्तिरूपे पदार्थानामत्यन्तमनवस्थिताः ॥ १ ॥

dik sādhanaṃ kriyā kāla iti vastvabhidhāyinaḥ |
śaktirūpe padārthānāmatyantamanavasthitāḥ || 1 ||

Direction, means, action, time — these, though expressing things, are utterly unsettled in the capacity-form of word-meanings.

A manifesto for the four samuddesas it opens. Dik sadhanam kriya kalah — *direction*, *means*, *action*, *time*: the subjects of samuddesas 6, 7, 8 and 9, named together because they share a status. Vastv-abhidhayinah — they *express things*: the words for them behave like thing-words, take cases, get qualified, function as nouns. And yet: sakti-rupe padarthanam atyantam anavasthitah — in the *capacity-form* of word-meanings, they are *utterly unsettled*: taken as saktis — powers, which is what the Padakanda holds all categories to be (3.1.22-23: dravyadayah sarvah saktayah) — they will not stay put. The four are the hardest cases for the whole scheme: each is indispensable to the grammar, each is treated as a thing by the language, and none of them will submit to being one. Anavasthita — unsettled — is a word Bhartrhari has used for the unsettledness of doctrines (2.138) and of the divergence among schools (2.107); here it names the categories' own instability. The next hundred pages will not stabilize them. They will show why they cannot be stabilized.

3.6.2-3 unformalized

व्यतिरेकस्य यो हेतुरवधिप्रतिपाद्ययोः ।
ऋज्वित्येव यतोऽन्येन विना बुद्धि� प्रवर्तते ॥ २ ॥

vyatirekasya yo heturavadhipratipādyayoḥ |
ṛjvityeva yato'nyena vinā buddhiḥ pravartate || 2 ||

That which is the cause of separation of the limit and the thing to be conveyed — since, from it, a cognition proceeds as simply 'straight', without another.

Direction defined by its office, and the source transmits the passage defectively (the page carries verse 2 only, verse 3 having dropped). Vyatirekasya yo hetuh avadhi-pratipadyayoh: that which is the *cause of separation* of the *limit* and the *thing to be conveyed* — dik is what holds apart the reference-point and what is located from it: 'east of the village' requires that village and thing be separated, and direction is the separating. And the criterion: rju iti eva yato 'nyena vina buddhih pravartate — since, *from it*, a *cognition* proceeds as simply *'straight'*, *without another*: direction delivers straightness immediately, needing no further term. So dik is a primitive: what makes two things stand apart in a way that a single cognition registers as a line. The samuddesa will spend twenty-seven pages showing that this primitive is a power and not a thing.
contested: the wisdomlib page for 3.6.2-3 carries only one verse; verse 3 appears to have dropped from the source. We translate what is transmitted and note the lacuna

3.6.4 unformalized

परापरत्वे मूर्तानां देशभेदनिबन्धने ।
तत एव प्रकल्पेते क्रमरूपे तु कालतः ॥ ४ ॥

parāparatve mūrtānāṃ deśabhedanibandhane |
tata eva prakalpete kramarūpe tu kālataḥ || 4 ||

Priority and posteriority of corporeal things are grounded in difference of place; from that very source they are constructed — but in the form of sequence, they are from time.

The division of labour between direction and time. Para-aparatve murtanam desa-bheda-nibandhane: *priority and posteriority* of *corporeal* things are grounded in *difference of place* — 'this is before that' said of bodies in space is a fact about where they are, and dik supplies it. Tata eva prakalpyete: from *that very source* they are *constructed*. But: krama-rupe tu kalatah — in the *form of sequence*, they are *from time*: the same before-and-after, said of events, comes from kala. So para/apara is ambiguous between a spatial and a temporal reading, and the two samuddesas divide it. The verse is doing careful preliminary work — priority is not one thing with two applications but two constructions sharing a word — and it prepares 3.6.13's argument that direction, like time, does its work by conferring divisions on what has none.

3.6.5 unformalized

आकाशस्य प्रदेशेन भागैश्चान्यैः पृथक् पृथक् ।
सा संयोगविभागानामुपाधित्वाय कल्पते ॥ ५ ॥

ākāśasya pradeśena bhāgaiścānyaiḥ pṛthak pṛthak |
sā saṃyogavibhāgānāmupādhitvāya kalpate || 5 ||

By a location of ether, and by other portions severally — that (direction) serves as the limiting adjunct of conjunctions and disjunctions.

Direction's mechanism, and it operates on ether. Akasasya pradesena bhagaih ca anyaih prthak prthak: by a *location of ether*, and by *other portions* *severally* — akasa is undifferentiated (3.1.15), and 'portions' of it are constructed by the things conjoined with it (3.1.15-16's doctrine: places belonging to what is not a place). Sa samyoga-vibhaganam upadhitvaya kalpate: *that* — direction — serves as the *limiting adjunct* of *conjunctions and disjunctions*. Upadhi: the limiting condition (3.2.2's asatya-upadhi; 1.75's grahana-upadhi-bheda). So dik is what makes contacts and separations *directional* — what turns a bare conjunction into a coming-from-the-east. It is an adjunct on an adjunct: ether's portions are already constructed, and direction conditions the constructions. Nothing in the chain is a thing.

3.6.6 unformalized

दिशो व्यवस्था देशानां दिग्व्यवस्था न विद्यते ।
शक्तयः खलु भावानामुपकारप्रभावितः ॥ ६ ॥

diśo vyavasthā deśānāṃ digvyavasthā na vidyate |
śaktayaḥ khalu bhāvānāmupakāraprabhāvitaḥ || 6 ||

There is a settled arrangement of places by direction; there is no settled arrangement of direction. For the capacities of things are brought about by assistance.

The asymmetry that gives the samuddesa its thesis. Diso vyavastha desanam: there is a *settled arrangement of places* *by direction* — dik fixes where things are; it is the principle of spatial order. Dig-vyavastha na vidyate: there is *no settled arrangement of direction* — nothing fixes dik itself; ask where east is and no answer is forthcoming that does not presuppose a standpoint. And the ground: saktayah khalu bhavanam upakara-prabhavitah — for the *capacities of things* are *brought about by assistance*: powers exist in the assisting they do (3.3.5's upakara, by which the unnameable relation is tracked; 3.3.37's connection just being cause-of-cognition). Direction is a power, powers are their assisting, and an assisting has no station of its own. So dik orders everything and is itself unordered — which is 3.6.1's anavasthita made precise.

3.6.7 unformalized

प्रत्यस्तरूपा भावेषु दिक् पूर्वेत्यभिधीयते ।
पूर्वबुद्धिर्यतो दिक् सा समाख्यामात्रमन्यथा ॥ ७ ॥

pratyastarūpā bhāveṣu dik pūrvetyabhidhīyate |
pūrvabuddhiryato dik sā samākhyāmātramanyathā || 7 ||

Direction, whose form is dissolved away in things, is called 'east'; that from which the cognition 'east' arises, that is direction — otherwise it is mere designation.

The criterion for when 'direction' names a power and when it names nothing. Praty-asta-rupa bhavesu dik purva iti abhidhiyate: direction, *whose form is dissolved away* in things — pratyasta-rupa: its own form set aside, effaced, having no standing apart from what it orders (3.6.6's no-arrangement-of-direction) — is called *'east'*. And the test: purva-buddhir yato dik sa — that *from which* the cognition *'east'* arises, *that* is direction; samakhya-matram anyatha: *otherwise* it is *mere designation*. Where 'east' wakes an actual orientation-cognition, direction is operating; where it is merely a label (the eastern province, so named on a map nobody orients by), it is samakhya-matra — mere naming, an aupacariki-satta posting (3.3.39). The verse gives the samuddesa a working criterion: direction is present exactly where it does cognitive work, and its name outruns its presence.

3.6.8 unformalized

स्वाङ्गाद् व्यवस्था या लोके न तस्यां नियता दिशः ।
प्रत्यङ्मुखस्य यत् पश्चात्तत्पुरस्ताद्विपर्यये ॥ ८ ॥

svāṅgād vyavasthā yā loke na tasyāṃ niyatā diśaḥ |
pratyaṅmukhasya yat paścāttatpurastādviparyaye || 8 ||

That arrangement which is in the world from one's own body — in it the directions are not fixed; what is behind for one facing west is in front for one turned about.

The relativity of direction, demonstrated by turning around. Sva-angad vyavastha ya loke: the arrangement which is in the world *from one's own body* — the primary way anyone orients: front, back, left, right. Na tasyam niyata disah: in it the *directions are not fixed*. And the demonstration: pratyan-mukhasya yat pascat tat purastad viparyaye — what is *behind* for one *facing west* is *in front* *when turned about*. Turn, and behind becomes before. Nothing moved but the body. So the body-centred directions are wholly standpoint-relative, and they are the ones we actually live by — which means the primary directional facts are not facts about the world at all. This is 3.6.6's thesis made undeniable by an experiment anyone can run standing still.

3.6.9 unformalized

देशव्यवस्थानियमो दिक्षु न व्यवतिष्ठते ।
रूढमप्यपरत्वेन पूर्वमित्यभिधीयते ॥ ९ ॥

deśavyavasthāniyamo dikṣu na vyavatiṣṭhate |
rūḍhamapyaparatvena pūrvamityabhidhīyate || 9 ||

The restriction of the arrangement of places does not stand fixed among the directions; even what is established as posterior is spoken of as 'prior'.

The relativity extended past the body. Desa-vyavastha-niyamah disu na vyavatisthate: the *restriction* of the arrangement of *places* does *not stand fixed* among the *directions* — even the fixed cardinal directions do not fix things, because which is which depends on where one stands. Rudham api aparatvena purvam iti abhidhiyate: even what is *established as posterior* — rudha, conventionally settled as the further one (2.128's rudhi: hardened currency) — is *spoken of as 'prior'*. The village east of me is west of my neighbour, and both of us are right. So even the conventionally-hardened directional assignments invert with standpoint. The verse pairs with 3.6.8: bodily directions invert by turning, cardinal directions invert by moving, and neither survives as a property of anything.

3.6.10 unformalized

अतो भाषितपुस्कत्वात् पुंवद्भावो न सिद्ध्यति ।
अस्मिन्नर्थे न शब्देन प्रसवः क्वचिदुच्यते ॥ १० ॥

ato bhāṣitapuskatvāt puṃvadbhāvo na siddhyati |
asminnarthe na śabdena prasavaḥ kvaciducyate || 10 ||

Therefore, from its having a spoken masculine, the masculine-substitution is not established; in this meaning, no engendering is anywhere stated by a word.

A grammatical consequence, and it is technical. Panini's rules provide for pumvad-bhava — *masculine-substitution*: in certain compounds, a feminine form is replaced by the corresponding masculine, and the rule applies where the stem is bhasita-pumska, 'having a spoken masculine' (a feminine whose masculine counterpart exists in usage with the same meaning). The direction-words are feminine (dik, prac) and the question is whether they qualify. Atah bhasita-pumskatvat pumvad-bhavo na sidhyati: *therefore*, from its having a spoken masculine, the masculine-substitution is *not established*. And the reason: asmin arthe na sabdena prasavah kvacid ucyate — in *this meaning*, *no engendering* is anywhere stated by a word: direction has no sex, and the grammatical gender of 'dik' answers to nothing in the thing. Prasava — engendering, generation: the ground on which grammatical gender is sometimes said to rest (the Linga-samuddesa, the thirteenth, will take this up). Direction fails the test because there is nothing there to be engendered.

3.6.11 unformalized

दिक्शक्तेरभिधाने तु नियतं दिशि दर्शनम् ।
पूर्वादीनां यथा षष्टेर्जीवितस्यावधारणे ॥ ११ ॥

dikśakterabhidhāne tu niyataṃ diśi darśanam |
pūrvādīnāṃ yathā ṣaṣṭerjīvitasyāvadhāraṇe || 11 ||

But when the capacity of direction is being expressed, the seeing of 'east' and the rest is fixed in the direction — as sixty is fixed in the determining of a lifetime.

The complement to 3.6.7: where direction *is* operating, it operates determinately. Dik-sakteh abhidhane tu: but when the *capacity of direction* is being *expressed* — where 'east' does its orienting work rather than merely labelling — niyatam disi darsanam purvadinam: the *seeing* of 'east' and the rest is *fixed* in the direction. And the simile: yatha sasteh jivitasya avadharane — as *sixty* in the *determining of a lifetime*: the traditional span, by which one says a man is in his sixties — a number that fixes nothing absolutely and fixes everything once the scale is granted. So direction's determinacy is scale-relative, exactly as the lifespan's is: within the frame it is exact, and the frame is not given by the thing. This is the samuddesa's balance-point — relativity (3.6.8-9) without arbitrariness (here): once a standpoint is taken, east is east, and no one is confused.

3.6.12 unformalized

छायाभाभ्यां नगादीनां भागभेदः प्रकल्पते ।
अतद्धर्मस्वभावेषु भागभेदो न कल्पते ॥ १२ ॥

chāyābhābhyāṃ nagādīnāṃ bhāgabhedaḥ prakalpate |
ataddharmasvabhāveṣu bhāgabhedo na kalpate || 12 ||

By shade and light, a difference of portions is constructed for mountains and the like; among things whose own nature is not of that property, a difference of portions is not constructed.

How directional portions get attached to things. Chaya-abhabhyam nagadinam bhaga-bhedah prakalpate: by *shade and light*, a *difference of portions* is *constructed* for mountains and the like — the mountain's sunny side and shady side, and thence its east face and west face: the divisions come from the sun's relation to it, not from the mountain. Atad-dharma-svabhavesu bhaga-bhedo na kalpate: among things whose *own nature* is *not of that property* — things that cast no shade, take no light — a difference of portions is *not constructed*. So directional divisions attach only where something extrinsic can differentiate, and where nothing can, the thing has no sides. This is 3.1.15's ether-argument in the mountains: portions are conferred by relata (samyogi-dharma-bhedena), and where no relatum differentiates, there are no portions to have.

3.6.13 unformalized

परमाणोरभागस्य दिशा भागो विधीयते ।
भागप्रकल्पनाशक्तिं प्रथमां तां प्रचक्षते ॥ १३ ॥

paramāṇorabhāgasya diśā bhāgo vidhīyate |
bhāgaprakalpanāśaktiṃ prathamāṃ tāṃ pracakṣate || 13 ||

For the partless atom, a part is prescribed by direction; that they call the first capacity — the capacity of constructing parts.

The samuddesa's most consequential verse. Paramanoh abhagasya disa bhago vidhiyate: for the *partless atom*, a *part* is *prescribed by direction* — the atom is by definition without parts, and direction gives it sides: an east face, a west face, whence it can touch its neighbours (the classic problem that broke Vaisesika atomism: if atoms are partless, contact must be total, and aggregates could not have magnitude). Direction supplies the parts the physics needs and the definition forbids. And the naming: bhaga-prakalpana-saktim prathamam tam pracaksate — that they call the *first capacity*: the *capacity of constructing parts*. Prathama — first: dik is the primordial power, prior to everything, because everything that has parts got them from it. And prakalpana — constructing: not revealing, constructing (2.236's apandita imagining the atom with parts, there a diagnosis of mental compulsion, here the compulsion's power named and honoured). Direction is what makes a divided world out of an undivided one, and it is not a thing.

3.6.14 unformalized

अदेशाश्चाप्यभागाश्च निष्क्रमा निरूपाश्रयाः ।
भावाः संसर्गिरूपात्तु शक्तिभेदः प्रकल्पते ॥ १४ ॥

adeśāścāpyabhāgāśca niṣkramā nirūpāśrayāḥ |
bhāvāḥ saṃsargirūpāttu śaktibhedaḥ prakalpate || 14 ||

Things are without place, without parts, without motion, without support; but from the form of what is commingled, a difference of capacities is constructed.

The consequence of 3.6.13, stated at full generality. Adesah ca api abhagah ca niskrama nirupasrayah bhavah: things are *without place*, *without parts*, *without motion*, *without support* — four privations, and they strip a thing of everything spatial. Nothing has a location of its own, nothing has sides of its own, nothing moves of itself, nothing rests on anything. And: samsargi-rupat tu sakti-bhedah prakalpate — but from the *form of what is commingled*, a *difference of capacities* is *constructed*. Everything spatial is conferred by relation — by what a thing is *with* (3.1.16's places belonging to relata; 3.6.5's ether-portions; 3.6.12's shade and light). The verse is the Dik-samuddesa's answer to 3.6.1's promise: direction will not settle as a thing because there are no things for it to be a property of. There are commingling and the capacities commingling constructs.

3.6.15 unformalized

निर्बागात्मकता तुल्या परमाणोर्घटस्य च ।
भागः शक्त्यंन्तरं तत्र परिमाणं च यत्तयोः ॥ १५ ॥

nirbāgātmakatā tulyā paramāṇorghaṭasya ca |
bhāgaḥ śaktyaṃntaraṃ tatra parimāṇaṃ ca yattayoḥ || 15 ||

Partlessness is equal for the atom and for the pot; a part there is another capacity — and so is whatever magnitude belongs to those two.

The great leveling, and it is the samuddesa's boldest claim. Nirbhagatmakata tulya paramanoh ghatasya ca: *partlessness* is *equal* for the *atom* and for the *pot*. The pot is as partless as the atom. This is not a claim about size: it is 3.6.14's doctrine applied without exception — nothing has parts of its own, so the pot's evident parts are as conferred as the atom's disputed ones, and the two stand on exactly the same footing. Bhagah sakty-antaram tatra: a *part* there is *another capacity* — parthood is a sakti, constructed by direction (3.6.13), not a feature of the thing. Parimanam ca yat tayoh: and so is whatever *magnitude* belongs to those two — size likewise. So the Vaisesika's whole problem — how do partless atoms compose extended things? — is dissolved rather than solved: the extended thing is no more composed than the atom is partless, both being capacity-constructions on what has neither parts nor magnitude. The samuddesa on direction has arrived, in fifteen verses, at the dissolution of the atomic ontology.

3.6.16 unformalized

यतः प्रकल्पते भेदो भेदस्तत्रापि दृश्यते ।
अदृष्टोपरतिं भेदमतो युक्ततरं विदुः ॥ १६ ॥

yataḥ prakalpate bhedo bhedastatrāpi dṛśyate |
adṛṣṭoparatiṃ bhedamato yuktataraṃ viduḥ || 16 ||

That from which difference is constructed — there too a difference is seen; therefore they know difference, whose ceasing is unseen, to be the more reasonable view.

The regress of differentiators, and its resolution by beginninglessness. Yatah prakalpate bhedah bhedah tatra api drsyate: that *from which* difference is *constructed* — direction, the first capacity (3.6.13) — *there too* a *difference is seen*: direction itself comes differentiated (east from west), and what differentiated *it*? The regress threatens exactly as it did for the atom's parts. And the resolution: adrsta-uparatim bhedam atah yuktataram viduh — therefore they know *difference whose ceasing is unseen* to be the *more reasonable* view: difference has no observed terminus, no point at which one reaches an undifferentiated differentiator. Adrsta-uparati: its cessation is not seen. This is not a proof that difference is beginningless but a methodological verdict — yuktatara, *more reasonable*: given that every candidate for a first differentiator turns out differentiated, the reasonable course is to stop looking for one. The same move stopped the samavaya-regress at 3.3.16 and the operation-regress at 3.3.28: refuse the demand rather than satisfy it.

3.6.17 unformalized

सर्वत्र तस्य कार्यस्य दर्शनाद्विभुरिष्यते ।
विभुत्वमेतदेवाहुरन्यः कार्यवतां विधिः ॥ १७ ॥

sarvatra tasya kāryasya darśanādvibhuriṣyate |
vibhutvametadevāhuranyaḥ kāryavatāṃ vidhiḥ || 17 ||

Because its effect is seen everywhere, it is held to be all-pervading; this very thing they call all-pervadingness — another is the rule for things that have effects.

What 'all-pervading' actually means, and it is deflationary. Sarvatra tasya karyasya darsanat vibhur isyate: because its *effect* is seen *everywhere*, it is held to be *all-pervading* — direction is called vibhu not because it has been found everywhere but because its working shows everywhere. Vibhutvam etad eva ahuh: *this very thing* they call *all-pervadingness*. So vibhutva is defined by universal efficacy, not by universal presence — there is no omnipresent stuff, only an operation nowhere absent (3.3.37's connection just being cause-of-cognition; 3.6.6's capacities brought about by assistance). And the contrast: anyah karyavatam vidhih — *another* is the rule for things that *have* effects: ordinary things, which have effects, are located where they are and their effects elsewhere. Direction is not such a thing. Its being everywhere *is* its effect being everywhere, and there is no further fact.

3.6.18 unformalized

चैतन्यवत् स्थिता लोके दिक्कालपरिकल्पना ।
प्रकृतिं प्राणिनां तां हि कोऽन्यथा स्थापयिष्यति ॥ १८ ॥

caitanyavat sthitā loke dikkālaparikalpanā |
prakṛtiṃ prāṇināṃ tāṃ hi ko'nyathā sthāpayiṣyati || 18 ||

The construction of direction and time stands in the world like consciousness itself; for who will establish otherwise that nature of living beings?

The samuddesa's most striking claim, and its simile is 1.41's. Caitanyavat sthita loke dik-kala-parikalpana: the *construction of direction and time* stands in the world *like consciousness itself*. The comparison is exact in the way 1.41's was (tradition persisting avicchedena, caitanyam iva — like consciousness): what is compared to consciousness is what one cannot get behind, because every attempt to get behind it uses it. Directional and temporal construing is not a theory anyone holds; it is the shape of any holding. And the rhetorical question seals it: prakrtim praninam tam hi ko 'nyatha sthapayisyati — for *who will establish otherwise* that *nature of living beings*? Prakrti here is nature-as-constitution: orienting and timing is what living beings *are*, not what they do. So the parikalpana that 3.6.13 called the first capacity is here called our nature — and the two descriptions are one: what constructs the world's parts is what we cannot help being.

3.6.19 unformalized

सङ्करो व्यवहाराणां प्रकृतेः स्याद्विपर्यये ।
तस्मात्त्यजन्निमान् भावान् पुनरेवावलंबते ॥ १९ ॥

saṅkaro vyavahārāṇāṃ prakṛteḥ syādviparyaye |
tasmāttyajannimān bhāvān punarevāvalaṃbate || 19 ||

There would be a confusion of practices in the reversal of that nature; therefore one who abandons these entities takes hold of them again.

The practical necessity, and the verse's last clause is wry. Sankaro vyavaharanam prakrteh syad viparyaye: there would be a *confusion of practices* in the *reversal* of that nature — abolish directional and temporal construing and no transaction survives; nothing could be located, sequenced, or done (3.3.71's vyavaharo nivartate: practice withdraws when reality and otherness are both abandoned). Tasmat tyajann iman bhavan punar eva avalambate: *therefore* one who *abandons* these entities *takes hold of them again*. The philosopher who has argued direction into a capacity and the atom into a construction still says 'to the east' when giving directions to his house. Avalambate — takes hold, leans on: he leans on what he has just refuted, and must. This is 3.3.82's doctrine (all worldly practice is carried on by a being raised up by construction alone, as though by a primary word-meaning) with a smile at the theorist's expense — including, unmistakably, the author's own.

3.6.20 unformalized

तस्यास्तु शक्तेः पूर्वादिभेदो भावान्तराश्रयः ।
भिन्ना दिक् तेन भेदेन भेदायैवोपकल्पते ॥ २० ॥

tasyāstu śakteḥ pūrvādibhedo bhāvāntarāśrayaḥ |
bhinnā dik tena bhedena bhedāyaivopakalpate || 20 ||

But of that capacity, the difference of 'east' and the rest rests upon another entity; direction, differentiated by that difference, serves for differentiation alone.

Direction's own differentiation, located outside it. Tasyah tu sakteh purvadi-bhedah bhava-antara-asrayah: of *that capacity*, the difference of *'east' and the rest* rests upon *another entity* — east is east relative to something else (the sun, the body, the reference-point of 3.6.2's avadhi); the differences within direction are conferred from outside, as direction confers differences on what it orders. Bhinna dik tena bhedena bhedaya eva upakalpate: *direction*, *differentiated by that difference*, serves *for differentiation alone*. So the sequence runs: something else differentiates direction; direction, so differentiated, differentiates everything else; and it does nothing but that. The verse answers 3.6.16's regress by accepting it and locating direction within it: dik is a differentiated differentiator, not a first term, and 3.6.16 already ruled that looking for a first term is unreasonable.

3.6.21 unformalized

अवधित्वेन चापेक्षायोगे दिग्लक्षणो विधिः ।
पूर्वमस्येति षष्ठ्येव दृष्टा धर्मान्तराश्रये ॥ २१ ॥

avadhitvena cāpekṣāyoge diglakṣaṇo vidhiḥ |
pūrvamasyeti ṣaṣṭhyeva dṛṣṭā dharmāntarāśraye || 21 ||

And when there is a dependence by way of being a limit, the rule characterized by direction applies; the sixth case alone is seen, as in 'this is prior to that', where another property is the substrate.

The grammar of directional expressions. Avadhitvena ca apeksa-yoge: when there is a *dependence by way of being a limit* — where one thing serves as the reference-point from which another is located — dig-laksano vidhih: the *rule characterized by direction* applies (Panini's provisions for directional words: purva, apara, daksina and their case-government). And the observation: purvam asya iti sasthy eva drsta dharma-antara-asraye — *'prior to this'*: the *sixth case alone* is seen, where *another property* is the *substrate*. The genitive, not the ablative: one says 'this village's east' rather than 'east from this village', and the genitive is the case of relation whose generating action has withdrawn (2.197-198). So direction's grammar registers exactly its metaphysics: a relation, standing without any live action, expressed by the case that expresses standing relations.

3.6.22 unformalized

पूर्वादीनां विपर्यासोऽदृष्टश्चावध्यसङ्करे ।
ऋज्वेतदस्येत्येतच्च लिङ्गं न व्यतिकीर्यते ॥ २२ ॥

pūrvādīnāṃ viparyāso'dṛṣṭaścāvadhyasaṅkare |
ṛjvetadasyetyetacca liṅgaṃ na vyatikīryate || 22 ||

The inversion of 'east' and the rest is not seen when the limits are unconfused; and this mark — 'this is straight from that' — is not intermixed.

The determinacy that survives the relativity. 3.6.8-9 showed directions inverting with standpoint; here the limit of that. Purvadinam viparyasah adrstah avadhy-asankare: the *inversion* of 'east' and the rest is *not seen* when the *limits are unconfused* — hold the reference-point fixed and east does not become west; the inversions of 3.6.8-9 all came from *changing* the avadhi. Rju etad asya iti etat ca lingam na vyatikiryate: and this *mark* — 'this is *straight* from that' (3.6.2's rju: the straightness direction delivers) — is *not intermixed*: the straight-line relation between two fixed points is determinate and does not blur. So directional relativity is standpoint-relativity and nothing more: relative to a limit, everything is exact. This is 3.6.11's balance (within the frame, exact; the frame not given by the thing) stated as a rule, and it is what keeps the samuddesa's constructivism from collapsing into arbitrariness.

3.6.23 unformalized

अन्तःकरणधर्मो वा बहिरेवं प्रकाशते ।
अस्यां त्वन्तर्बहिर्भावः प्रक्रियायां न विद्यते ॥ २३ ॥

antaḥkaraṇadharmo vā bahirevaṃ prakāśate |
asyāṃ tvantarbahirbhāvaḥ prakriyāyāṃ na vidyate || 23 ||

Or it is a property of the inner organ that shines forth thus, outwardly; but in this procedure, there is no being-within or being-without.

The inner/outer question raised and dismissed. Antahkarana-dharmo va bahir evam prakasate: *or* it is a property of the *inner organ* that *shines forth* thus, *outwardly* — direction as a form of the mind, projected: the reading a Kantian would recognize, and it is offered as an alternative (va). But then the dismissal: asyam tu antar-bahir-bhavah prakriyayam na vidyate — but in *this procedure*, there is *no being-within or being-without*. The inner/outer distinction is itself a directional construction (3.6.13's bhaga-prakalpana: the constructing of parts), so it cannot be used to place direction. To ask whether direction is in the mind or in the world is to ask a directional question about direction, and 3.3.77's rule forbids it: thing-distinctions do not deserve definitions among non-things. The verse is a small masterpiece of self-restraint: it names the idealist option, sees that stating it presupposes what it explains, and declines.

3.6.24 unformalized

एकत्वमासां शक्तीनां नानात्वं वेति कल्पने ।
अवस्तुपतिते ज्ञात्वा सत्यतो न परामृशेत् ॥ २४ ॥

ekatvamāsāṃ śaktīnāṃ nānātvaṃ veti kalpane |
avastupatite jñātvā satyato na parāmṛśet || 24 ||

Knowing that the construction of oneness or of manifoldness for these capacities has fallen among non-things — one should not reflect upon it as real.

A methodological injunction, and it is the samuddesa's discipline. Ekatvam asam saktinam nanatvam va iti kalpane: the *construction of oneness* or of *manifoldness* for these *capacities* — is direction one power or many (east, west, north as distinct saktis)? Avastu-patite jnatva: *knowing* that it has *fallen among non-things* — the question is about capacities, and capacities are not things, and thing-questions do not apply (3.3.77 again). Satyato na paramrset: one should *not reflect upon it as real*. The injunction is precise: not 'do not ask' but 'do not take the answer as real' — one may construct oneness or manifoldness as the description requires (2.179's licensed double description) and must not mistake either for a finding. This is the samuddesa policing itself: having just declined the inner/outer question (3.6.23), it now declines the one/many question, on the same ground.

3.6.25 unformalized

विकल्पातीततत्त्वेषु सङ्केतोपनिबन्धनाः ।
भावेषु व्यवहारा ये लोकस्तत्रानुगम्यते ॥ २५ ॥

vikalpātītatattveṣu saṅketopanibandhanāḥ |
bhāveṣu vyavahārā ye lokastatrānugamyate || 25 ||

Among entities whose reality is beyond construction, the practices resting on convention — the world is followed along in those.

Where the injunction of 3.6.24 leaves us. Vikalpa-atita-tattvesu bhavesu: among *entities* whose *reality is beyond construction* — everything, on this samuddesa's showing (3.6.14: things are without place, parts, motion, support). Sanketa-upanibandhanah vyavaharah ye: the *practices* resting on *convention* — sanketa: agreed usage, the working namings of 2.142. Lokah tatra anugamyate: *the world is followed along* in those. Not: the world is *corrected*. Followed. The wise man does not construct alternatives against the world's namings (2.142's tat prajnah na vikalpayet), and here that counsel is applied to the most fundamental case: the world says east and west and before and after, its entities are beyond all such construction, and one follows the world. Anugamyate is the samuddesa's last practical word, and it is the same verb 3.6.19 used for the theorist taking hold again of what he abandoned.

3.6.26 unformalized

नैकत्वमस्त्यनानात्वं विनैकत्वेन नेतरत् ।
परमार्थे तयोरेष भेदोऽत्यन्तं न विद्यते ॥ २६ ॥

naikatvamastyanānātvaṃ vinaikatvena netarat |
paramārthe tayoreṣa bhedo'tyantaṃ na vidyate || 26 ||

There is no oneness without non-manifoldness, and not the other without oneness; in the highest sense, this difference between the two does not exist at all.

The one/many question of 3.6.24 answered by dissolution. Na ekatvam asti ananatvam: there is *no oneness* without *non-manifoldness* — to be one is to be not-many; the concept is negative through and through. Vina ekatvena na itarat: and *not the other* without *oneness* — to be many is to be not-one. Each is the other's negation and neither has independent content. Paramarthe tayoh esa bhedo 'tyantam na vidyate: in the *highest sense*, this *difference* between the two does *not exist at all*. So the question 'is direction one or many?' has no answer because its two options are not two: each is the denial of the other, and where neither can be affirmed independently, the disjunction is empty. This is 3.3.60-61's structure exactly (being and non-being mutually understood, hence constructions of one self), now applied to number — and it explains 3.6.24's injunction: one does not reflect on it as real because there is no *it*.

3.6.27 unformalized

न शक्तीनां तथा भेदो यथा शक्तिमतां स्थितिः ।
न च लौकिकमेकत्वं तासामात्मसु विद्यते ॥ २७ ॥

na śaktīnāṃ tathā bhedo yathā śaktimatāṃ sthitiḥ |
na ca laukikamekatvaṃ tāsāmātmasu vidyate || 27 ||

There is no difference of the capacities such as belongs to the standing of things that have capacities; nor is there a worldly oneness among their selves.

The capacities placed outside the number-categories altogether. Na saktinam tatha bhedo yatha sakti-matam sthitih: there is *no difference of the capacities* such as belongs to the *standing of things that have* capacities — powers are not distinct in the way their bearers are distinct: two cows are two, and the powers in them are not two in that way (1.2's aprthaktve 'pi saktibhyah: not separate from its powers, yet functioning as though separate). Na ca laukikam ekatvam tasam atmasu vidyate: nor is there a *worldly oneness* among their *selves* — neither are they one in the way a thing is one. So capacities are neither many as things are many nor one as a thing is one: they fall outside the number-scheme, which is exactly 3.6.24's avastu-patite (fallen among non-things). The verse is the samuddesa's most precise statement of what a sakti is, and it says what it is not.

3.6.28 unformalized

नैकत्वं व्यवतिष्ठेत नानात्वं चेन्न कल्पयेत् ।
नानात्वं चावहीयेत यद्येकत्वं न कल्पयेत् ॥ २८ ॥

naikatvaṃ vyavatiṣṭheta nānātvaṃ cenna kalpayet |
nānātvaṃ cāvahīyeta yadyekatvaṃ na kalpayet || 28 ||

Oneness would not stand fixed if one did not construct manifoldness; and manifoldness would fall away if one did not construct oneness.

The mutual dependence of 3.6.26 stated as a constructive fact. Na ekatvam vyavatistheta nanatvam cen na kalpayet: *oneness* would not *stand fixed* if one did not *construct manifoldness* — the one is available only against a many that construction supplies. Nanatvam ca avahiyeta yadi ekatvam na kalpayet: and *manifoldness* would *fall away* if one did not construct *oneness* — the many is available only against a one. So both members of the pair are held in place by the other's construction, and neither is found. This is the Dik-samuddesa's fitting close: a samuddesa about the power that constructs all parts (3.6.13's bhaga-prakalpana-sakti) ends by showing that the categories in which we count the parts are themselves mutually-propping constructions. Direction makes the many; the many and the one make each other; and nothing in the sequence rests on anything. The next samuddesa — Sadhana, on the karakas, the largest in the kanda — will find the same structure in the grammar's account of who does what to whom.