Book 3 - Pada-kāṇḍa (3): Sambandha-samuddeśa (On Relation)

3.3.1 unformalized

ज्ञानं प्रयोक्तुर्बाह्योऽर्थः स्वरूपं च प्रतीयते ।
शब्दैरुच्चरितैस्तैषां संबन्धः समवस्थितः ॥ १ ॥

jñānaṃ prayokturbāhyo'rthaḥ svarūpaṃ ca pratīyate |
śabdairuccaritaistaiṣāṃ saṃbandhaḥ samavasthitaḥ || 1 ||

The speaker's cognition, the external object, and the own-form are understood; by words when uttered, the connection of these stands established.

The samuddesa opens by naming its three relata. What a word delivers is: jnanam prayoktuh — the *speaker's cognition* (what he had in mind); bahyo 'rthah — the *external object* (what it was about); svarupam ca — and the *own-form* (the word itself, 1.50's self-presentation, 3.1.6's sva jati expressed first of all). Three things, and: sabdaih uccaritaih tesam sambandhah samavasthitah — by words *when uttered*, the *connection* of these stands established. Note uccaritaih — *when uttered*: the connection is established in the uttering, not before (2.399's door: the eternal bond is a standing possibility and utterance is the walking through; 2.401's relation constituted within the act). So the samuddesa's subject is announced as a three-term relation that comes into being when someone speaks. Everything that follows will ask what such a relation could be — and the answer, prepared since 2.46, is that it is not a thing at all.

3.3.2 unformalized

प्रतिपत्तिर्भवत्यर्थे ज्ञाने वा संशयः क्वचित् ।
स्वरूपेषूपलब्धेषु व्यभिचारो न विद्यते ॥ २ ॥

pratipattirbhavatyarthe jñāne vā saṃśayaḥ kvacit |
svarūpeṣūpalabdheṣu vyabhicāro na vidyate || 2 ||

Comprehension occurs with respect to the object; in the cognition there is sometimes doubt; but when the own-forms are apprehended, there is no deviation.

The three relata of 3.3.1 sorted by reliability, and the sorting is exact. Pratipattir bhavaty arthe: *comprehension* occurs with respect to the *object* — hearing a word, one gets its meaning. Jnane va samsayah kvacit: in the *cognition* there is *sometimes doubt* — what the speaker actually had in mind is often uncertain (he may have misspoken, or meant otherwise, or not known his own mind). But: svarupesu upalabdhesu vyabhicaro na vidyate — when the *own-forms* are *apprehended*, there is *no deviation*: about the word itself there is never error; hearing 'gauh', one cannot be wrong that 'gauh' was said. So the three relata have three epistemic grades: the word-form is indefeasible, the object is reliably reached, the speaker's mind is doubtful. Vyabhicara — deviation — is the logician's term for a mark that strays from what it marks (3.1.32's satya/asatya sorting), and its absence in the word's own case is why 3.1.6 could make the word's self-expression primary: it is the one thing in the transaction that cannot fail.

3.3.3 unformalized

अस्यायं वाचको वाच्य इति षष्ठ्या प्रतीयते ।
योगः शब्दार्थयोस्तत्त्वमित्यतो व्यपदिश्यते ॥ ३ ॥

asyāyaṃ vācako vācya iti ṣaṣṭhyā pratīyate |
yogaḥ śabdārthayostattvamityato vyapadiśyate || 3 ||

'This is the expressor of that, that is the expressible' — so it is understood through the sixth case; the yoking of word and meaning is therefore designated as their reality.

How the connection presents itself in language. Asya ayam vacakah vacyah iti sasthya pratiyate: 'this is *the expressor of that*, that is *the expressible*' — it is understood through the *sixth case*, the genitive: we speak of the word *of* a meaning, the meaning *of* a word, and the genitive is the case of relation as such (2.197-198's doctrine: the genitive expresses relations whose generating action has withdrawn). Yogah sabdarthayoh tattvam ity ato vyapadisyate: the *yoking* of word and meaning is *therefore designated as their reality*. Mark the 'therefore': it is *because* we say it in the genitive that we call the yoking their reality. The designation follows the grammar. So the samuddesa's opening move is to notice that our whole conviction that there *is* a word-meaning relation rests on a case-ending — which, given everything the work has said about case-endings being postings (2.198's samasasya nivrttaye: the genitive prescribed to block compounding), is not a reassuring foundation. The interrogation begins here.

3.3.4 unformalized

नाभिधानं स्वधर्मेण संबन्धस्यास्ति वाचकम् ।
अत्यन्तपरतन्त्रत्वाद्रूपं नास्यापदिश्यते ॥ ४ ॥

nābhidhānaṃ svadharmeṇa saṃbandhasyāsti vācakam |
atyantaparatantratvādrūpaṃ nāsyāpadiśyate || 4 ||

There is no naming that expresses the connection by its own property; because it is utterly dependent, no form of it is designated.

The samuddesa's central thesis, and it is 2.46's finding stated as doctrine. Na abhidhanam sva-dharmena sambandhasya asti vacakam: there is *no naming* that expresses the connection *by its own property* — no word reaches it as words reach things, by delivering what it is in itself. And the reason: atyanta-paratantratvat rupam na asya apadisyate — because it is *utterly dependent*, no *form* of it is *designated*. Paratantra — dependent, other-tenanted: the term 1.62 used for the subordinate member that takes no operations directly, and 2.196 for the particles that cannot stand alone. Here it is atyanta, *utterly*: the relation is not merely dependent in some respect; dependence is all it is. A thing with no independent standing has no rupa, no form, to be named — and so the relation, which every semantics needs, is the one item language cannot reach. This is why 2.46 said its form is never seen and it is utterly beyond thinghood: not a defect in our access, but the absence of anything to access.

3.3.5 unformalized

उपकारात्स यत्रास्ति धर्मस्तत्रानुगम्यते ।
शक्तीनामपि सा शक्तिर्गुणानामप्यसौ गुणः ॥ ५ ॥

upakārātsa yatrāsti dharmastatrānugamyate |
śaktīnāmapi sā śaktirguṇānāmapyasau guṇaḥ || 5 ||

Where it exists from assistance, there the property is followed along; it is the capacity even of capacities, the quality even of qualities.

How the unnameable relation is nonetheless tracked. Upakarat sa yatra asti dharmah tatra anugamyate: where it exists *from assistance* — where one thing assists another, and the assisting is the relation's whole presence — there the *property* is *followed along*: we detect the relation by its work, never by its face (2.46's karya-anumeyah: inferable from its effect). And then two formulations of remarkable compression: saktinam api sa saktih — it is the *capacity even of capacities*; gunanam api asau gunah — the *quality even of qualities*. The relation is what enables enabling, what qualifies qualifying. It stands one level up from every category and inside each: nothing has its power except by relation, and relation has no power of its own. This is the samuddesa's answer to how the formless can be omnipresent — it is not a further item alongside capacities and qualities, it is their functioning, and functioning has no face.

3.3.6 unformalized

तद्धर्मणोस्तु ताच्छब्द्यं संयोगसमवाययोः ।
तयोरप्युपकारार्था नियतास्तदुपाधयः ॥ ६ ॥

taddharmaṇostu tācchabdyaṃ saṃyogasamavāyayoḥ |
tayorapyupakārārthā niyatāstadupādhayaḥ || 6 ||

But the use of that word for conjunction and inherence, which have that for their property — for those two also, the adjuncts of that are fixed, for the sake of assistance.

The Vaisesika's two relations placed. Tad-dharmanoh tu tacchabdyam samyoga-samavayayoh: the *use of that word* — 'relation' — for *conjunction* and *inherence*, which have *that* (relation-ness) for their property. So samyoga (contact between substances) and samavaya (the intimate inherence binding quality to substance, universal to particular) are called relations by courtesy: they have relation-hood as a property, they are not relation itself. And: tayoh api upakara-artha niyatah tad-upadhayah — for *those two also*, the *adjuncts* of that are *fixed*, *for the sake of assistance*. Even the named relations are, on inspection, adjuncts fixed for assistance's sake — determinations laid on so that the assisting can be described (3.2.2's asatya-upadhi: unreal adjuncts through which the real is ascertained). The Vaisesika thinks he has two relation-*categories*; Bhartrhari grants him two upadhis and no category. 2.435 already drew this distinction — conjunction nameable because it is a property of its relata, relation-as-such reachable only obliquely.

3.3.7 unformalized

काचिदेव हि सावस्था कार्यप्रसवसूचिता ।
कस्याचित् केनचिद्यस्यां संयोग उपजायते ॥ ७ ॥

kācideva hi sāvasthā kāryaprasavasūcitā |
kasyācit kenacidyasyāṃ saṃyoga upajāyate || 7 ||

For there is some state, indicated by the production of an effect, of one thing with another, wherein conjunction arises.

Conjunction analysed away. Kacid eva hi sa avastha — there is *some state*, and the vagueness is deliberate: kacid eva, 'some or other', the shrug marking that nothing determinate can be said. Karya-prasava-sucita: *indicated by the production of an effect* — we know the state only because something results (3.3.5's upakara; 2.288's asadharanam karyam, the non-common effect by which the real is discriminated). Kasyacit kenacid yasyam samyoga upajayate: of *one thing with another*, wherein *conjunction arises*. So samyoga is not a relation observed between two things; it is a state — undescribable except by its effects — in which we say conjunction has arisen. The Vaisesika's clearest, most tangible relation (two things touching: what could be plainer?) has dissolved into an effect-indicated somewhat. And if samyoga goes, samavaya — which nobody ever claimed to perceive — goes with it.

3.3.8-11 unformalized

निरात्मकानामुत्पत्तौ नियमः क्वचिदेव यः ।
तेनैवाव्यपवर्गश्च प्राप्त्यभेदे स यत्कृतः ॥ ८ ॥
आत्मान्तरस्य येनात्मा तदात्मेवावधार्यते ।
यतश्चैकस्य नानात्वं तत्त्वं नाध्यवसीयते ॥ ९ ॥
तां शक्तिं समवायाख्यां शक्तीनामुपकारिणीम् ।
भेदाभेदावतिक्रान्तामन्यथैव व्यवस्थिताम् ॥ १० ॥
धर्मं सर्वपदार्थानामतीतः सर्वलक्षणः ।
अनुगृह्णाति संबन्ध इति पूर्वेभ्य आगमः ॥ ११ ॥

nirātmakānāmutpattau niyamaḥ kvacideva yaḥ |
tenaivāvyapavargaśca prāptyabhede sa yatkṛtaḥ || 8 ||
ātmāntarasya yenātmā tadātmevāvadhāryate |
yataścaikasya nānātvaṃ tattvaṃ nādhyavasīyate || 9 ||
tāṃ śaktiṃ samavāyākhyāṃ śaktīnāmupakāriṇīm |
bhedābhedāvatikrāntāmanyathaiva vyavasthitām || 10 ||
dharmaṃ sarvapadārthānāmatītaḥ sarvalakṣaṇaḥ |
anugṛhṇāti saṃbandha iti pūrvebhya āgamaḥ || 11 ||

(8) That restriction which occurs somewhere in the arising of things that have no selves, and the non-separation effected by that very thing where there is no difference in attainment; (9) that by which the self of one self is ascertained as though it were the self of another; and from which the manifoldness of one thing is not determined as its reality; (10) that capacity called inherence, which assists the capacities, which transcends difference and non-difference and stands in quite another way — (11) the connection favours that property of all word-meanings, itself transcending all characterization: such is the tradition from the earlier ones.

A single four-verse sentence, the samuddesa's most sustained period, defining the relation by everything it does and nothing it is. The subject is deferred to 11 and the accusatives pile up. It is (8) the *restriction* — niyamah — that shows up in the arising of nir-atmakanam, things *that have no selves* (things whose being is wholly relational); and the *non-separation* where attainment does not differ. It is (9) that by which atma-antarasya atma tad-atma iva avadharyate — the self of one thing is ascertained *as though* it were another's (the intentionality-structure of 3.2.9-10: cognition presenting as its object while being utterly not it); and that from which ekasya nanatvam — the *manifoldness of one thing* — is *not determined as its reality*. It is (10) tam saktim samavaya-akhyam — the *capacity called inherence* — saktinam upakarinim, *assisting the capacities* (3.3.5), bheda-abhedau atikrantam — *transcending difference and non-difference*: it is neither identical with its relata nor other than them, anyatha eva vyavasthitam, standing *in quite another way*. And (11) the main clause at last: sambandhah anugrhnati dharmam sarva-padarthanam, atitah sarva-laksanah — the *connection favours* the property of all word-meanings, *itself transcending all characterization*. Iti purvebhya agamah: *such is the tradition from the earlier ones* — reported, not invented. The passage defines by exclusion (transcending difference and non-difference, transcending all characterization) because 3.3.4 established that no positive naming is available. What it names is the enabling of everything, which is nothing.
contested: the syntax across the four verses is genuinely hard and our reconstruction — accusatives in 8-10 governed by anugrhnati in 11 — is one of several; the transcription's reading at several points is insecure. What is not in doubt is the doctrine: relation as bheda-abheda-atikranta, transcending both difference and identity

3.3.12 unformalized

पदार्थीकृत एवान्यैः सर्वत्राभ्युपगम्यते ।
संबन्धस्तेन शब्दार्थः प्रविभक्तुं न शक्यते ॥ १२ ॥

padārthīkṛta evānyaiḥ sarvatrābhyupagamyate |
saṃbandhastena śabdārthaḥ pravibhaktuṃ na śakyate || 12 ||

By others, it is admitted everywhere only as having been made into a word-meaning; therefore the meaning of the word 'connection' cannot be analysed out.

The paradox of talking about relation at all. Padarthikrta eva anyaih sarvatra abhyupagamyate sambandhah: by others, the connection is admitted, everywhere, *only as having been made into a word-meaning* — padarthikrta: *made* a padartha, converted into an item by the very act of discussing it. The moment one says 'the relation', one has treated as a thing what 3.3.4 showed has no form. Tena sabdarthah pravibhaktum na sakyate: *therefore* the meaning of the word ('connection') *cannot be analysed out* — one cannot extract, by apoddhara (2.10's method), a word-meaning for 'sambandha', because what the word purports to name is not the sort of thing that survives extraction. The verse is exactly self-aware: this samuddesa is seventy-six verses about relation, and its twelfth verse says that its subject exists only as an artifact of being talked about. Which is consistent — the whole work has held that padarthas are creatures of laksana (2.436) — but here the point turns on the treatise itself.

3.3.13 unformalized

समवायात् स्व आधारः स्वा च जातिः प्रतीयते ।
एकार्थसमवायात्तु गुणः स्वाधार एव ये ॥ १३ ॥

samavāyāt sva ādhāraḥ svā ca jātiḥ pratīyate |
ekārthasamavāyāttu guṇaḥ svādhāra eva ye || 13 ||

From inherence, one's own substratum and one's own universal are understood; but from inherence in a single object, a quality is one whose substratum is its own.

The Vaisesika's machinery set out, and the setting-out is scrupulous. Samavayat sva adharah sva ca jatih pratiyate: from *inherence*, one's *own substratum* and one's *own universal* are understood — samavaya is what ties a quality to the substance it is in, and a universal to the particular it characterizes; both relations are 'inherence' on that system. Eka-artha-samavayat tu gunah sva-adhara eva ye: but from *inherence in a single object*, a quality is one whose substratum is its own. Eka-artha-samavaya — co-inherence in one object — is the Vaisesika's device for relating two qualities to each other (the colour and the taste of one mango are related by both inhering in the mango, not directly). Bhartrhari reports the system accurately before dismantling it: the reader should see that he knows exactly what he is refusing. And the refusal is already prepared: whatever samavaya does, it does as an upadhi fixed for assistance's sake (3.3.6), and it transcends difference and non-difference (3.3.10) — which is not what the Vaisesika thinks samavaya is at all.

3.3.14 unformalized

द्रव्यत्वसत्तासंयोगाः स्वन्याधारोपबन्धनाः ।
तत्प्रदेशविभागाश्च गुणा द्वित्वादयश्च ये ॥ १४ ॥

dravyatvasattāsaṃyogāḥ svanyādhāropabandhanāḥ |
tatpradeśavibhāgāśca guṇā dvitvādayaśca ye || 14 ||

Substance-hood, existence, conjunctions, the divisions of their locations, and the qualities such as duality — these have their basis in their own substratum and in another's.

The catalogue continued, and its selection is pointed. Dravyatva-satta-samyogah — *substance-hood*, *existence*, *conjunctions*; tat-pradesa-vibhagah ca — and the *divisions of their locations*; guna dvitvadayah ca ye — and the *qualities such as duality* (number, which the Jati-samuddesa spent forty verses on). All of these are sva-anya-adhara-upabandhanah: having their *basis* in their *own* substratum *and in another's*. That is: none of them is self-standing; each is anchored partly in itself and partly elsewhere — which is to say, each is relational through and through. And the list is the Vaisesika's own inventory of what is real: substance-hood, existence (satta, their highest universal), conjunction, number. Bhartrhari is showing that the categories the realist takes as bedrock all have the two-footed structure that makes them dependent — and 3.3.4 established that what is atyanta-paratantra has no form of its own to be named. The realist's furniture is being catalogued for demolition.

3.3.15 unformalized

केचित् स्वाश्रयसंयुक्ताः केचित् तत्समवायिनः ।
संयुक्तसमवेतेषु समवेतास्तथा परे ॥ १५ ॥

kecit svāśrayasaṃyuktāḥ kecit tatsamavāyinaḥ |
saṃyuktasamaveteṣu samavetāstathā pare || 15 ||

Some are conjoined with their own substratum, some inhere in it; others likewise inhere in what inheres in what is conjoined.

The relational hierarchy at its most baroque, and the baroqueness is the argument. Kecit sva-asraya-samyuktah: *some* are *conjoined* with their own substratum; kecit tat-samavayinah: *some* *inhere* in it; samyukta-samavetesu samavetah tatha pare: *others* likewise *inhere in what inheres in what is conjoined*. That last is a three-storey relation — inherence in an inherent in a conjunct — and the Vaisesikas needed such ladders to explain how, say, a sound in the ether relates to a distant hearer, or how a quality of a part relates to the whole. Bhartrhari lists the storeys without comment. The comment is the list: a system that must climb three relations to connect two things has made relation do so much work that the question 3.3.4 asked — what *is* it, that it can do all this and be named by nothing? — becomes unavoidable. The samuddesa's method here is the same as 2.77-86's exegetical catalogue: recite the opponent's machinery at length, fairly, and let its weight be felt.

3.3.16 unformalized

स्वाश्रयेण तु संयुक्तैः संयुक्तं विभु गम्यते ।
समवायस्य संबन्धो नापरस्तत्र दृश्यते ॥ १६ ॥

svāśrayeṇa tu saṃyuktaiḥ saṃyuktaṃ vibhu gamyate |
samavāyasya saṃbandho nāparastatra dṛśyate || 16 ||

But the all-pervading is understood as conjoined with things conjoined with their own substratum; no further connection of inherence is seen there.

The regress hunted to its lair in the Vaisesika's own system. Sva-asrayena tu samyuktaih samyuktam vibhu gamyate: the *all-pervading* (vibhu: ether, time, the self — the omnipresent substances) is understood as *conjoined with* things which are themselves conjoined with their substrata (3.3.15's three-storey ladder). And then the observation that matters: samavayasya sambandho na aparah tatra drsyate — *no further connection of inherence* is seen *there*. Ask the Vaisesika what connects samavaya to its relata, and he cannot answer with another samavaya (that would start the regress his opponents have always pressed). He must say: samavaya connects by itself, needing no further connector. Bhartrhari records the answer without objecting — because it is *his* answer too, and he will generalize it at 3.3.28 (an operation has no further operation). The realist stops the regress by fiat at exactly one place; Bhartrhari will stop it by principle everywhere.

3.3.17 unformalized

संबन्धस्याविशिष्टत्वान्न चात्र नियमो भवेत् ।
तस्माच्छब्दार्थयोर्नैव संबन्धः परिकल्पते ॥ १७ ॥

saṃbandhasyāviśiṣṭatvānna cātra niyamo bhavet |
tasmācchabdārthayornaiva saṃbandhaḥ parikalpate || 17 ||

And because the connection is undifferentiated, no restriction would obtain here; therefore no connection of word and meaning is constructed at all.

The consequence for the samuddesa's own subject, and it is devastating. Sambandhasya avisistatvat: because the connection is *undifferentiated* — samavaya, on the Vaisesika's account, is *one*: a single eternal relation, the same everywhere, in which everything inheres in everything it inheres in. Na ca atra niyamo bhavet: therefore *no restriction* would obtain here — an undifferentiated relation cannot explain why *this* quality is in *this* substance and not another; it relates indiscriminately or not at all. Tasmat sabdarthayoh na eva sambandhah parikalpyate: *therefore* no connection of *word and meaning* is constructed at all — if relation cannot restrict, it cannot pair a word with its meaning either, and the semantic bond the whole work rests on (1.23's nitya sambandha) has no relational account. The verse is the samuddesa's crisis, deliberately staged: the realist's relation cannot do the work, and Bhartrhari's has no form to be named (3.3.4). What is left is 3.3.29's yogyata, and everything between here and there clears the ground for it.

3.3.18 unformalized

अदृष्टवृत्तिलाभेन यथा संयोग आत्मनः ।
क्वचित् स्वस्वामियोगाख्योऽभेदेऽन्यत्रापि स क्रमः ॥ १८ ॥

adṛṣṭavṛttilābhena yathā saṃyoga ātmanaḥ |
kvacit svasvāmiyogākhyo'bhede'nyatrāpi sa kramaḥ || 18 ||

As, by the obtaining of an unseen operation, there is somewhere a conjunction of the self, called the owner-owned relation — in non-difference, that pattern holds elsewhere too.

A relation that is manifestly not a physical connection, offered as the model. Sva-svami-yoga — the *owner-owned* relation: what connects a man to his field? No contact, no inherence; the field is not touching him and not in him. Adrsta-vrtti-labhena — by the obtaining of an *unseen operation*: what relates them is adrsta, the unseen — moral-legal desert, the invisible entitlement that ownership is. Samyoga atmanah kvacit: it is somewhere called a *conjunction of the self*. And: abhede anyatra api sa kramah — in *non-difference*, that *pattern* holds *elsewhere* too. The ownership-relation is the perfect specimen for Bhartrhari's purpose: everyone grants it is real, everyone grants it is not a physical relation, and nobody can point to it. If relation can be like *that* — invisible, effect-indicated, constituted by an unseen operation — then the word-meaning bond need not be a connector between two things at all. 2.395's joint-property analogy drew on the same legal intuitions; here the law supplies the metaphysics.

3.3.19 unformalized

प्राप्तिं तु समवायाख्यां वाच्यधर्मातिवर्तिनीम् ।
प्रयोक्ता प्रतिपत्ता वा न शब्दैरनुगच्छति ॥ १९ ॥

prāptiṃ tu samavāyākhyāṃ vācyadharmātivartinīm |
prayoktā pratipattā vā na śabdairanugacchati || 19 ||

But the attainment called inherence, which transcends the property of being expressible — neither speaker nor comprehender follows it by words.

The unnameability of 3.3.4, applied to samavaya by name. Praptim tu samavaya-akhyam vacya-dharma-ativartinim: the *attainment* called *inherence*, which *transcends the property of being expressible* — praptih, attainment, is a deliberately thin word: what samavaya amounts to is that something has been *reached*, and beyond that nothing is sayable. Prayokta pratipatta va na sabdaih anugacchati: neither *speaker* nor *comprehender* *follows it by words*. Both parties to the transaction — the one who means and the one who understands (3.3.1's three relata) — fail alike: no speaker can put the relation into words, no hearer can take it out of them. This sets up the paradox that occupies the next five verses. For the verse has just *said* that inherence transcends expressibility — which is to say, it has expressed something about the inexpressible, and thereby, apparently, refuted itself.

3.3.20 unformalized

अवाच्यमिति यद् वाच्यं तदवाच्यतया यदा ।
वाच्यमित्यवसीयेत वाच्यमेव तदा भवेत् ॥ २० ॥

avācyamiti yad vācyaṃ tadavācyatayā yadā |
vācyamityavasīyeta vācyameva tadā bhavet || 20 ||

That which is expressed as 'inexpressible' — when it is determined as expressible by way of its inexpressibility, then it would become expressible indeed.

The self-refutation, stated with complete clarity. Avacyam iti yad vacyam: that which is *expressed as 'inexpressible'* — the phrase already contains its problem: to call a thing inexpressible is to express something of it. Tad avacyataya yada vacyam iti avasiyeta — when it is *determined as expressible* by way of *its very inexpressibility* — vacyam eva tada bhavet: then it would become *expressible indeed*. The reasoning: if 'inexpressible' successfully characterizes it, then it has been characterized, and it is not inexpressible. Every apophatic theology and every doctrine of an ineffable absolute meets this argument, and Bhartrhari — whose whole system rests on an unnameable relation (3.3.4) and a reality transcending all characterization (3.3.11) — meets it head-on rather than hoping it will not be noticed. The next verse gives the other horn.

3.3.21 unformalized

अथाप्यवाच्यमित्येवं न तद् वाच्यं प्रतीयते ।
विवक्षितास्य यावस्था सैव नाध्यवसीयते ॥ २१ ॥

athāpyavācyamityevaṃ na tad vācyaṃ pratīyate |
vivakṣitāsya yāvasthā saiva nādhyavasīyate || 21 ||

Or if, as 'inexpressible', it is not understood as expressible — then the very state of it that was intended is not determined.

The second horn, and together with 3.3.20 it is a dilemma. Atha api avacyam iti evam na tad vacyam pratiyate — or if, as 'inexpressible', it is *not* understood as expressible: take the other option, and deny that calling it inexpressible expresses anything of it. Then: vivaksita asya ya avastha sa eva na adhyavasiyate — the *very state* of it that was *intended* is *not determined*. If the word does not express, it does not express — including the inexpressibility one was trying to convey. So: say 'inexpressible' successfully and it is expressible (3.3.20); say it unsuccessfully and you have said nothing (3.3.21). The dilemma appears to close every route. And Bhartrhari's escape, when it comes at 3.3.26, will not be to break either horn but to deny the assumption both share — that the expressing word is itself among the things expressed.

3.3.22 unformalized

तथान्यथा सर्वथा च यस्यावाच्यत्वमुच्यते ।
तत्रापि नैव सावस्था तैः शब्दैः प्रतिषिध्यते ॥ २२ ॥

tathānyathā sarvathā ca yasyāvācyatvamucyate |
tatrāpi naiva sāvasthā taiḥ śabdaiḥ pratiṣidhyate || 22 ||

And of that whose inexpressibility is stated thus, otherwise, and in every way — there too, that state is not negated by those words.

The dilemma generalized past any verbal escape. Tatha anyatha sarvatha ca yasya avacyatvam ucyate: of that whose inexpressibility is stated *thus*, *otherwise*, and *in every way* — however one phrases it, whatever qualifications one heaps on ('inexpressible in a manner of speaking', 'inexpressible from the highest standpoint'). Tatra api na eva sa avastha taih sabdaih pratisidhyate: *there too* that *state* is *not negated* by those words. The point cuts both ways and is the sharper for it: the words do not *establish* the inexpressibility (3.3.20's horn), and neither do they *negate* the state — the thing's condition is untouched by anything said about it. So the paradox is not that our words about the ineffable are false; it is that they do not reach it at all, in either direction. What follows (3.3.23-24) will locate where such words *do* operate, and it is not on their apparent object.

3.3.23 unformalized

न हि संशयरूपेऽर्थे शेषत्वेन व्यवस्थिते ।
अव्युदासे स्वरूपस्य संशयोऽन्यः प्रवर्तते ॥ २३ ॥

na hi saṃśayarūpe'rthe śeṣatvena vyavasthite |
avyudāse svarūpasya saṃśayo'nyaḥ pravartate || 23 ||

For when a meaning of doubtful form stands as the remainder, there being no exclusion of its own form, no other doubt arises.

A structural observation that begins the escape. Samsaya-rupe 'rthe sesatvena vyavasthite — when a meaning of *doubtful* form stands as the *remainder* (sesa: what is left over, the residue after the operation, 2.82's sesa): sva-rupasya avyudase — there being *no exclusion of its own form* — samsayo 'nyah na pravartate: *no other doubt* arises. When one is doubting, the doubt has a determinate form of its own, and that form is not itself in doubt: to be uncertain whether it is a post or a man is to be entirely certain that one is uncertain. The doubting does not doubt itself. This is the pattern that will resolve the paradox: an operation does not include itself among its objects. And it is the same insight 3.1.105 reached from the other side (the cognition 'pot-cognition' is distinct from the pot-cognition), and that 3.3.28 will state as a principle.

3.3.24 unformalized

यदा च निर्णयज्ञाने निर्णयत्वेन निर्णयः ।
प्रक्रम्यते तदा ज्ञानं स्वधर्मेणावतिष्ठते ॥ २४ ॥

yadā ca nirṇayajñāne nirṇayatvena nirṇayaḥ |
prakramyate tadā jñānaṃ svadharmeṇāvatiṣṭhate || 24 ||

And when, in the cognition of ascertainment, ascertainment is commenced as ascertainment — then the cognition stands by its own property.

The companion to 3.3.23, from the positive side. Nirnaya-jnane nirnayatvena nirnayah prakramyate: when, in the *cognition of ascertainment*, *ascertainment* is *commenced as ascertainment* — when one ascertains that one has ascertained. Tada jnanam sva-dharmena avatisthate: then the cognition *stands by its own property*. The reflexive act does not undermine the first-order one; it stands on it, and the first-order cognition retains its own character throughout. So reflexivity is not vicious: doubting-about-doubt leaves the doubt intact (3.3.23), ascertaining-one's-ascertainment leaves the ascertainment intact. Sva-dharmena — 'by its own property': the phrase 3.3.4 used to deny that the connection can be named (na abhidhanam sva-dharmena sambandhasya asti vacakam). Cognitions have own-properties; relations do not; and that asymmetry is why the paradox of 3.3.20-22 is soluble while the unnameability of 3.3.4 stands.

3.3.25 unformalized

सर्वं मिथ्या ब्रवीमीति नैतद्वाक्यं विवक्ष्यते ।
तस्य मिथ्याभिधाने हि प्रक्रान्तोऽर्थो न गम्यते ॥ २५ ॥

sarvaṃ mithyā bravīmīti naitadvākyaṃ vivakṣyate |
tasya mithyābhidhāne hi prakrānto'rtho na gamyate || 25 ||

'I say that everything is false' — this sentence is not what is intended; for in the stating of its own falsity, the meaning commenced is not conveyed.

The liar paradox, in a fifth-century grammarian's treatise, with a solution. Sarvam mithya bravimi iti — 'I say that *everything* is false': the sentence that, if true, is false, since it is among the everything. Na etad vakyam vivaksyate: *this sentence is not what is intended* — the speaker's vivaksa does not extend to the utterance making it. And the reason: tasya mithya-abhidhane hi prakranto 'rtho na gamyate — for in the *stating of its own falsity*, the *meaning commenced* is *not conveyed*: include the sentence in its own scope and the assertion self-destructs, delivering nothing — so that inclusion cannot be what was meant, since what was meant was conveyed (the speaker did say something, and we understood him). The solution is *pragmatic* rather than formal: not a hierarchy of languages, not a ban on self-reference, but an appeal to vivaksa — the sentence's scope is what the speaker aimed (1.155, 2.400's directed eye), and no speaker aims at annihilating his own assertion. And it is grounded in the structure 3.3.23-24 established: an operation is not among its own objects. The verse is a landmark and it is not an isolated flash: it is exactly what the samuddesa's whole account of self-reference predicts.
contested: whether the verse states the paradox as an aporia or offers vivaksa as its resolution divides readers; we take the second, on the strength of prakranto 'rtho na gamyate (the meaning commenced is not conveyed — which functions as a reason, not a lament) and of 3.3.26's immediate generalization

3.3.26 unformalized

न च वाचकरूपेण प्रवृत्तस्यास्ति वाच्यता ।
प्रतिपाद्यं न तत्तत्र येनान्यत् प्रतिपाद्यते ॥ २६ ॥

na ca vācakarūpeṇa pravṛttasyāsti vācyatā |
pratipādyaṃ na tattatra yenānyat pratipādyate || 26 ||

And what operates in the form of an expressor has no expressibility; that by which another is conveyed is not itself what is to be conveyed there.

The principle beneath the solution, and it is stated with complete generality. Na ca vacaka-rupena pravrttasya asti vacyata: what *operates in the form of an expressor* has *no expressibility* — a word doing the expressing is not, in that act, among the expressed. Pratipadyam na tat tatra yena anyat pratipadyate: *that by which another is conveyed* is not *itself what is to be conveyed* there. This is the use/mention distinction, arrived at as the solution to a paradox rather than as a piece of housekeeping — and it dissolves both problems at once. The liar (3.3.25): 'everything is false' operates as expressor, so it is not among the expressed everything. The ineffable (3.3.20-22): the word 'inexpressible' operates as expressor, so what it expresses is not thereby made an expressible object — one may say 'inexpressible' without contradiction, because saying is not the same as bringing within the said. Note tatra — *there*: the exclusion is act-relative, not absolute. The same word, in another act, can perfectly well be expressed (1.65's regress inside citation; 2.100's grahana requiring exhibited form). Nothing is permanently unsayable; nothing says itself while saying.

3.3.27 unformalized

असाधिका प्रतिज्ञेति नेयमेवाभिधीयते ।
यथा तथास्य धर्मोऽपि नैव कश्चित् प्रतीयते ॥ २७ ॥

asādhikā pratijñeti neyamevābhidhīyate |
yathā tathāsya dharmo'pi naiva kaścit pratīyate || 27 ||

'The thesis is non-establishing' — this very one is not thereby stated; just so, no property whatever of it is understood.

The principle applied to the debater's self-refutation. Asadhika pratijna iti — 'the *thesis* is *non-establishing*': the standard move by which one accuses an opponent's proposition of proving nothing. Na iyam eva abhidhiyate: *this very one* is not thereby stated — the accusation does not include itself among the theses it convicts; it operates as expressor (3.3.26) and so stands outside its own scope. Yatha tatha asya dharmo 'pi na eva kascit pratiyate: *just so*, *no property whatever* of it is understood. The tu quoque fails: one cannot turn 'your thesis establishes nothing' back on itself, because the utterance is not among its own objects. The verse extends the solution from the liar (3.3.25) to the whole family of self-refutation arguments that Indian debate ran on — and it is worth noticing what Bhartrhari has thereby protected. His own doctrines are exactly the sort that invite the tu quoque: 'all cognition is word-interwoven' (1.123), 'the sciences describe only avidya' (2.233), 'nothing uncommingled bears any predicate' (3.1.21). Each would be self-refuting if utterances fell within their own scope. They do not.

3.3.28 unformalized

व्यापारस्यापरो यस्मान्न व्यापारोऽस्ति कश्चन ।
विरोधमनवस्थां वा तस्मात् सर्वत्र नाश्रयेत् ॥ २८ ॥

vyāpārasyāparo yasmānna vyāpāro'sti kaścana |
virodhamanavasthāṃ vā tasmāt sarvatra nāśrayet || 28 ||

Since there is no other operation of an operation — therefore one should not resort, everywhere, to contradiction or to infinite regress.

The principle stated as a maxim, and it is the samuddesa's methodological centre. Vyaparasya aparo yasman na vyaparo 'sti kascana: since there is *no other operation* of an *operation* — an operating does not itself operate; a cutting is not cut, a knowing is not known by a further knowing (3.1.104's lamp: light is not illuminated by another light), an expressing is not expressed (3.3.26). Tasmat virodham anavastham va sarvatra na asrayet: *therefore* one should *not resort*, *everywhere*, to *contradiction* or to *infinite regress*. The two great weapons of Indian dialectic — you contradict yourself; your account regresses — are here disarmed at a stroke, and disarmed by a principle rather than a dodge. Both weapons work by folding an operation back into its own domain, and operations do not have domains that include themselves. The Vaisesika stopped the samavaya-regress by fiat at one point (3.3.16); Bhartrhari has now given the reason that stops every such regress everywhere, and it is the reason the paradoxes of 3.3.20-27 dissolved. Sarvatra — 'everywhere': the maxim is unrestricted, and the whole system needs it to be.

3.3.29 unformalized

इन्द्रियाणां स्वविषयेष्वनादिर्योग्यता यथा ।
अनादिरर्थैः शब्दानां संबन्धो योग्यता तथा ॥ २९ ॥

indriyāṇāṃ svaviṣayeṣvanādiryogyatā yathā |
anādirarthaiḥ śabdānāṃ saṃbandho yogyatā tathā || 29 ||

As the fitness of the sense-faculties for their own objects is beginningless — so the connection of words with meanings, which is fitness, is beginningless.

The positive doctrine, at last, and the samuddesa's whole demolition was clearing ground for it. Indriyanam sva-visayesu anadir yogyata yatha: as the *fitness* of the sense-faculties for their *own objects* is *beginningless* — nobody asks what connects the eye to colour, or why the ear is for sound rather than for smell; the fitness is constitutive, unexplained, and nobody finds it mysterious. Anadir arthaih sabdanam sambandho yogyata tatha: so the *connection of words with meanings* — which *is* fitness — is *beginningless*. The word-meaning relation is not a connector between two independently-standing items (3.3.4-17 showed no such connector can be found or named). It is yogyata: a fitness, of exactly the kind the senses have for their objects — primitive, constitutive, not further derivable. This was already offered at 2.97, in passing, as the answer to why *these* sounds manifest *this* word; here it is the samuddesa's settled conclusion. And its virtue is that it stops asking the wrong question: what relates word to meaning is what relates eye to colour, namely nothing — they are made for each other, and that is the end of the analysis.

3.3.30 unformalized

असाधुरनुमानेन वाचकः कैश्चिदिष्यते ।
वाचकत्वाविशेषे वा नियमः पुण्यपापयोः ॥ ३० ॥

asādhuranumānena vācakaḥ kaiścidiṣyate |
vācakatvāviśeṣe vā niyamaḥ puṇyapāpayoḥ || 30 ||

The incorrect form is held by some to be expressive by inference; or, there being no difference in expressiveness, the restriction is with respect to merit and demerit.

The yogyata-doctrine tested against a standing problem: if fitness is beginningless and constitutive, how do corrupt forms mean? Two answers, both familiar. Asadhur anumanena vacakah kaiscid isyate: the *incorrect* form is held by some to be expressive *by inference* — reached through the correct form it deviates from (2.149's account: the apabhramsa conveying anumanena, through a recovery so practiced it vanishes; 2.152's sadhu-vyavahita). Or: vacakatva-avisese va niyamah punya-papayoh — there being *no difference in expressiveness*, the *restriction* is with respect to *merit and demerit*: both forms mean equally, and only dharma distinguishes them (1.27's foundational concession, restated at 2.153's honest limit). The verse offers no new answer and does not need one: both accounts are compatible with yogyata, since fitness explains why the correct form means and neither account claims the corrupt one means by a different mechanism. The old settlement holds.

3.3.31 unformalized

संबन्धशब्दे संबन्धो योग्यतां प्रति योग्यता ।
समयाद्योग्यतासंविन्मातापुत्रादियोगवत् ॥ ३१ ॥

saṃbandhaśabde saṃbandho yogyatāṃ prati yogyatā |
samayādyogyatāsaṃvinmātāputrādiyogavat || 31 ||

In the word 'connection' there is a connection; with respect to fitness there is fitness; from convention comes the awareness of fitness — like the relation of mother and son and the like.

The reflexive application, and it is the samuddesa's wittiest verse. Sambandha-sabde sambandhah: in the word *'connection'* there is a *connection* — the word 'sambandha' is related to its meaning, as every word is; the term for relation stands in the very relation it names. Yogyatam prati yogyata: with respect to *fitness* there is *fitness* — the word 'yogyata' is fit for its meaning by fitness. The regress threatens visibly, and 3.3.28 has already disarmed it: there is no operation of an operation, and the fitness by which 'fitness' means is not a further fitness needing explanation. Then the empirical clause: samayat yogyata-samvit — from *convention* comes the *awareness* of fitness: the fitness itself is beginningless (3.3.29), and our *knowing* which word is fit for which meaning is learned, conventional, taught (2.118's samaya). And the simile: matr-putradi-yogavat — *like the relation of mother and son*: real, constitutive, not made by anyone's agreement — and which of two people stand in it is something one learns. The distinction between the relation and our knowledge of it is exactly what the whole conventionalism debate needed.

3.3.32 unformalized

शब्दः कारणमर्थस्य स हि तेनोपजन्यते ।
तथा च बुद्धिविषयादर्थाच्छब्दः प्रतीयते ॥ ३२ ॥

śabdaḥ kāraṇamarthasya sa hi tenopajanyate |
tathā ca buddhiviṣayādarthācchabdaḥ pratīyate || 32 ||

The word is the cause of the meaning, for it is produced by that; and thus the word is understood from the meaning that is the object of cognition.

The circularity of the word-meaning relation, stated without embarrassment. Sabdah karanam arthasya: the *word* is the *cause* of the *meaning* — it produces the meaning in the hearer (2.143's flash, occasioned by words). Sa hi tena upajanyate: *for it is produced by that* — and the word is produced by the meaning, in the speaker, who has something to say and finds words for it (1.47's vitarkitah pura buddhya: deliberated first in the mind, then installed on its meaning). Each causes the other. Tatha ca buddhi-visayad arthat sabdah pratiyate: and thus the *word* is *understood from* the *meaning that is the object of cognition*. The circle is not vicious because the two are not two: word and meaning are aspects of one self (2.31, 3.2.16's aprthaktve sambandhah: connection in non-separateness, as though of distinct selves). What looks like reciprocal causation between independent items is one thing presenting its two faces to speaker and hearer respectively. And on the yogyata-doctrine (3.3.29) nothing further is owed: fitness is not a causal chain to be traced but a constitutive suitedness, and asking which of the fitted came first is asking which of the eye and colour is prior.

3.3.33 unformalized

भोजनाद्यपि मन्यन्ते बुद्ध्यर्थे यदसंभवि ।
बुद्ध्यर्थादेव बुद्ध्यर्थे जाते तदपि दृश्यते ॥ ३३ ॥

bhojanādyapi manyante buddhyarthe yadasaṃbhavi |
buddhyarthādeva buddhyarthe jāte tadapi dṛśyate || 33 ||

They consider that even eating and the like, which is impossible in respect of a mental object, is nonetheless seen — a mental object having arisen from a mental object alone.

A puzzle about intentional objects, put as an observation. Bhojanadi api — even *eating* and the like — is buddhy-arthe asambhavi: *impossible in respect of a mental object*: one cannot eat an imagined mango; the mental object does not nourish (2.295's dreamt poison, which kills the dreamt man and leaves the dreamer breathing). And yet: buddhy-arthad eva buddhy-arthe jate tad api drsyate — a mental object having arisen *from a mental object alone*, *that too is seen*: within the mind, the imagined eating of the imagined mango happens perfectly well; the dream-meal is eaten. So intentional objects support intentional operations while supporting no real ones, and the whole transaction is closed under mentality. The verse prepares the samuddesa's turn to aupacariki satta — figurative existence — by establishing that there is a domain in which things exist enough to be operated on and not enough to feed anyone. That domain is where language lives.

3.3.34 unformalized

अनित्येषवपि नित्यत्वमभिधेयात्मना स्थितम् ॥ ३४ab ॥
अनित्यत्वं स्वशक्तिर्वा सा च नित्यान्न भिद्यते ॥ ३४cd ॥

anityeṣavapi nityatvamabhidheyātmanā sthitam || 34ab ||
anityatvaṃ svaśaktirvā sā ca nityānna bhidyate || 34cd ||

Even in non-eternal things, eternality stands, by way of their being expressible. Or non-eternality is its own capacity — and that is not different from the eternal.

Two routes to the same conclusion, and the verse gives both in two half-lines. First: anityesu api nityatvam abhidheya-atmana sthitam — even in *non-eternal* things, *eternality* stands, *by way of their being expressible*: whatever can be meant is, as meant, eternal — the pot perishes and pot-as-expressible does not (3.1.2's nityau eva: both candidates for word-meaning are eternal; 3.2.6's every word expressing only the eternal). Being sayable confers permanence, because what words reach is Being (3.1.33). Second: anityatvam sva-saktir va sa ca nityan na bhidyate — or *non-eternality* is its *own capacity*, and *that* is *not different from the eternal*: transience is one of Being's powers (3.1.22's sarva-sakty-atma-bhutatvam), and powers are not other than what has them (1.2's aprthaktve 'pi saktibhyah). So on either route, nothing escapes eternality: the perishing thing is eternal as expressible, and its perishing is an eternal thing's power. The two half-lines are the samuddesa's most economical demonstration that the nitya/anitya distinction cannot be drawn where the realist wants it.
contested: the source paginates 34 as two half-verses; we read them as two alternative arguments (va marking the second), which the parallel structure supports

3.3.35 unformalized

शब्देनार्थस्थ संस्कारो दृष्टादृष्टप्रयोजनः ।
क्रियते सोऽभिसंबन्धमन्तरेण कथं भवेत् ॥ ३५ ॥

śabdenārthastha saṃskāro dṛṣṭādṛṣṭaprayojanaḥ |
kriyate so'bhisaṃbandhamantareṇa kathaṃ bhavet || 35 ||

A refinement of the object, having seen and unseen purposes, is effected by the word; how could that occur without a connection?

An argument *for* the reality of the word-meaning connection, put in the mouth of an objector. Sabdena arthasya samskarah kriyate: a *refinement of the object* is effected *by the word* — samskara, the ritual purification and preparation (1.146's therapeutic triad; 1.131's sabda-samskara). Drstadrsta-prayojanah: having *seen and unseen* purposes — the mantra sanctifies the offering visibly and invisibly (1.138's visapaharana: mantra-efficacy, form-bound). And the argument: sah abhisambandham antarena katham bhavet — *how could that occur without a connection*? If words do things to objects — and the whole ritual tradition says they do — there must be a real bond along which the doing travels. The objection is well-aimed at 3.3.4's thesis (the connection has no form) and at 3.3.29's (it is mere fitness, like eye-to-colour): fitness does not obviously *sanctify*. The next verse answers.

3.3.36 unformalized

नावश्यमभिधेयेषु संस्कारः स तथाविधः ।
दृश्यते न च संबन्धस्तथाभूतो विवक्षितः ॥ ३६ ॥

nāvaśyamabhidheyeṣu saṃskāraḥ sa tathāvidhaḥ |
dṛśyate na ca saṃbandhastathābhūto vivakṣitaḥ || 36 ||

Such a refinement is not necessarily seen in the things expressed; nor is a connection of that sort what is intended.

The objection of 3.3.35 declined on both its premises. Na avasyam abhidheyesu samskarah sa tathavidhah drsyate: such a refinement is *not necessarily seen* in the things expressed — most words do not sanctify most objects; saying 'pot' does nothing to the pot. The ritual case is special, and a semantics is not built from special cases (the mantra's efficacy being fixed by domain rather than aimed by minds, 2.406). Na ca sambandhah tathabhuto vivaksitah: *nor* is a connection *of that sort* what is *intended* — the yogyata-doctrine (3.3.29) never claimed the word-meaning fitness was a channel along which influence flows. Fitness is not a pipe. The eye is fit for colour and does nothing to colour. So the objection assumed a picture of the relation — a real bond transmitting effects — that 3.3.4-17 already dismantled, and it can be answered simply by declining the picture.

3.3.37 unformalized

सति प्रत्ययहेतुत्वं संबन्ध उपपद्यते ।
शब्दस्यार्थे यतस्तत्र संबन्धोऽस्तीति गम्यते ॥ ३७ ॥

sati pratyayahetutvaṃ saṃbandha upapadyate |
śabdasyārthe yatastatra saṃbandho'stīti gamyate || 37 ||

It is fitting that being a cause of cognition is the connection; since the word is that with respect to the meaning, therefore a connection is understood to exist there.

The connection redefined functionally, and this is the samuddesa's constructive answer. Sati pratyaya-hetutvam sambandha upapadyate: it is *fitting* that *being a cause of cognition* is the *connection* — not a bond between two items, but simply this: the word occasions the meaning-cognition. Sabdasya arthe yatah tatra sambandho 'sti iti gamyate: since the *word* is that (a cause of cognition) with respect to the *meaning*, *therefore* a connection is *understood to exist* there. Mark the order: we do not find a connection and then explain the cognition; we find the cognition and *call* that a connection. Sambandho 'sti iti gamyate — it is *understood to exist*: the relation's whole existence is our inference from its effect (2.46's karya-anumeyah, now not as a complaint but as the definition). So the word-meaning connection is nothing over and above the fact that words wake meanings — which is exactly what yogyata says (3.3.29: fitness, primitive, not further analysable) and exactly what 3.3.4 said cannot be named.

3.3.38 unformalized

नित्येऽनित्येऽपि वाच्येऽर्थे पुरुषेण कथंचन ।
संबन्धोऽकृतसंबन्धैः शब्दैः कर्तुं न शक्यते ॥ ३८ ॥

nitye'nitye'pi vācye'rthe puruṣeṇa kathaṃcana |
saṃbandho'kṛtasaṃbandhaiḥ śabdaiḥ kartuṃ na śakyate || 38 ||

Whether the expressible object be eternal or non-eternal, a connection cannot in any way be made by a person, by means of words that have no made connection.

The conventionalist refuted by a regress. Suppose a person could *make* the word-meaning connection — establish by fiat that 'gauh' shall mean cow (2.118's samaya-doctrine: convention without tradition). With what would he do it? Akrta-sambandhaih sabdaih — *by means of words that have no made connection*: to institute a convention one must say something, and the saying already requires words that mean — but on the hypothesis, no word means until instituted. Purusena kathamcana sambandhah kartum na sakyate: a connection *cannot in any way* be *made by a person*. And the premise is granted in advance for both horns: nitye 'nitye 'pi vacye 'rthe — whether the object be *eternal or non-eternal*, the argument runs the same. The regress is the one every conventionalism faces: the first convention cannot be established, because establishing requires what it establishes. Hence anadi — beginningless (3.3.29): not because tradition says so, but because nothing else is coherent.

3.3.39 unformalized

व्यपदेशे पदार्थानामन्या सत्तौपचारिकी ।
सर्वावस्थासु सर्वेषामात्मरूपस्य दर्शिका ॥ ३९ ॥

vyapadeśe padārthānāmanyā sattaupacārikī |
sarvāvasthāsu sarveṣāmātmarūpasya darśikā || 39 ||

In the designation of word-meanings there is another, figurative existence, which exhibits the own-form of all of them, in all their states.

The samuddesa's great constructive posit, and it will occupy the rest of the movement. Vyapadese padarthanam — in the *designation* of word-meanings — anya satta aupacariki: there is *another* existence, *figurative* — upacara, the transferred or metaphorical use (2.253's gauna, 1.76's kala transferred to the word). Not the real existence things have, but a second, designation-relative one. Its office: sarva-avasthasu sarvesam atma-rupasya darsika — *exhibiting* the *own-form* of *all* of them, in *all* their states. Everything mentionable has it — the past, the future, the impossible, the hare's horn — because to be designated at all is to have this existence. This is what 3.3.33 was preparing (a domain where things exist enough to be operated on and not enough to feed anyone) and it is the samuddesa's solution to the problem of how language can speak of what is not: it can, because designation confers its own existence, and that existence is figurative through and through.

3.3.40-41 unformalized

स्फटिकादि यथा द्रव्यं भिन्नरूपैरुपाश्रयैः ।
स्वशक्तियोगात् संबन्धं ताद्रूप्येणोपगच्छति ॥ ४० ॥
तद्वच्छब्दोऽपि सत्तायामस्यां पूर्वं व्यवस्थितः ।
धर्मैरुपैति संबन्धमविरोधिविरोधिभिः ॥ ४१ ॥

sphaṭikādi yathā dravyaṃ bhinnarūpairupāśrayaiḥ |
svaśaktiyogāt saṃbandhaṃ tādrūpyeṇopagacchati || 40 ||
tadvacchabdo'pi sattāyāmasyāṃ pūrvaṃ vyavasthitaḥ |
dharmairupaiti saṃbandhamavirodhivirodhibhiḥ || 41 ||

(40) As a substance such as crystal, through supports of differing forms, comes by connection with that very form, from the operation of its own capacity — (41) so too the word, previously established in this existence, comes by connection with properties both non-conflicting and conflicting.

The crystal, and it is the perfect image for aupacariki satta. (40): sphatikadi — *crystal* — placed against supports of differing colours, takes their colour: bhinna-rupaih upasrayaih tad-rupyena sambandham upagacchati, it comes by connection *with that very form* — the crystal near a red flower *is* red, to every eye. And the mechanism: sva-sakti-yogat — from the operation of *its own capacity*: the crystal's transparency is what lets it take the colour; the redness is the flower's and the taking is the crystal's own power. (41) applies it: tadvat sabdah api sattayam asyam purvam vyavasthitah — so too the *word*, *previously established* in *this* existence (3.3.39's figurative one) — dharmaih upaiti sambandham avirodhi-virodhibhih: comes by connection with properties *non-conflicting* and *conflicting* alike. The word takes on the colour of whatever it is set against — including contradictory colours, since figurative existence has no consistency-requirement. A word can be red and blue at once, as a crystal cannot: which is why 'the hare's horn' is sayable.

3.3.42 unformalized

एवं च प्रतिषेध्येषु प्रतिषेधप्रक्लृप्तये ।
आश्रितेषुपचारेण प्रतिषेधः प्रवर्तते ॥ ४२ ॥

evaṃ ca pratiṣedhyeṣu pratiṣedhapraklṛptaye |
āśriteṣupacāreṇa pratiṣedhaḥ pravartate || 42 ||

And thus, in the case of things to be negated — for the construing of the negation — the negation operates upon them when they have been resorted to by way of figurative existence.

The negation-problem solved, and this is what 3.3.39's posit was for. To say 'the hare's horn does not exist', one must first *have* the hare's horn: pratisedhyesu asritesu upacarena — the things to be negated having been *resorted to* by way of *figurative* existence — pratisedha-praklrptaye, for the *construing* of the negation — pratisedhah pravartate: the negation *operates*. The horn is granted aupacariki satta by being mentioned, and the negation then denies it real existence. Nothing is contradictory: what is negated (real existence) is not what was granted (figurative existence). This dissolves the dossier of 2.240-245 — where the negated sentence's meaning could be located nowhere, the cancelled deposit having no home — and it does so without the flash-doctrine having to carry the whole load. The mentioned exists as mentioned; the negation reaches the other existence; and 'the hare's horn does not exist' is exactly as coherent as it feels.

3.3.43 unformalized

आत्मलाभस्य जन्माख्या सत्ता लभ्यं च लभ्यते ।
यदि सज्जायते कस्मादथासज्जायते कथम् ॥ ४३ ॥

ātmalābhasya janmākhyā sattā labhyaṃ ca labhyate |
yadi sajjāyate kasmādathāsajjāyate katham || 43 ||

Existence is the name for the birth of self-obtaining, and what is to be obtained is obtained. If it is born being existent — from what? And if being non-existent — how?

The classical dilemma of origination, and Bhartrhari states it in its sharpest form. Atma-labhasya janma-akhya satta: *existence* is the name for the *birth of self-obtaining* — to be born is to obtain oneself; labhyam ca labhyate, and *what is to be obtained is obtained*. Then the dilemma: yadi saj jayate kasmat — if it is born *being existent*, *from what*? (What is already there needs no birth; the born would be born of itself.) Atha asaj jayate katham — and if *being non-existent*, *how*? (What is not there cannot do anything, including be born.) Sat or asat, and neither can be born. This is the argument the Samkhyas answered with satkaryavada (the effect pre-exists), the Vaisesikas with asatkaryavada (it does not), and the Madhyamikas with the conclusion that nothing is born at all. Bhartrhari's answer is coming, and it is none of these: birth is a figurative predication (3.3.45-46), and the dilemma is an artifact of taking it literally.

3.3.44 unformalized

सतो हि गन्तुर्गमनं सति गम्ये प्रवर्तते ।
गन्तृवच्चेन्न जन्मार्थो चेत्तद्वन्न जायते ॥ ४४ ॥

sato hi ganturgamanaṃ sati gamye pravartate |
gantṛvaccenna janmārtho cettadvanna jāyate || 44 ||

For the going of a goer who exists proceeds when the destination exists; if it be like the goer — then birth is not its meaning; if it be like that, it is not born.

The dilemma of 3.3.43 pressed through an analogy. Satah hi gantuh gamanam sati gamye pravartate: the *going* of a *goer who exists* proceeds when the *destination exists* — ordinary actions require their agents and objects to be there already; going presupposes a goer and a place to go. Now apply this to birth: gantrvac cet na janmartho — *if* (the born thing) be *like the goer* (existing already, as the goer must), then *birth is not its meaning*: an already-existing thing is not born. Cet tadvat na jayate — if it be like that, it is *not born*. Birth is unique among actions in that its agent cannot pre-exist it — which is precisely why the sat/asat dilemma bites here and nowhere else. Going has a goer; birth cannot have a bearer in the same way. So either birth is not an action at all, or its agent-relation is not what the grammar's karaka-system supposes. The next verses take the second option.

3.3.45-46 unformalized

उपचर्य तु कर्तारमभिधानप्रवृत्तये ।
पुनश्च कर्मभावेन तां क्रियां च तदाश्रयाम् ॥ ४५ ॥
अथोपचारसत्तैवं विधेयास्तत्र लादयः ।
जन्मना तु विरोधित्वात् मुख्या सत्ता न विद्यते ॥ ४६ ॥

upacarya tu kartāramabhidhānapravṛttaye |
punaśca karmabhāvena tāṃ kriyāṃ ca tadāśrayām || 45 ||
athopacārasattaivaṃ vidheyāstatra lādayaḥ |
janmanā tu virodhitvāt mukhyā sattā na vidyate || 46 ||

(45) But having figuratively imposed an agent, for the sake of the operation of expression, and again, by way of objecthood, that action and what rests on it — (46) then, existence being figurative, the la-affixes and the rest are to be prescribed there; but because of conflict with birth, the primary existence is not found.

The solution, and it is grammatical through and through. (45): upacarya tu kartaram — having *figuratively imposed an agent*: the unborn thing is *made* an agent by upacara, not found to be one — abhidhana-pravrttaye, *for the sake of the operation of expression*: the imposition is done so that something can be *said*. And likewise the action and its substrate, imposed karma-bhavena, by way of objecthood. (46): atha upacara-satta evam vidheyah tatra ladayah — existence being *figurative*, the *la-affixes* (Panini's tense-and-mood affixes: lat, lit, lut — the verbal endings) *are to be prescribed there*: the grammar's whole verbal apparatus applies to a figuratively-imposed agent. And the honest admission: janmana tu virodhitvat mukhya satta na vidyate — because of *conflict with birth*, the *primary* existence is *not found*. The sat/asat dilemma (3.3.43) is unanswerable for real existence and does not arise for figurative: 'it is born' predicates aupacariki satta of what has no mukhya satta, and the grammar runs on the figure. Language can say what metaphysics cannot think.

3.3.47 unformalized

आत्मानमात्मना बिभ्रदस्तीति व्यपदिश्यते ।
अन्तर्भावाच्च तेनासौ कर्मणा न सकर्मकः ॥ ४७ ॥

ātmānamātmanā bibhradastīti vyapadiśyate |
antarbhāvācca tenāsau karmaṇā na sakarmakaḥ || 47 ||

Bearing itself by itself, it is designated as 'it exists'; and because of that inclusion, it is not transitive by that object.

The verb 'to be' analysed, and the analysis is exquisite. Atmanam atmana bibhrad asti iti vyapadisyate: *bearing itself by itself*, it is designated as *'it exists'* — the existence-verb's agent and its object are the same thing: what exists bears itself, is its own burden. And the grammatical consequence: antarbhavat ca tena asau karmana na sakarmakah — because of that *inclusion*, it is *not transitive* by that object: the object is *inside* the verb, absorbed, so 'asti' takes no accusative. The verse explains a fact of Sanskrit grammar (the verb 'as' is intransitive) by a metaphysical structure (existence is self-bearing), and the explanation is exactly what 3.3.45-46 needed: if existing is self-bearing, then a thing must be there to bear itself, and the unborn cannot — which is why birth conflicts with primary existence (3.3.46) and requires the figure. Antarbhava, inclusion, is also 3.3.26's principle in another key: the expressing is not among the expressed, and the self-bearing is not among what is borne.

3.3.48 unformalized

प्राक् च सत्ताभिसंबन्धान्मुख्या सत्ता कथं भवेत् ।
असंश्च नास्तेः कर्ता स्यादुपचारस्तु पूर्ववत् ॥ ४८ ॥

prāk ca sattābhisaṃbandhānmukhyā sattā kathaṃ bhavet |
asaṃśca nāsteḥ kartā syādupacārastu pūrvavat || 48 ||

And prior to connection with existence, how could primary existence be? And a non-existent thing would be the agent of 'is not' — but the figure is as before.

The dilemma extended to non-existence, symmetrically. Prak ca satta-abhisambandhat mukhya satta katham bhavet: *prior to* connection with *existence*, how could *primary existence* be? — the thing must exist to be connected with existence, and connecting with existence is what existing is: the circle is unbreakable, and 3.3.43's dilemma reappears as a regress. Then the mirror-case: asan ca nasteh karta syat — a *non-existent* thing would be the *agent* of *'is not'*: 'the hare's horn does not exist' makes the horn the subject of a verb, so the non-existent is doing something (namely, not-existing), which is absurd on any literal reading. Upacaras tu purvavat: *but the figure is as before* — 3.3.45-46's solution covers this case too. The non-existent is figuratively imposed as agent so that the negation can be stated (3.3.42's doctrine). Both existence and non-existence, when predicated, are predicated figuratively — and the grammar, which cheerfully conjugates both, was never doing metaphysics.

3.3.49-51 unformalized

तस्माद्भिन्नेषु धर्मेषु विरोधिष्वविरोधिनीम् ।
विरोधिख्यापनायैव शब्दैस्तैरुपाश्रिताम् ॥ ४९ ॥
अभिन्नकालामर्थेषु भिन्नकालेष्ववस्थिताम् ।
प्रवृत्तिहेतुं सर्वेषां शब्दानामौपचारिकीम् ॥ ५० ॥
एतां सत्तां पदार्थो हि न कश्चिदतिवर्तते ।
सा च सम्प्रतिसत्तायाः पृथग्भाष्ये निदर्शिता ॥ ५१ ॥

tasmādbhinneṣu dharmeṣu virodhiṣvavirodhinīm |
virodhikhyāpanāyaiva śabdaistairupāśritām || 49 ||
abhinnakālāmartheṣu bhinnakāleṣvavasthitām |
pravṛttihetuṃ sarveṣāṃ śabdānāmaupacārikīm || 50 ||
etāṃ sattāṃ padārtho hi na kaścidativartate |
sā ca sampratisattāyāḥ pṛthagbhāṣye nidarśitā || 51 ||

(49) Therefore, among differing and conflicting properties, that non-conflicting one, resorted to by those words for the very purpose of making the conflicting known; (50) whose time is undivided, though standing among objects that are in divided times; the cause of the operation of all words, and figurative — (51) this Existence no word-meaning whatever transgresses; and it has been separately exhibited in the Bhasya, apart from present existence.

The samuddesa's culminating period, three verses to a single sentence, and its last line is a citation. The subject is aupacariki satta and it is characterized by four things. (49): among properties that are bhinnesu virodhisu — *differing and conflicting* — it is avirodhinim, *non-conflicting*: figurative existence quarrels with nothing, since it is what lets contradictories be said at all (3.3.41's crystal taking conflicting colours); and it is resorted to virodhi-khyapanaya eva — *for the very purpose of making the conflicting known*: we grant the hare's horn existence precisely in order to deny it (3.3.42). (50): abhinna-kalam arthesu bhinna-kalesu avasthitam — *its time is undivided* though it stands among objects *in divided times*: it is what lets us speak of the past and the future in one breath, being itself timeless. Pravrtti-hetum sarvesam sabdanam aupacarikim: the *cause of the operation of all words*, and *figurative*. (51) delivers the main clause: etam sattam padartho hi na kascid ativartate — *this* Existence *no word-meaning whatever transgresses*. And then, remarkably: sa ca samprati-sattayah prthag bhasye nidarsita — and it *has been separately exhibited in the Bhasya*, apart from *present* existence. Patanjali distinguished them; Bhartrhari is drawing out what the Mahabhasya already had. The samuddesa that began by finding relation unnameable ends by naming what all words rest on — and it is not a relation but a figure.
contested: the Bhasya-reference of 51 is to Patanjali's discussions distinguishing satta from samprati-satta (existence as such from present existence); the precise passage is disputed among commentators and we leave it unidentified

3.3.52 unformalized

प्रदेशस्यैकदेशं वा परतो वा निरूपणम् ।
विपर्ययमभावं वा व्यवहारोऽनुवर्तते ॥ ५२ ॥

pradeśasyaikadeśaṃ vā parato vā nirūpaṇam |
viparyayamabhāvaṃ vā vyavahāro'nuvartate || 52 ||

Practice follows along upon the determining of a location's single portion, or upon what is beyond it — or upon inversion, or upon absence.

The range of what practice can rest on, and its breadth is the point. Vyavaharo 'nuvartate: practice *follows along* — upon pradesasya ekadesam, the *single portion* of a location (a part, taken for the whole); or paratah, upon *what is beyond it* (something else entirely, standing in for it); or viparyayam, upon *inversion* (the thing taken as its opposite); or abhavam, upon *absence* (nothing there at all). Four bases, and only the first is even partly the thing. So transaction proceeds indifferently on partial grasps, substitutes, inversions and voids — which is to say that vyavahara does not require its objects to be as it takes them (2.296's loka-prasiddhi; 3.1.95's practice not constructed from what stands at the end of analysis). The verse opens the samuddesa's last movement by establishing that the relation between practice and reality is loose enough that no metaphysical result will disturb the market.

3.3.53 unformalized

यथेन्द्रियस्य वैगुण्यात् सत्ताध्यारोपवानिव ।
जायते प्रत्ययोऽर्थेभ्यस्तथैवोद्देशजा मतिः ॥ ५३ ॥

yathendriyasya vaiguṇyāt sattādhyāropavāniva |
jāyate pratyayo'rthebhyastathaivoddeśajā matiḥ || 53 ||

As, from a defect of the sense-faculty, a cognition arises from objects as though it had existence superimposed on it — just so is the cognition born of designation.

The superimposition-doctrine (3.1.6's adhyaropa) applied to existence itself. Yatha indriyasya vaigunyat: as, from a *defect of the sense-faculty* — the jaundiced eye, the fevered tongue (2.105's variation, receiver-side) — sattadhyaropavan iva jayate pratyayah arthebhyah: a cognition arises from objects *as though it had existence superimposed*: the diseased eye's yellow presents as *being there*, as a property of the conch. Tatha eva uddesa-ja matih: *just so* is the cognition *born of designation*. To designate is to superimpose existence — the mere act of mentioning confers being (3.3.39's aupacariki satta, exhibiting the own-form of everything in all its states). And the analogy's edge is that the sense-defect is a *defect*: designation confers existence the way a diseased eye confers yellow. Not falsely, exactly — the yellow is really seen, the horn is really mentioned — but not from the object's side.

3.3.54 unformalized

आकृत्स्नविषयाभासं शब्दः प्रत्ययमाश्रितः ।
अर्थमाहान्यरूपेण स्वरूपेणानिरूपितम् ॥ ५४ ॥

ākṛtsnaviṣayābhāsaṃ śabdaḥ pratyayamāśritaḥ |
arthamāhānyarūpeṇa svarūpeṇānirūpitam || 54 ||

The word, resting on a cognition whose appearing does not encompass the whole object, states the object by way of another form — its own form being undetermined.

What a word actually does, stated with three careful qualifications. Sabdah pratyayam asritah: the *word* rests on a *cognition* — not on the object; the route runs through the mind (2.132's buddhi-visaya). Akrtsna-visaya-abhasam: whose *appearing does not encompass the whole* object — the cognition it rests on is partial, never the thing entire (2.161's durlabham sarva-avayava-darsanam: seeing all the parts is beyond anyone). Artham aha anya-rupena: it *states the object by way of another form* — through an adjunct that is not the object's own (3.2.2's asatya-upadhi). Sva-rupena anirupitam: its *own form* being *undetermined* — the object as it is in itself is never fixed by the word. Four clauses, and each subtracts something: the word reaches a partial cognition, of another form, leaving the thing's own form untouched. This is the samuddesa's most exact statement of how much distance lies between a word and its object, and it explains why the relation could not be found (3.3.4): there is no place along that route where two things are joined.

3.3.55 unformalized

रूपणव्यपदेशाभ्यां लौकिके वर्त्मनि स्थितौ ।
ज्ञानं प्रत्यमिलापं च सदृशौ बालपिण्डितौ ॥ ५५ ॥

rūpaṇavyapadeśābhyāṃ laukike vartmani sthitau |
jñānaṃ pratyamilāpaṃ ca sadṛśau bālapiṇḍitau || 55 ||

In respect of determining and designating, both standing on the worldly path — the child and the learned man are alike, as regards cognition and expression.

A great leveling, and it is delivered without irony. Rupana-vyapadesabhyam laukike vartmani sthitau: in respect of *determining* and *designating*, both standing on the *worldly path* — jnanam praty abhilapam ca sadrsau bala-panditau: as regards *cognition* and *expression*, the *child* and the *learned man* are *alike*. The pandit's cognition is as partial as the infant's (3.3.54), his designations as figurative (3.3.53), his objects as untouched in their own form. Learning buys precision within vyavahara and no purchase outside it — the scholar and the child stand on the same road, differing in how far along. This is 2.485's counsel from the other side (knowledge graces those who wait upon their elders — but what it graces them with is not an exit), and 3.1.95's finding (practice is not constructed from what stands at the end). The verse is the samuddesa's warning against mistaking erudition for access, and its placement — just before the movement on being and non-being — is not accidental.

3.3.56 unformalized

सर्वार्थरूपता शुद्धिर्ज्ञानस्य निरुपाश्रया ।
ततोऽप्यस्य परां शुद्धिमेके प्राहुररूपिकाम् ॥ ५६ ॥

sarvārtharūpatā śuddhirjñānasya nirupāśrayā |
tato'pyasya parāṃ śuddhimeke prāhurarūpikām || 56 ||

The purity of cognition is its having all objects for its form, without any support; some declare a purity higher even than that of it — one that is formless.

Two grades of cognitive purity, and the second is the limit. Sarvartha-rupata suddhih jnanasya nirupasraya: the *purity* of cognition is its having *all objects for its form*, *without any support* — a cognition that is not colored by any particular object because it holds them all (the crystal of 3.3.40 with every flower at once; 2.250's sarvarthya at the cognitive level). That is one purity: omniform, unsupported. Tato 'pi asya param suddhim eke prahuh arupikam: *some* declare a purity *higher even than that* — one that is *formless*: not all-formed but no-formed, awareness with no object-shape at all (3.1.106's cognition whose own form is never ascertained apart from objects; 2.133's samvin-matram, mere awareness). The pair marks the ascent's last two rungs, and the verse reports rather than asserts the higher — eke prahuh, 'some declare'. Bhartrhari's own system needs the first (a plenitude carved by nimittas) and gestures at the second.

3.3.57 unformalized

अपप्लवो हि ज्ञानस्य बाह्याकारानुपातिता ।
कालुष्यमिव तत्तस्य संसर्गे व्यतिभेदजम् ॥ ५७ ॥

apaplavo hi jñānasya bāhyākārānupātitā |
kāluṣyamiva tattasya saṃsarge vyatibhedajam || 57 ||

For the disturbance of cognition is its following upon external configurations; that is, as it were, its turbidity, born of mutual interpenetration in the commingling.

The account of why the lower purity is impure. Upaplavo hi jnanasya bahya-akara-anupatita: the *disturbance* of cognition is its *following upon external configurations* — awareness taking the shape of what it knows (3.2.9's tad-atma iva: presenting as though it were the object while being utterly not it). Kalusyam iva tat tasya: that is, *as it were*, its *turbidity* — kalusya, muddiness, the clouding of clear water by what is stirred into it. Samsarge vyatibhedajam: *born of mutual interpenetration in the commingling* — vyatibheda, reciprocal cutting-into: knower and known each entering the other, neither left clean. The upaplava of 1.86 (speech's constant disturbance, krama-upasrsta) is here given its cognitive twin, and the diagnosis is the same: commingling is what produces the appearance, and the appearance is what we have (3.1.20's prapanca arising only among things commingled).

3.3.58 unformalized

यथा च ज्ञानमालेखादशुद्धौ व्यवतिष्ठते ।
तथोपाश्रयवानर्थः स्वरूपाद्विप्रकृष्यते ॥ ५८ ॥

yathā ca jñānamālekhādaśuddhau vyavatiṣṭhate |
tathopāśrayavānarthaḥ svarūpādviprakṛṣyate || 58 ||

And as cognition stands in impurity from the painting-on — so the object, having a support, is drawn away from its own form.

The symmetry completed, and both sides suffer alike. Yatha ca jnanam alekhad asuddhau vyavatisthate: as *cognition* stands in *impurity* from the *painting-on* — alekha, the smearing or inscribing: the object's form painted onto awareness (3.3.57's turbidity). Tatha upasrayavan arthah sva-rupad viprakrsyate: *so* the *object*, *having a support*, is *drawn away* from its *own form*: the thing, standing on its supports and adjuncts, is dragged from what it is (3.3.40's crystal, whose redness is not its own). So the commingling damages both relata: cognition is muddied by taking the object's shape, and the object is displaced by wearing its adjuncts. Neither knower nor known survives the encounter as itself — which is why no relation between them can be found (3.3.4), there being, strictly, no two things standing there to be related.

3.3.59 unformalized

एवमर्थस्य शब्दस्य ज्ञानस्य च विपर्यये ।
भावाभाववभेदेन व्यवहारानुपातिनौ ॥ ५९ ॥

evamarthasya śabdasya jñānasya ca viparyaye |
bhāvābhāvavabhedena vyavahārānupātinau || 59 ||

Thus, in the inversion of object, word and cognition, the two — by way of the difference of being and non-being — follow along upon practice.

The three relata of 3.3.1 gathered, and their fate is one. Evam arthasya sabdasya jnanasya ca viparyaye: thus, in the *inversion* of *object*, *word*, and *cognition* — all three displaced from their own forms (3.3.57-58) — bhava-abhava-vibhedena vyavahara-anupatinau: the two — being and non-being — *follow along upon practice*, by way of their difference. Mark the direction: bhava and abhava do not ground practice; they *follow* it (anupatin, the same verb 3.3.52 used for practice following its four bases). Existence and non-existence are not the fixed poles against which our transactions are measured; they are distinctions that arise within transacting. The verse opens the movement that 3.3.60-71 will complete: an examination of being and non-being that treats them as vyavahara-relative from the start.

3.3.60 unformalized

यथा भावमुपाश्रित्य तदभावोऽनुगम्यते ।
तथाभावमुपाश्रित्य तद्भावोऽप्यनुगम्यते ॥ ६० ॥

yathā bhāvamupāśritya tadabhāvo'nugamyate |
tathābhāvamupāśritya tadbhāvo'pyanugamyate || 60 ||

As, resting upon being, the absence of it is followed — so, resting upon absence, the being of it too is followed.

The mutual dependence of the two, stated with perfect symmetry. Yatha bhavam upasritya tad-abhavo 'nugamyate: as, *resting upon being*, the *absence* of it is followed — one grasps an absence only against a presence: the absent pot is understood by way of the pot (3.3.42's figurative existence granted so the negation can operate). And the converse, which is the verse's contribution: tatha abhavam upasritya tad-bhavo 'pi anugamyate — so, *resting upon absence*, the *being* of it *too* is followed: presence is grasped against absence — the pot is *here* only against its being able to be not-here. Neither is prior; each is understood through the other. So bhava and abhava are a pair, and pairs are relational, and relations are what this samuddesa has spent seventy verses showing to be unfindable and unnameable. The consequence is drawn immediately.

3.3.61 unformalized

नाभावो जायते भावो नैति भावोऽनुपाख्यताम् ।
एकस्मादात्मनोऽनन्यौ भावाभावौ विकल्पितौ ॥ ६१ ॥

nābhāvo jāyate bhāvo naiti bhāvo'nupākhyatām |
ekasmādātmano'nanyau bhāvābhāvau vikalpitau || 61 ||

Non-being is not born as being; being does not come to indescribability. The two, being and non-being, are constructions, not other than one self.

The dilemma of origination (3.3.43) resolved by dissolving its terms. Na abhavo jayate bhavo: *non-being* is *not born as* being — nothing crosses from nothing to something; na eti bhavo 'nupakhyatam — *being* does *not come to* indescribability: nothing crosses back. There is no traffic between the two, which is exactly why 3.3.43's dilemma had no answer: it presupposed a crossing. And the resolution: ekasmad atmano ananyau bhava-abhavau vikalpitau — the two, being and non-being, are *constructions*, *not other than one self*. Vikalpita: constructed (3.2.8's tattvam eva avikalpitam taking on the form of construction). They are not two conditions between which things move; they are two carvings of one Being (3.1.33's satta differentiated by its relata; 3.1.38's Being as its own non-existence). Nothing is born because there is nowhere to be born from — and everything is said to be born, figuratively (3.3.45-46).

3.3.62 unformalized

अभावस्यानुपाख्यत्वात् कारणं न प्रसाधकम् ।
सोपाख्यस्य तु भावस्य कारणं किं करिष्यति ॥ ६२ ॥

abhāvasyānupākhyatvāt kāraṇaṃ na prasādhakam |
sopākhyasya tu bhāvasya kāraṇaṃ kiṃ kariṣyati || 62 ||

Since non-being is indescribable, a cause is not what establishes it; and of being, which is describable, what will a cause do?

Causation dissolved on both horns, and briskly. Abhavasya anupakhyatvat karanam na prasadhakam: since *non-being* is *indescribable*, a *cause* is *not what establishes* it — one cannot produce what cannot even be characterized; there is nothing there for a cause to make. Sopakhyasya tu bhavasya karanam kim karisyati: and of *being*, which *is* describable — that is, which is already there to be described — *what will a cause do*? What exists needs no producing. So causes have no work: not on non-being (nothing to work on), not on being (nothing left to do). This is 3.3.43's sat/asat dilemma turned from origination to causation generally, and its conclusion is the same: the categories will not sustain the operation we insist on performing with them. And the resolution is the same too — 3.3.45-46's figure: agents, actions and causes are upacara, imposed so that something can be said.

3.3.63 unformalized

तस्मात्सर्वमभावो वा भावो वा सर्वमिष्यते ।
न त्ववस्थान्तरं किंचिदेकस्मात् सत्यतः स्थितम् ॥ ६३ ॥

tasmātsarvamabhāvo vā bhāvo vā sarvamiṣyate |
na tvavasthāntaraṃ kiṃcidekasmāt satyataḥ sthitam || 63 ||

Therefore everything is held to be either non-being, or else everything is being; but no other state whatever stands, from the one reality.

The conclusion, and its form is the disjunction that will not resolve. Tasmat sarvam abhavo va bhavo va sarvam isyate: *therefore* *everything* is held to be *non-being*, or *everything* is *being*. Not: some things are and some are not. Either the whole is one or the whole is the other, and no fact chooses — because the two are one Being's carvings (3.3.61) and the carving is ours. Na tu avasthantaram kimcid ekasmat satyatah sthitam: but *no other state whatever* stands, *from the one reality* — the one real admits no third condition, and no intermediate. So we may say 'all is being' (3.1.33's satta, in which all words stand established) or 'all is non-being' (the total negation), and these are the same claim differently carved. This is 3.1.13's finding again — on the jati-option everything is a universal, on the dravya-option everything is a substance, and both are unrestricted, hence neither is a discovery — now at the highest possible generality.

3.3.64 unformalized

तस्मान्नाभावमिच्छन्ति ये लोके भाववादिनः ।
अभाववादिनो वापि न भावं तत्त्वलक्षणम् ॥ ६४ ॥

tasmānnābhāvamicchanti ye loke bhāvavādinaḥ |
abhāvavādino vāpi na bhāvaṃ tattvalakṣaṇam || 64 ||

Therefore those in the world who are proponents of being do not admit non-being; nor do the proponents of non-being admit being as the mark of reality.

The two schools placed, and the placing is deflationary. Tasmat na abhavam icchanti ye loke bhava-vadinah: therefore those who are *proponents of being* do not admit *non-being* — the realist, having chosen the first disjunct of 3.3.63, cannot find room for real absences (and Vaisesika's struggles with abhava as a category are the tradition's evidence). Abhava-vadinah va api na bhavam tattva-laksanam: nor do the *proponents of non-being* admit *being* as the *mark of reality* — the sunyavadin, having chosen the second, cannot admit a real being. Each school is consistent, each is total, and neither can accommodate the other's datum — which is what 3.3.63 predicted: the disjuncts are exhaustive and exclusive and undecidable, being two carvings of one thing. The verse does not adjudicate between the great schools. It explains why they cannot adjudicate between themselves.

3.3.65 unformalized

अद्वये चैव सर्वस्मिन् स्वभावादेकलक्षणे ।
परिकल्पेषु मर्यादा विचित्रैवोपलभ्यते ॥ ६५ ॥

advaye caiva sarvasmin svabhāvādekalakṣaṇe |
parikalpeṣu maryādā vicitraivopalabhyate || 65 ||

And in everything, which is non-dual and of a single character by its own nature, a boundary of quite various kinds is found among the constructions.

The one and the many, stated at the movement's height. Advaye ca eva sarvasmin svabhavad eka-laksane: in *everything*, which is *non-dual* and of a *single character* by its *own nature* — advaya: the word is the Vedantins' and the Buddhists' alike, and Bhartrhari uses it of what 3.1.33 called satta and 3.2.11 called sabda-tattva. Parikalpesu maryada vicitra eva upalabhyate: among the *constructions*, a *boundary* of *quite various* kinds is *found*. Maryada — boundary, limit, the line that divides: and it is found *among the constructions*, not in what they construct upon. So the world's variegation is a variegation of parikalpa, and the one it is laid on has a single character. The verse is the samuddesa's most compact statement of the two-truths architecture that 3.2.12-13's paired tetralemmas set out: non-dual in its own nature, endlessly bounded in our constructions, and the boundaries are real *as constructions* (vicitra eva upalabhyate — they *are found*, and variously).

3.3.66 unformalized

चतस्रो हि यथावस्था निरुपाख्ये प्रकल्पिताः ।
एवं द्वैविध्यमप्येतद् भावाभावव्यपाश्रयम् ॥ ६६ ॥

catasro hi yathāvasthā nirupākhye prakalpitāḥ |
evaṃ dvaividhyamapyetad bhāvābhāvavyapāśrayam || 66 ||

For just as four states are constructed with respect to the indescribable — so too is this two-foldness, which rests on being and non-being.

The tetralemma named as a construction, and named as one construction among possible others. Catasro hi yatha avastha nirupakhye prakalpitah: for just as *four states* are *constructed* with respect to the *indescribable* — the catuskoti's four corners (is, is not, both, neither), laid on what admits no characterization (3.2.12's eight negations). Evam dvaividhyam api etad bhava-abhava-vyapasrayam: *so too* is this *two-foldness*, resting on *being and non-being*. Both the fourfold and the twofold are prakalpita — constructed. So Bhartrhari is not offering the tetralemma as the truth about the indescribable; he is classing it with the dichotomy as one more grid laid on what takes no grids. The verse is remarkable for its detachment: it stands outside the four-cornered method and describes it as a construction, which is a place very few users of that method have managed to stand.

3.3.67-71 unformalized

अविरोधी विरोधी वा सन्नसन् वापि युक्तितः ।
क्रमवानक्रमो वापि नाभाव उपपद्यते ॥ ६७ ॥
अविरोधी विरोधी वा सन्नसन्नपि तत्त्वतः ।
क्रमवानक्रमो वापि तेन भावो न विद्यते ॥ ६८ ॥
अभावे त्रिषु कालेषु न भेदस्यास्ति सम्भवः ।
तस्मिन्नसति भावेऽपि त्रैकाल्यं नावतिष्ठते ॥ ६९ ॥
आत्मतत्त्वपरित्यागः परतो नोपपद्यते ।
आत्मतत्त्वन्तु परतः स्वतो वा नोपकल्पते ॥ ७० ॥
तत्त्वे विरोधे नानात्व उपकारो न कश्चन ।
तत्त्वान्यत्वपरित्यागे व्यवहारो निवर्तते ॥ ७१ ॥

avirodhī virodhī vā sannasan vāpi yuktitaḥ |
kramavānakramo vāpi nābhāva upapadyate || 67 ||
avirodhī virodhī vā sannasannapi tattvataḥ |
kramavānakramo vāpi tena bhāvo na vidyate || 68 ||
abhāve triṣu kāleṣu na bhedasyāsti sambhavaḥ |
tasminnasati bhāve'pi traikālyaṃ nāvatiṣṭhate || 69 ||
ātmatattvaparityāgaḥ parato nopapadyate |
ātmatattvantu parataḥ svato vā nopakalpate || 70 ||
tattve virodhe nānātva upakāro na kaścana |
tattvānyatvaparityāge vyavahāro nivartate || 71 ||

(67) Non-conflicting or conflicting, existent or non-existent, sequential or non-sequential — by reasoning, non-being is not established. (68) Non-conflicting or conflicting, existent or non-existent in reality, sequential or non-sequential — by that same reasoning, being is not found. (69) In non-being there is no possibility of difference in the three times; and that being absent, the three-timedness of being too does not stand. (70) The abandonment of the self-reality does not hold from another; and the self-reality does not come about from another, nor from itself. (71) When reality, conflict, and manifoldness are the case, there is no assistance whatever; and when reality and otherness are both abandoned, practice withdraws.

The samuddesa's philosophical summit: a five-verse period applying one argument-schema symmetrically to both members of the pair. (67) takes *non-being* through six alternatives — avirodhi virodhi va (non-conflicting or conflicting), san asan va (existent or non-existent), kramavan akramo va (sequential or non-sequential) — and concludes: na abhava upapadyate, *non-being is not established*. (68) takes *being* through the identical six and concludes: tena bhavo na vidyate, *by that same reasoning*, *being is not found*. The symmetry is the argument: whatever refutes one refutes the other, because they are one thing's carvings (3.3.61). (69) then removes time from both: abhave trisu kalesu na bhedasya asti sambhavah — in *non-being* there is no possibility of *difference in the three times* (a nothing has no past and future); tasmin asati bhave 'pi traikalyam na avatisthate — and *that* being absent, the *three-timedness of being* too does *not stand*: being's temporality was constituted against non-being's (3.3.60's mutual dependence), and falls with it. (70) closes the escape-routes for self-reality: atma-tattva-parityagah paratah na upapadyate — the *abandonment* of self-reality does not hold *from another*; atma-tattvam tu paratah svato va na upakalpate — and self-reality does not come about *from another*, *nor from itself*. Nothing loses its nature by another's doing, and nothing acquires one from itself or another. And (71) the honest cost: tattve virodhe nanatva upakaro na kascana — when *reality*, *conflict*, and *manifoldness* are the case, there is *no assistance whatever* (nothing can help anything: the relation that would carry assistance has been shown unfindable); tattva-anyatva-parityage vyavaharo nivartate — and when *reality and otherness are both abandoned*, *practice withdraws*. That last line is the samuddesa's integrity. The analysis, pressed to its end, does not deliver a better metaphysics; it delivers the withdrawal of vyavahara — and vyavahara is where words live (2.297's sabdah loka-nibandhanah). The examination has reasoned its way to the place where reasoning stops transacting, and it says so.
contested: the six alternatives of 67-68 are our resolution of three pairs; some readers group them differently. More substantively, whether 71's conclusion is a reductio of the analysis (therefore do not analyse thus) or its honest terminus (therefore practice and reality do not meet) is the deepest question of the passage, and 3.3.72ff. will bear on it

3.3.72 unformalized

यत्र द्रष्टा च दृश्यं च दर्शनं वा विकल्पितम् ।
तस्यैवार्थस्य सत्यत्वं श्रितास्त्रय्यन्तवेदिनः ॥ ७२ ॥

yatra draṣṭā ca dṛśyaṃ ca darśanaṃ vā vikalpitam |
tasyaivārthasya satyatvaṃ śritāstrayyantavedinaḥ || 72 ||

Where seer, seen, and seeing alike are constructed — the knowers of the Vedanta hold that the reality belongs to that object alone.

The turn back from the abyss of 3.3.71, and it names its authority. Yatra drasta ca drsyam ca darsanam va vikalpitam: where *seer*, *seen*, and *seeing* alike are *constructed* — the tripuiti of 1.4 and 3.2.14, and all three of it are vikalpita, laid on. Tasya eva arthasya satyatvam sritah trayy-anta-vedinah: the knowers of the *trayy-anta* — the *end of the three*, which is the Vedanta — hold the *reality* to belong to *that object alone*: to that one, in which knower, known, and knowing are constructions. So what survives the tetralemmas (3.3.67-71) is not nothing but the one on which the triad is constructed — 3.2.11's sabda-tattva, 3.1.33's satta. And Bhartrhari does not claim this as his discovery: he cites the Vedanta-knowers, as 3.3.11 cited the earlier ones (purvebhya agamah) and 2.485 said knowledge does not grace those who have not waited upon their elders. The samuddesa's most vertiginous stretch ends by naming a lineage.
contested: trayy-anta-vedinah ('knowers of the end of the three') is standardly the Vedantins; whether Bhartrhari means a specific school or the upanisadic tradition broadly cannot be settled from the karika

3.3.73 unformalized

सामान्यं वा विशेषं वा यस्मादाहुर्विशेषवत् ।
शब्दास्तस्मादसत्येषु भेदेष्वेव व्यवस्थिताः ॥ ७३ ॥

sāmānyaṃ vā viśeṣaṃ vā yasmādāhurviśeṣavat |
śabdāstasmādasatyeṣu bhedeṣveva vyavasthitāḥ || 73 ||

Since words state either a general or a particular, as though it possessed particulars — therefore they stand established only among unreal differences.

The consequence of 3.3.72 for language, and it is the samuddesa's most economical statement of the semantic predicament. Samanyam va visesam va yasmad ahuh visesavat: since words state either a *general* or a *particular*, *as though it possessed particulars* — every word delivers its object under a determination, carved (3.1.12's particulars entering only in universal dress). Tasmat asatyesu bhedesu eva sabdah vyavasthitah: *therefore* words stand established *only among unreal differences*. Not: words sometimes err. Words *live* among asatya bhedas — the unreal differences of 3.3.65's parikalpa, 3.1.32's asatya vyaktayah — and have nowhere else to live, since the real admits no differences to stand among (3.3.65's advaya, of single character). This is not a defect of language but its element: speech is the medium of the constructed, and asking it to reach the unconstructed is asking a fish to walk.

3.3.74 unformalized

न ह्यभावस्य सद्भावे भावस्यात्मा प्रहीयते ।
न चाभावस्य नास्तित्वे भावस्यात्मा प्रसूयते ॥ ७४ ॥

na hyabhāvasya sadbhāve bhāvasyātmā prahīyate |
na cābhāvasya nāstitve bhāvasyātmā prasūyate || 74 ||

For when non-being exists, the self of being is not abandoned; nor, when non-being does not exist, is the self of being produced.

The independence of the two, against 3.3.60's apparent mutual dependence. Na hi abhavasya sad-bhave bhavasya atma prahiyate: for when *non-being exists* — granting absences their reality — the *self of being* is *not abandoned*: being does not lose anything by absences being real. Na ca abhavasya nastitve bhavasya atma prasuyate: nor, when non-being *does not exist*, is the self of being *produced*: being gains nothing by absences being unreal. So the two do not trade: neither's reality costs or buys the other's. The verse guards against a misreading of 3.3.60-61 (the two as constructions of one self, mutually understood): mutual *understanding* is not mutual *constitution*. Being's nature is untouched by whatever we settle about absence — which is why the schools of 3.3.64 can be so total and so stable: each ignores the other's category without incoherence, because the categories do not in fact depend on each other for their natures.

3.3.75 unformalized

न शाबलेयस्यास्तित्वं बाहुलेयस्य बाधकम् ।
न शाबलेयो नास्तीति बाहुलेयः प्रकल्पते ॥ ७५ ॥

na śābaleyasyāstitvaṃ bāhuleyasya bādhakam |
na śābaleyo nāstīti bāhuleyaḥ prakalpate || 75 ||

The existence of Sabaleya does not annul Bahuleya; nor is Bahuleya constructed by 'Sabaleya does not exist'.

The point of 3.3.74 in the cowshed. Sabaleya and Bahuleya are the tradition's two cows — the dappled one and the ample one, standing in for any two individuals. Na sabaleyasya astitvam bahuleyasya badhakam: the *existence* of the dappled cow does not *annul* the other — one thing's being there is not another's not-being-there; presence does not exclude by itself. Na sabaleyo na asti iti bahuleyah prakalpate: nor is Bahuleya *constructed* by 'Sabaleya does not exist' — denying one does not produce the other; absences do not manufacture presences. The example is chosen for its homeliness: nobody thinks that pointing at one cow abolishes another, or that saying one is missing conjures the second. And what it disarms is a real temptation — that vyavrtti, exclusion (3.1.14, 3.1.98's apoha), might be the whole story: if a thing were nothing but its exclusion of others, then existence and non-existence would trade in exactly the way this verse denies.

3.3.76-77 unformalized

अभावो यदि वस्तु स्यात्तत्रेयं स्याद्विचारणा ।
ततश्च तदभावेऽपि स्याद्विचार्यमिदं पुनः ॥ ७६ ॥
अवस्तुत्वादतीतं यद् व्यवहारस्य गोचरम् ।
तत्र वस्तुगतो भेदो न निर्वचनमर्हति ॥ ७७ ॥

abhāvo yadi vastu syāttatreyaṃ syādvicāraṇā |
tataśca tadabhāve'pi syādvicāryamidaṃ punaḥ || 76 ||
avastutvādatītaṃ yad vyavahārasya gocaram |
tatra vastugato bhedo na nirvacanamarhati || 77 ||

(76) If non-being were a thing, this examination would apply to it; and then, in the absence of that too, this would again be a matter for examination. (77) That which, from its not being a thing, has passed beyond the range of practice — there a difference belonging to things does not deserve a definition.

The regress that awaits anyone who reifies absence. (76): abhavo yadi vastu syat tatra iyam syad vicarana — *if* non-being *were a thing*, this *examination* would apply to it: all the questions asked of things (is it one or many? eternal or produced? 3.3.67's six alternatives) would have to be asked of absences. Tatah ca tad-abhave 'pi syad vicaryam idam punah: and *then*, in the *absence of that* too, this would *again* be a matter for examination — the absence of an absence would be a further thing, needing its own examination, and so without end. Reify absence and the regress is immediate. (77) draws the moral: avastutvat atitam yad vyavaharasya gocaram — that which, *from its not being a thing*, has *passed beyond* the *range of practice* — tatra vastu-gato bhedo na nirvacanam arhati: there a difference *belonging to things* does *not deserve a definition*. One may not apply thing-distinctions to non-things. The regress is stopped exactly as 3.3.28 stopped all regresses: by refusing to fold a category back onto what is not in its domain.

3.3.78 unformalized

अपदेऽर्थे पदन्यासः कारणस्य न विद्यते ।
अथ च प्रागसद्भावः कारणे सति दृश्यते ॥ ७८ ॥

apade'rthe padanyāsaḥ kāraṇasya na vidyate |
atha ca prāgasadbhāvaḥ kāraṇe sati dṛśyate || 78 ||

The setting-down of a foot by a cause is not found in an object that is no place for it; and yet a prior non-existence is seen when the cause exists.

A genuine puzzle about causation and prior absence, stated as a tension. Apade 'rthe pada-nyasah karanasya na vidyate: the *setting-down of a foot* by a *cause* is not found in an object that is *no place* for it — a cause needs somewhere to stand, something to work on; it cannot get a footing in a nothing (3.3.62's argument: a cause has no work on non-being). And yet: atha ca prag-asad-bhavah karane sati drsyate — and yet a *prior non-existence* *is seen* when the *cause exists*: before the pot is made, there is the pot's absence, and the potter is at work on it. So causation seems to require a foothold that prior-absence cannot provide, and prior-absence is nonetheless what every production starts from. The verse states the difficulty without softening it, and the verses following will not solve it so much as show that it cannot be posed — because 'the prior state of a non-thing' is not a describable condition (3.3.79).

3.3.79 unformalized

का तस्य प्रागवस्थेति वस्त्वाश्रितमिदं पुनः ।
प्राहवस्थेति न ह्येतद् द्वयमप्यस्त्यवस्तुनि ॥ ७९ ॥

kā tasya prāgavastheti vastvāśritamidaṃ punaḥ |
prāhavastheti na hyetad dvayamapyastyavastuni || 79 ||

'What is its prior state?' — this again rests on a thing; 'the prior state' — for neither of these two exists in a non-thing.

The question of 3.3.78 dissolved by examining its presuppositions. Ka tasya prag-avastha iti: 'what is its *prior state*?' — the question one wants to ask about the pot before it was made. Vastu-asritam idam punah: this *rests on a thing* — asking after something's prior state presupposes a something whose state it is. Prag-avastha iti na hi etad dvayam api asti avastuni: 'the prior state' — for *neither of these two* exists in a *non-thing*: neither the priority nor the state. A non-thing has no states, and it has no before. So 'the pot's prior non-existence' is not a condition anything was in; it is a phrase built from thing-vocabulary and applied where the vocabulary has no purchase (3.3.77's ruling: thing-distinctions do not deserve definitions among non-things). The puzzle of 3.3.78 required a describable prior condition, and there is none — which is not an answer to the puzzle but a demonstration that it was never a question.

3.3.80 unformalized

न चोर्ध्वमस्ति नास्तीति वचनायानिबन्धनम् ।
अलं स्यादपदस्थानमेतद्वाचः प्रचक्षते ॥ ८० ॥

na cordhvamasti nāstīti vacanāyānibandhanam |
alaṃ syādapadasthānametadvācaḥ pracakṣate || 80 ||

And afterward there is no ground for saying 'it exists' or 'it does not exist'; enough — they call this the footless station of speech.

The terminus, and its phrase is unforgettable. Na ca urdhvam asti nasti iti vacanaya anibandhanam: and *afterward* — past the point 3.3.79 reached — there is *no ground* for saying *'it exists'* or *'it does not exist'*: neither predicate has a foothold. Alam syat: *enough* — the word is a full stop, the debater's concession that the matter cannot be carried further. And then: apada-sthanam etad vacah pracaksate — they call this the *footless station of speech*: apada-sthana, the place where speech has no foot to set down (3.3.78's pada-nyasa, the setting-down of a foot, now denied to language itself). Speech, which walks by predicating, arrives at a place with no floor. This is the samuddesa's most beautiful formulation of the limit that 1.35's connoisseur, 2.144's ineffable flash, 3.1.95's indescribable own-nature, and 3.3.4's unnameable relation have all circled — and it names it not as a mystery but as a *station*: a place one can arrive at, and recognize, and stop.

3.3.81 unformalized

अत्यद्भुता त्वियं वृत्तिर्यदभागं यदक्रमं ।
भावानां प्रागभूतानामात्मतत्त्वं प्रकाशते ॥ ८१ ॥

atyadbhutā tviyaṃ vṛttiryadabhāgaṃ yadakramaṃ |
bhāvānāṃ prāgabhūtānāmātmatattvaṃ prakāśate || 81 ||

But this operation is utterly wonderful — that the self-reality of things not previously existent shines forth, partless and sequenceless.

The wonder, and its placement immediately after the footless station is the samuddesa's finest moment. Atyadbhuta tu iyam vrttih: this *operation* is *utterly wonderful* — adbhuta, the word 1.142 used of the supreme station of speech (etad adbhutam). What is wonderful: yad abhagam yad akramam bhavanam prag-abhutanam atma-tattvam prakasate — that the *self-reality* of things *not previously existent* *shines forth*, *partless* and *sequenceless*. The very things 3.3.78-80 showed could not be said to exist or not exist, whose prior state was undescribable, before which speech has no footing — *these shine forth*, whole and out of time. Prakasate: the manifestation-verb of the entire work (1.94's lamp, 2.415's undivided shining). So the analysis reaches a place where speech cannot stand, and at that place the thing *shows*. Bhartrhari does not explain this; he calls it wonderful. It is the honest response of a system that has argued its way to a limit and found something on the far side that it did not put there.

3.3.82 unformalized

विकल्पोत्थापितेनैव सर्वो भावेन लौकिकः ।
मुख्येनेव पदार्थेन व्यवहारो विधीयते ॥ ८२ ॥

vikalpotthāpitenaiva sarvo bhāvena laukikaḥ |
mukhyeneva padārthena vyavahāro vidhīyate || 82 ||

All worldly practice is carried on by means of a being raised up by construction alone — as though by a primary word-meaning.

The return to earth, and it is unembarrassed. Vikalpa-utthapitena eva sarvo bhavena laukikah vyavaharo vidhiyate: *all* worldly practice is *carried on* by means of a *being raised up by construction alone* — vikalpa-utthapita: constructed, propped up, stood on its feet by the mind. Mukhyena iva padarthena: *as though* by a *primary* word-meaning. Every transaction runs on constructed beings taken as though they were the real thing — and the iva marks the as-though without withdrawing the practice. This is 2.238's asatya vartman stated as a completed doctrine: having stood on the untrue path, one thereafter seeks the true — and meanwhile one buys grain, performs rites, and teaches grammar, all on beings that construction raised. The verse rescues everything the preceding twelve verses seemed to imperil. The footless station (3.3.80) is where analysis ends; it is not where anyone lives.

3.3.83 unformalized

भावशक्तिमतश्वैनां मन्यन्ते नित्यवादिनः ।
भावमेव क्रमं प्राहुः न भावादपरः क्रमः ॥ ८३ ॥

bhāvaśaktimataśvaināṃ manyante nityavādinaḥ |
bhāvameva kramaṃ prāhuḥ na bhāvādaparaḥ kramaḥ || 83 ||

And the proponents of eternality consider this to belong to what possesses the power of being; they call sequence being itself — there is no sequence apart from being.

Sequence identified with being, and the identification is 3.1.35's. Bhava-saktimatah ca enam manyante nitya-vadinah: the *proponents of eternality* consider *this* (sequence) to belong to what *possesses the power of being*. Bhavam eva kramam prahuh: they call *sequence* *being itself*; na bhavad aparah kramah: there is *no sequence apart from being*. So krama is not a container things move through nor a relation among them: it is being, exercising its power (3.1.36's kramena saktibhih svabhih: by its own powers, in sequence). This closes the account 3.1.35 opened — Being with sequence is action, Being with sequence withdrawn is substance — by denying that sequence was ever a second thing to be added or removed. What is withdrawn in substance is not an ingredient but an aspect.

3.3.84 unformalized

क्रमान्न यौगपद्यस्य कश्चिद्भेदोऽस्ति तत्त्वतः ।
यथैव भावान्नाभावः कश्चिदन्योऽवसीयते ॥ ८४ ॥

kramānna yaugapadyasya kaścidbhedo'sti tattvataḥ |
yathaiva bhāvānnābhāvaḥ kaścidanyo'vasīyate || 84 ||

In reality there is no difference whatever of simultaneity from sequence — just as no non-being whatever is determined as other than being.

The parallel that generalizes 3.3.83. Kramat na yaugapadyasya kascid bhedo 'sti tattvatah: *in reality* there is *no difference whatever* of *simultaneity* from *sequence* — the two modes of 2.462 (sequence or simultaneity, which the world does not transgress) are not two conditions of things but two takings. Yatha eva bhavat na abhavah kascid anyo 'vasiyate: *just as* no *non-being* whatever is determined as *other than* being (3.3.61's ekasmad atmano ananyau). The verse pairs the two great dichotomies — sequence/simultaneity and being/non-being — and dissolves both by the same move: each pair is one thing's carvings, and the carving is ours. And the pairing is apt, since 3.3.69 already showed that time-difference falls with the being/non-being distinction. What the two dichotomies have in common is that neither survives being asked which of its members the one really is.

3.3.85 unformalized

कालस्याप्यपरं कालं निर्दिशन्त्येव लौकिकाः ।
न च निर्देशमात्रेण व्यतिरेकोऽनुगम्यते ॥ ८५ ॥

kālasyāpyaparaṃ kālaṃ nirdiśantyeva laukikāḥ |
na ca nirdeśamātreṇa vyatireko'nugamyate || 85 ||

Worldly people do indeed designate another time even of time; and yet, by mere designation, a separateness is not established.

Designation's impotence, exhibited on the case that most tempts reification. Kalasya api aparam kalam nirdisanti eva laukikah: worldly people *do indeed* designate *another time even of time* — 'the time of the sacrifice', 'a long time ago', treating time as a thing that has its own times. Na ca nirdesa-matrena vyatireko 'nugamyate: and yet, by *mere designation*, a *separateness* is *not established*. That we can say it does not make it two. The verse is a general warning with a specific target: 3.3.39's aupacariki satta means that anything mentionable acquires an existence by being mentioned — and this verse blocks the inference from that existence to real distinctness. Designation confers being (3.3.53) and does not confer separateness. So the regress of times, and every regress generated by designating the designatum's conditions, is a regress of postings and not of things.

3.3.86 unformalized

आधारं कल्पयन् बुद्ध्या नाभावे व्यवतिष्ठते ।
अवस्तुष्वपि नोत्प्रेक्षा कस्यचित् प्रतिबध्यते ॥ ८६ ॥

ādhāraṃ kalpayan buddhyā nābhāve vyavatiṣṭhate |
avastuṣvapi notprekṣā kasyacit pratibadhyate || 86 ||

One who constructs a substratum by the intellect does not come to a halt in non-being; nor is anyone's imagining obstructed even among non-things.

The mind's freedom, stated as a fact about it. Adharam kalpayan buddhya na abhave vyavatisthate: one who *constructs a substratum* by the *intellect* does *not come to a halt* in *non-being* — the mind, asked to think of an absence, supplies a bearer for it and keeps going; it will not stop at nothing. Avastusu api na utpreksa kasyacit pratibadhyate: nor is anyone's *imagining* *obstructed* even among *non-things* — utpreksa, the imagining that 2.236 caught giving parts to the partless atom. So the mind is unstoppable in exactly the place where reality gives out: it constructs substrata for absences, imagines the unimaginable, and never reports an obstruction. This explains both why the footless station (3.3.80) is so hard to reach — the mind keeps laying down floors — and why aupacariki satta is available for everything (3.3.39-42): the imagining that cannot be obstructed is what confers it.

3.3.87 unformalized

तस्माच्छक्तिविभागेन नित्यः सदसदात्मकः ।
एकोऽर्थः शब्दवाच्यत्वे बहुरूपः प्रकाशते ॥ ८७ ॥

tasmācchaktivibhāgena nityaḥ sadasadātmakaḥ |
eko'rthaḥ śabdavācyatve bahurūpaḥ prakāśate || 87 ||

Therefore, by division of its capacities, the eternal one — whose self is both being and non-being — shines forth as multiform, in its being expressible by words.

The samuddesa's conclusion, and every word of it has been earned. Tasmat sakti-vibhagena: *therefore*, by *division of its capacities* (1.2's Brahman resting on differentiated powers; 3.1.22's sarva-sakty-atma-bhutatvam). Nityah sad-asad-atmakah: the *eternal* one, whose *self is both being and non-being* — not neither, as the tetralemmas of 3.3.67-68 might have suggested, but *both*, since the two are its carvings (3.3.61). Eko 'rthah: *one* object — the whole Padakanda's two candidates (3.1.2's jati or dravya) having collapsed into it. Sabda-vacyatve bahu-rupah prakasate: *in its being expressible by words*, it *shines forth as multiform*. The multiformity is located exactly: it is in the being-expressible, not in the thing. One reality, both-natured, appearing many *because* it is sayable — which is 3.1.6's superimposition (the word's own universal laid over the object's) reached by the road of relation instead of the road of universals. The samuddesa that began by asking what connects word to meaning ends by finding that the multiplicity of meanings *is* the connection.

3.3.88 unformalized

व्यवहारश्च लोकस्य पदार्थैः परिकल्पितैः ।
शास्त्रे पदार्थः कार्यार्थं लौकिकः प्रविभज्यते ॥ ८८ ॥

vyavahāraśca lokasya padārthaiḥ parikalpitaiḥ |
śāstre padārthaḥ kāryārthaṃ laukikaḥ pravibhajyate || 88 ||

And the world's practice runs by means of constructed word-meanings; in the science, the worldly word-meaning is analysed out for the sake of the operation.

The samuddesa's last verse, and it hands everything back. Vyavaharah ca lokasya padarthaih parikalpitaih: the *world's practice* runs by means of *constructed* word-meanings — the beings raised by vikalpa (3.3.82), taken as though primary, and sufficient for every transaction. Sastre padarthah karya-artham laukikah pravibhajyate: *in the science*, the *worldly* word-meaning is *analysed out* *for the sake of the operation*. Two levels, cleanly separated and both licensed. The world constructs and transacts; the science takes the world's constructions and divides them further, for its own operations' sake (2.343's vyavahara constructed by division, for the sake of the operation — the identical formula). Neither reaches the real, and neither needs to. This is where eighty-eight verses of the most severe metaphysics in the work deposit the reader: back in the market and the classroom, with the assurance that what is done there does not require what the analysis could not find. The Sambandha-samuddesa examined relation until it vanished, and then said: carry on.